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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCT ION 
Eva lua ting wha t voters are thinking and dec id ing how best to com­
mun ica te with them are crit ica l to a pol itica l cand ida te plann ing a 
campa ign strategy . Until  recently , a candida te rel ied on his  own in­
stincts and those of his advisers to eva luate wha t peopl e thought about 
a particular is sue or person and to determine the most eff ective way of 
presenting campa ign messages . 
Pol itica l  pol l ing ha s changed this . Pol itica l s c ient ist  Paul  
Van Riper sa id in  Handbook .£f. Practica l Pol itics " the r.a p idly increas­
ing util ization of soc ia l sc ience techniques to  hel p  deterrrtine 
pol itica l stra tegy is one of the most important of the rec ent trends 
in Amer ican pol itic s . " 1 
As  a resu lt ,  modern-day cand ida tes are relying on pol l ing more 
and moree� However , a s  the popular ity of pol itical  pol l ing has in­
crea s ed ,  s o  ha s its c ost . Sophisticated opin ion research is often too 
expens ive for cand ida tes w ith l imited budgets . 
One way a c ampa ign with a sma l l budget can get around this problem 
is to do its own pol l ing . But such  a venture can be r is ky because set­
ting up a pol l ing operat ion is difficult , and if not done pr operly , the 
pol l  w ill  not yield  a ccurate data . 
This the s is a ddresses this probl em d irectly .  It  establ ishes a 
methodol ogy for a statew ide ,  in-house po ll  that can produc e rel iabl e ,  
stra tegic data for a South Da kota pol itical campa ign .  
The methodol ogy f or this thes is wa s ta il ored to an  a c tual  cam­
pa ign , tha t of the 1 982 South Dakota Democra tic guberna toria l  
candida te , Micha el J .  O ' Connor , whose opponent wa s the incunilient 
Republ.ican governor , Wil l iam Jankl ow . 
The methodol ogy outl ined herein would be spec if ica l ly a ppl ica ble 
to any sta tewide campa ign in South Dakota and genera l ly a ppl ica bl e to 
campa igns in other rura l states . Furthermore ,  many a spec ts of the 
methodol ogy c ould  be a ppl ied to other k inds of surveys . 
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The devel opment of this methodology involved many separa te steps . 
The f ive chapters f ol l owing this one will  expla in the steps in deta il .  
Cha pter I I  esta bl ishes a perspect ive for the ca s e  s tudy by ex­
amining ba ckground informa t ion rela ted to pol itica l pol l ing . This 
information is  presented in four sections . 
The f irst s ection d iscusses the importa nce of pol itica l pol l ing 
and its increa s ingly w idespread  use by pol itic ians . 
The sec ond s ec tion traces the history of pol itica l pol l ing from 
its beginn ings in 1824 through the 1930s , when cand ida tes f irst used 
pol ls for stra teg ic purposes , up to the present . 
The third s ec tion examines candida tes ' use of  profess iona l pol l­
sters and pol l ing f irms . It a lso  studies the probl ems enc ountered by 
campa igns that hire  them . 
The fourth s ec tion studies the use of in-hous e pol l s .  
Cha pter I I I  d iscusses what kinds of useful stra teg ic informa t ion 
can be ga ined from pol l s  a s  well as the l imitat ions and misuses of 
The methodol ogy for this thesis wa s ta ilored to an  a c tual  cam­
pa ign , tha t of the 1 982 South Dakota Democra tic guberna tor ia l  
cand idate , Micha el J .  O ' Connor , whose opponent wa s the incunilient 
Republ ican governor , W il l iam Jankl ow .  
The methodol ogy outl ined herein would be spec if ica l ly a ppl icable 
to any s ta tewide campa ign in South Da kota and genera l ly a ppl ica ble  to 
campa igns in other rura l states . Furthermore , many a spec ts of the 
methodology c ould  be a ppl ied to other kinds of surveys . 
2 
The devel opment of this methodology involved ma ny s epara te steps . 
The f ive chapters  fol l owing this one wil l  expla in the steps in deta il .  
Cha pter I I  establ ishes a perspective for the ca s e  study by ex­
amin ing ba ckground inforn� tion rela ted to pol itica l pol l ing . This 
information is  presented in four sections . 
The f irst s ec tion d iscusses the importance of pol itica l pol l ing 
and its increa s ingly w idespread  use by pol itic ians . 
The sec ond s ec tion trac es the h istory of pol itica l pol l ing from 
its beg innings in 1824 through the 1 930s , when cand ida tes f irst used 
pol ls for s tra teg ic purpose s ,  up to the present.  
The third s ec tion examines candida tes ' use of profess iona l pol l­
sters a nd pol l ing f irms . It a lso  stud ies the probl ems enc ountered by 
campa igns that hire  them . 
The fourth s ec tion studies the use of in-hous e pol l s . 
Cha pter I I I  d iscusses what kinds of useful stra teg ic information 
can be ga ined from pol l s  a s  well  a s  the l imitat ions and misuses of 
pol l data . This chapter focuses on the theories of s evera l prominent 
pol itica l sc ient ists , po l lsters and polit ica l consultants . 
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Experts ' opinions regarding useful stra tegic informat ion that ca n 
be ga ined from pol ls can be broken down into s ix categor ies . These  
are :  (1 ) a s sess ing the most important issues in a campa ign , (2 ) a s­
sessing a cand ida te ' s  overa l l  support,  (3 ) obta in ing demogra phic infor­
mation about the e lectora te , (4 ) determin ing cand ida tes ' images , 
( 5 )  as sess ing opponents ' wea knesses , and ( 6 ) determin ing the ma ss  
media habits of the el ectorate .  
Experts ' opin ions regarding the limita tions o f  pol ling can a l so  
be  put into s ix ca tegories . These are : ( l ) limita tions of tr ia l-hea t 
da ta in a ss ess ing candidates '  strength , (2 ) miseva lua t ion of the impor­
ta nc e of is sues in a campa ign , (3 ) the extremely trans itory natur e of 
pol l  results , (4 ) the high potentia l  for errors in both the des ign and 
ana lys is of  a pol l ,  ( 5 )  ignor ing pol l  results when devel op ing campa ign 
strategy , and (6 ) overempha siz ing po ll  da ta a t  the expens e of other 
relevant factors  in campa ign decision-making . 
Cha pter IV explains how the methodology for this survey wa s 
devised. This pha s e  of the proj ect inc luded deciding on a ba s ic sur­
vey techn ique ; decid ing on a method for drawing the sample ;  stratifying 
and draw ing the sampl e; des igning and wr iting the questionna ire ;  tra in­
ing and supervis ing the interviewers; c od ing and ta bula ting the 
questionnair es ; and ana lyzing the da ta . 
The first of  these steps--dec iding whether the pol l  should be a 
fac e-to-fa c e ,  tel ephone , or ma il survey--is one of the most important 
questions to be answered regard ing a survey ' s methodol ogy. The tele­
phone method wa s chos en pr imar ily becaus e a ma il  survey would  have 
been too s l ow and c ou ld  not have provided suf fic iently accurate data , 
and a fa ce-to-fa ce  survey would have been too expens ive and too im­
pra ct ica l for volunteers to conduct. 
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Onc e the tel ephone method wa s selected , the next quest ion wa s 
whether to draw the sample from telephone d irector ies or by a techn ique 
c a l l ed "random d ig it d ia l ing" (RDD ) o A lthough random d ig it d ia l ing is 
genera lly the preferred method , it wa s dec ided that for this survey, 
tel ephone d irector ies would be a better bas is for drawing a sample .  
This was because  the sl ightly more representative sample  that would 
have resulted from u s ing RDD was not suf f ic ient just if icat ion for the 
added expense and t ime that method would have c ost. 
In stratifying the sample , steps were  taken to ensure tha t it 
would accura tely ref lect  a l l  geogra phic areas of South Dakota.  F irst 
the number of households with telephones w ithin each  South Da kota 
te lephone exchange wa s ca lculated . Then each exchange wa s placed into 
a stra tum from which a c erta in portion of the tota l sample was to be 
drawn. A ltogether 96 s trata were c onstructed. From these  strata , 696 
households were  se lected at random from telephone d irector ies. 
The quest ionna ire for the survey , des igned and wr itten in col­
laboration with the O ' Connor campa ign sta f f ,  c ons isted of 20 opinion­
related and demogra phic-related items. 
After campa ign volunteers had been recru ited and tra ined to be 
interviewers , the survey was ta ken . Ca l l ing started on Monday , August 
1 6 ,  1982, and c onc luded on Thursday the fol lowing week. 
Cod ing of the questionna ir e ' s open-ended questions bega n dur ing 
the interviewing per iod and conc luded shortly a fter the interview ing 
had f inished . 
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When the cod ing had been compl eted , the quest ionna ires were tabu­
la ted and the re sults ana lyzed in a report submitted to the campa ign . 
These results , a l ong w ith a br ief d i scus sion of the pol l ' s  c ost  and 
response  rate , are presented in Cha pter v. 
The s ixth and f ina l cha pter summarizes the thes is and evaluates 
the survey ' s  strengths and wea knesses . It a lso  presents suggestions 
for improving the methodol ogy , the thesis ' c onc lus ions and rec ommen­
dat ions for further study . 
The two-fold purpose  of this thes is can be summar ized·thusly :  
(1 ) t o  des ign a methodology f or a statew ide pol l  in South Dakota that 
can be used in devis ing a strategy for a po l it ica l campa ign , and 
(2 ) to demonstra te that  in-house po l l ing is a viable opt ion for a 
campa ign with l imited funds . 
Footnote 
1Paul  P. Va n Riper , Ha ndbook of Pract ica l Pol itics  (New York : 
Harper & Row , 1967 ) ,  P• 1 13. --
6 
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CHAPTER II  
PERSPECTIVE 
Before descr ibing in deta il  the pol l ing methodol ogy used f or this 
thes is , it is useful to first examine the historica l background of 
po l itica l pol l ing in genera l as wel l  as current thoughts on both pro­
fess iona l and in-house pol l ing . By so  doing , this methodol ogy can be 
put into its proper pers pect ive . 
This cha pter esta bl ishes a c ontemporary framework f or this thes is 
by show ing the importance and w ides pread use of pol l ing in modern 
po l itica l campa igns . It a l so  presents a br ief history of pol itic a l  
pol l ing showing how i t  has grown t o  pr ominenc e ,  part icularly i n  the 
la st 50 years o 
The la st part of the cha pter d iscusses d if ferent types  of pol l ing 
f irms , s evera l of the currently most noted po ll sters  and the drawbacks 
of hiring profess iona l pol lster s .  Fina l ly ,  the different ways in-house  
pol ls can  be used is examined . 
Importance of Po l l ing 
Not l ong a g o ,  pol it ic ians st il l questioned whether pol l s  were 
rea l ly of much va lue . Now there is a lmost no dissent regard ing the 
importance  of pol l ing in c onducting a pol it ica l campa ign . 
Academic research in this area ha s been scarce o One study in 1977 
that attempted to isolate the fa ctors that determine the success  of 
c ongress iona l campa igns d id c onc lude that profes siona l pol l ing wa s one 
such fa ctor . 1 
Despite the lac k of research ava ilabl e ,  persons involved in de­
termin ing campa ign strateg ies enthus ia stica l ly endorse  po l ls . W idely 
respected pol l sters  Charl es w. Rol l ,  Jr . and A lbert H. Cantr il  wrote 
tha t " inta ginatively c onc eived and skil lful ly executed opin ion po l l s  
8 
can provide the cutting edge" in a campa ign . 2 They sa id the rea s on for 
this is  that " the candidate who usua l ly preva ils  is the one who most 
effectively responds to the c oncerns of the people ,  and there is no 
better way to l earn of these concerns than through opin ion research . "3 
Many experts share this view, inc lud ing pol it ica l c onsulta nt Hank 
Parkinson , who stated f latly that " no cand ida te can a fford to be w ith­
out publ ic opin ion surveys , " 4 and po l itica l consultant Joseph 
Na pol itan ,  who sa id he would  " no more try to run a campa ign w ithout 
adequate polls  than I would try to sa il the Atlant ic w ithout a 
c ompa s s  • " 5 
Because of the great c onf idenc e pol it ica l c onsu ltants and other s 
have in pol ls , po l l ing i s  pervas ive o Pol itica l sc ientist David Lee 
Rosenbloom wrote : " Pol itica l pol l ing ha s spread  to every l eve l of the 
pol itic a l  system w ith a sophistication tha t is d i ff icult  f or the out­
s ider to c ornprehend . " 6 
The extent to which pol l ing ha s bec ome a part of a lmost every 
a spect  of our na t iona l pol it ica l  proc ess ha s led Ro l l  and Ca ntr il to 
suggest that " if the press  and ma ss  med ia can be termed ' the Fourth 
Estate '  of government ,  then the pol l ing establ ishment is ea s ily a can­
d ida te to bec ome ' the Fifth Esta te. ' " 7 
Pol l ing ha s bec ome so preva lent that po ll s are even taken by can-
d ida tes who do not know how to read  the resu lts or use  the informa tion .  
Rosenbloom sa id : "A lmost every pol l ster and profess iona l mana ger in 
9 
the country ha s at l east  one story about a cand idate who bought a pol l , 
kept it prominently pla ced on his desk--or l ocked it away in a drawer 
he c ou ld point to--just to show he was running a ' modern ' campa ign . "8 
This does not mean that po l itic ians are not aware of  the short-
comings of pol ls .  They ar e .  But most would  agree with pol it ica l 
sc ient ist Larry J .  Sabato ' s  ana lys is : 
The a lternat ives to  good pol l ing are far more fa l l ible  and l ess  
satisfying . Crowd s ize and  warmth , newspaper ed itor ia l s  and  
letter s ,  ma il  to a n  officeholder or candidate  and  intu iti on un­
quest ionably have a much greater marg in for error than any 
proper ly conducted random-sample survey of rea s ona bl e  s ize . 
And none  of these other devices  can be near ly a s  informative a s  
a c ompr ehens ive po l l . 9 
History of  Pol it ica l Po ll ing 
Poll ing is now c ons idered essent ia l in pol itica l c ampa igns , but it 
has taken the pol l ing fra ternity a long t ime to a chieve this rec ogni-
t ion among pol it ic ians . Pol itica l po l l s  have been ta ken for over 1 50 
years , but it wa s not until a fter World War I I  tha t their us e became 
widespread .  
Pol it ica l fact-f inding through publ ic opin ion surveys began in 
1824 when the Harrisburg Pennsylvanian took a straw vote in  W i lmington , 
Delaware ,  on that year ' s  pres ident ia l rac e .  The vote , ta ken "w ithout 
d iscr imination of parties , "  showed Andrew Jackson the c l ear l eader w ith 
335 votes a s  opposed to 169 for John Qu incy Adams , 1 9  for Henry Clay , 
and 9 for Wi lliam Crawford . 10  
The f irst rec orded pol l for a state contest was ta ken in 
Mis s is s ippi in 1851 . In that year , an a s s istant ed itor f or the 
10 
Natchez Cour ier polled 17  cr itica l c ounties where he felt the outc ome 
wa s in doubt . His poll , ba sed on 800 interviews , c orrectly pred icted 
which cand ida te would rec e ive a ma j or ity in 15 out of the 17 c ount ies . 
The overa l l  state vote was within two points of his c a lcula t ions . 1 1  
The f irst politica l cand idate to use  a poll wa s Mrs . Alex Mi ller 
in her successful campa ign for secretary of state in Iowa in 1 932 .  She 
rec e ived help from her son-in-law who wanted to try out a sampl ing 
techn iqu e  he had developed as a Ph .D.  candidate a t  the Un ivers ity of 
Iowa . His poll found that Mrs . Miller had a good chance of w inn ing 
and foreshadowed the c oming Democratic sweep in Iowa . The young poll ­
ster , George H .  Gallup ,  la ter went on to f ound the Ga l lup Poll a nd 
bec ome one of the deans of the pol l ing fraternity in the United 
States . 12  
A fter L iterary Digest magaz ine ' s  disa strous 1936  poll which 
erroneously predicted that A l fred Landon would beat Frankl in Roosevelt , 
polling became more " sc ientif ic . "  The Digest poll ' s fundamenta l error 
wa s that it surveyed only automobile  owner s and telephone subscr ibers , 
thereby leaving out a large segment of the electorate . This deba c l e  
underscored the nec ess ity for polls t o  have representat ive santples . 13 
In 1 940 ,  Roosevelt  became the f irst pres ident to have a regular 
flow of polling information c oming into his offic e .  One issue about 
which Roosevelt  wa s particularly c onc erned wa s Amer ican s ent iment 
towards the war in Europe . H is pollster was a man who ,  like Gallup ,  
a l so became very pr ominent in  the polling profess ion , Ha d l ey Cantri1 . 14 
The f irst c and idate to � for a pr ivately conducted po l l  was 
Ja cob Javits when he wa s a cand ida te for Congress from New York ' s 21st 
1 1  
d istr ict in 1 946 .  Javits hired Elmo Roper t o  ta ke po l it ic a l  s ound ings 
for his carnpa ign which he won . Javi ts la ter served in the Un ited 
States Sena te . 15 
The 1 960s br ought a dramatic r ise  in the use of pol l s  by pol i­
t ic ians . In 1 960 , John Kennedy hired Lou Harris to ana lyze publ ic 
opin ion in important pr imary states dur ing his pres identia 1 campa ign . l6  
By 1962 , two-thirds of Un ited States Senate candida tes were us ing 
surveys , and in the 1 966 e lections , 85 percent of a l l  w inning Senate 
c ontender s ,  virtua l ly a l l  gubernator ia l cand idates , and a bout ha l f  of 
the victor ious Un ited States representatives had c orrmliss ioned pol l s . l 7  
I t  wa s estimated that i n  1 968 , 1 , 200 individua l po l l s  c osting 
around $6 mil l ion were pr ivately c orrm1is s ioned by cand ida tes for off ice  
at  a l l  l evel s . l8 The pol l ing budget for the Nixon campa ign a l one was 
$584 , 000 . 1 9  
Twelve years later in the pres identia 1 campa ign of  1 98 0 ,  Rona ld 
Reagan and Jirrm1y Carter spent a c ombined tota l of wel l  over $3 mil l ion 
on po l ls .20 
Today pol l ing rema ins widespread ,  if not un iversa l ,  a t higher 
po l itica l l evels ,2 1  and only a few po l itic ians rema in skept ica l .  Three 
who f it into this la tter category were 1980  pres identia l c ontenders 
Senator Edward Kennedy , Governor Jerry Brown and former Governor John 
Conna l ly .  It might b e  noted that whil e  their campa igns were f l ounder­
ing ,  the campa igns that po l l ed the most extens ively--thos e of Carter , 
Reagan and George Bush--were having much greater s ucces s . 22 
The message by now should  be c lear to wou ld-be of f ic eholders : 
po l l s  are a key wea pon in the campa ign arsena l .  
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Profess iona l Po l l sters and Poll ing Firms 
As  po l it ic ians have bec ome more aware of their need for po ll s ,  
the demand for po ll ing  ha s increa sed . And a s  the demand f or po l l ing 
ha s incr.ea sed ,  s o  ha s the number of profess iona l pol lsters  and pol l ing 
f irms ea ger to sel l the ir s ervic es to candida tes .  
There are est imated to be  over 200 po ll ing f irms in  the Un ited 
States today.  About 150 of these operate primar ily on the state and 
loca l levels and a bout 50 to 75 are regiona l or nat iona l .23 The f irms 
range in s ize from huge market ing research outf its to one-ma n postcard 
t. 24 opera 1.ons . 
Pol itica l c onsultant Robert Agranof f c la ss if ied thes e  pol l ing 
f irms in f ive ca tegor ies : 
1 .  Nationa l publ ic opin ion f irms , such a s  the Ga l lup  Organiza­
t ion ,  Dan iel Yanklovich,  and Lou is Harr is and A ss oc iates 
which publ is h  the results of the ir f ind ings . The ir ma j or 
c l ients are the news media . They genera lly have n o  pr ivate 
pol itica l c l ients . 
2 .  Na t iona l f irms having large numbers  of private po l it ica l 
c l ients , such a s  The Market Opinion Corp . , and John F .  
Kra ft , Inc . They genera l ly work for many c l ients and often 
work in a s  many a s  thirty-f ive to forty sta tes in a g iven 
el ection . 
3 .  Reg iona l f irms that spec ia l ize in a s ingle sta te or a few 
surrounding states , such a s  Centra l Surveys , Inc . of  
Shenandoah ,  Iowa , and Beldon Assoc iates of Da l la s ,  Texa s .  
These f irms genera l ly perform a w ide range o f  research 
s ervices for a sma l l number of candidates . 
4 .  Groups of s pec ia l ists formed to c onduct informat i on research 
for a s ingl e campa ign • • • •  
5 .  Loca l pol ls ter s ,  one-man operators , and postcard-pollta kers .25 
Although there are many pol l ing orga n iza tions , only a minor ity 
ta ke pol itica l campaigns .  The ma j or electora l contests  are dominated 
by only a sma l l  number w ithin this minor ity.26 
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The most prominent po l itica l po ll ing f irms are : 
Cambr idge Survey Re search (Pa tr ic k Caddel l ,  pres ident ) .  Ca dde l l  
became prominent while  serving a s  George McGovern ' s pres identia l cam-
pa ign pol lster in 1 972 a t  age 22 . A fterwards he founded his  own f irm . 
He obta ined even grea ter renown for his work for Jimmy Carter from 
1976 to l98o27 and ha s been perha ps the most inf luentia l of any pol iti-
ca l pol l ster .  
Wi l l iam E• Hamilton� Sta ff ,  Inc . Hamilton is a former med ia 
ana lyst for the Un ited Sta tes Informa tion Agency and a former in-
structor in soc ia l statistics o His f irm is na tiona l but does most of 
its business in s outhern and border states for modera te to  l ibera l 
Democrats .28 
Peter Q. Hart Research As soc iate s ,  Inc . Hart worked f or po llsters 
Lou Harr is and Ol iver Quayle as we l l  as f or the Democra t ic Nationa l 
Corrunittee .  He is  most noted for his work for Senator Edward Kennedy ' s 
1980 pres ident ia l campa ign .  His f irm is very l ibera l-or iented . 29 
Y.• Lance Tarra nce a nd Assoc ia tes . A former research d irector for 
the Republ ica n Na tiona l Committee , Tarranc e is a lso  a profes sor of 
pol itica l sc ience at Ric e Un ivers ity . He does work  f or moderate-to-
c ons ervative Republ icans and pol led for John Conna l ly ' s 1 980 pr es i­
dentia l campa ign .30 
Dec is ion Ma king Inf ormat ion (Richard Wirthin , pres ident ) .  Wirthin 
i� currently the most prominent c onserva tive pol l ster . He worked for 
Rona ld Rea gan ' s  pres identia 1 campa igns in 1976 and 1980 and is  particu­
larly c lose to the pres ident , regular ly c onduct ing pol ls for the 
administration .3 1 
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Market Opin ion Research (Robert Teeter , pres ident ) .  Teeter 
worked his way thr ough the ranks of  MJR to become its pres ident ; he is 
one of the few ma j or pol it ica l  po l l sters a s soc iated w ith a l ong-
establ ished marketing research f irm . He worked for the pres identia l 
campa igns of Richard N ixon (1972 ) ,  Gera ld Ford ( 1976 ) ,  and George Bush 
(1980 ) . 32 
The serv ices of pol l ing f irms are sought out and used extens ively 
by cand idates , but h ir ing one of these f irms does have drawba cks . 
One is that--with the exception of most of the f irms just l isted 
and a f ew others--publ ic opin ion f irms are ba s ica l ly marketing research 
f irms . Pol itica l c onsulta nt Wa lter DeVr ies po inted out the problems 
this can cause pol it ic ians : 
There is a d i fferenc e between testing style changes on a new 
Chrys l er or pref erenc es for cerea l and soa p ,  and do ing a 
thorough in-depth study on peopl e ' s po l it ica l attitudes . So  
often pol it ica l pol l ing is such a sma l l  part of a research 
f irm ' s bus iness that it is only an  avocation rather than a 
vocat ion . And there is a tendency , I think , to a s s ign the 
pol it ica l a cc ounts to the more mediocre ,  l ess  ta lented members 
of the f irm. A l s o ,  they don ' t make much money on pol it ica l 
poll ing . 33 
Another cr itic ism l eve led at pol itica l consulta nts in genera l is  
that of impersona l ity . Poll ster s ,  cr itics say , don ' t rea l ly care about 
the is sues or wha t peopl e are thinking . The only thing that c oncerns 
them is f ind ing something around which to bu ild a c ommun ica tion program 
d . th 34 an  campa1gn eme . 
The la ck of knowledge about po l l ing on the part of a ca nd idate 
and campa ign sta ff  can a l so be a s er ious probl em in hir ing a pol l ing 
f irm. For example ,  ignorance of pol l ing makes it very d i f f icult for 
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candidates and the ir sta ffs to  j udge and eva luate the servic es  of pol l­
sters who are c ompet ing for a j ob .35 Pol lsters are sometimes hired 
for reasons tha t have l ittl e  to do  w ith the qua l ity of research that 
wi l l  be del ivered . A po l l ing f irm ' s previous c l ients , f lattery , ins ide­
dopester ism and c ost c ons iderat ions are often the se l l ing po ints that 
carry the day .36. And pol l ing ignora nce makes a campa ign susc ept ibl e 
to pol lsters  who use del iter ious shortcutt ing methods or are outr ight 
char latans . 3 7 
But the most ser ious drawback is c ost . S imply put , pol l s  are 
expens ive.  
In 1 972 , pol itica l consultant Joseph Napol itan sa id tha t  a c on­
gress iona l distr ict pol l should  cost from $3 , 000 to $4 , 500 .38 Four 
years la ter , the avera ge c ongress iona l district pol l  wa s estima ted to 
c ost around $6 , ooo39  and c osts have continued to c l imb. More extens ive 
use  of the te l ephone-suxvey method rather than the more expens ive 
fac e-to-fa c e  in-household techn ique ha s helped keep c osts in check 
dur ing the la st severa l years . But many candida tes st i l l  are e ither 
unw il l ing or unable to  po l l  because of the great expens e involved . 40 
In-House  P ol l ing 
To get around s ome of the drawbacks of us ing profess iona l 
pol lsters--such as  c ost , char latanism and impersona l ity--mor e campa igns 
are turn ing to in-house  po ll ing . Such poll ing is bec oming more c ommon 
espec ia l ly in the campa igns of incumbent congressmen and governors who 
41 use sta f f  funds to ta ke regular surveys . 
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These surveys ar e often poor ly c onc e ived and executed by ind i­
vidua ls  w ith l ittle  tra in ing ; 42 and virtua l ly a l l  experts warn that 
in-hou se poll ing proj ects should be undertaken with great caution--if 
a t  a l l .  There are severa l rea s ons why this is s o .  
One i s  becaus e of  the expertis e needed to  ta ke a pol l  a nd ana lyze 
its data . A granoff wrote : 
Pol l ing involves a c ombinat ion of techn ica l kncmledge and ex­
per ienc e ,  ne ither of which can be substituted by enthus ia sm or 
economy. Sampl ing requ ires a knowl edge of mathema t ic a l  pr oba ­
bil ities and to lerance of error . Questionna ire des ign requ ires  
a theoret ica l know ledge of vot ing and the psychology and me­
cha n ic s  of questioning . Supervis ion and interviewing requ ires 
[ s ic] pr ior tra in ing . Coding requ ires knowledgeable  dec is ion 
rr� king expertis e .  A l l of these fac ets are buttressed by the 
exper ienc e of previous surveying .43 
A s ec ond rea s on to  be wary of in-house  pol ls  is tha t the inaccur-
ate data from a poor survey can damage a campa ign . Veteran pol itica l 
operat ive Edward Schwartzman warned : 
• • •  strange things happen in a campa ign when " bad"  data 
are produced : Other peopl e hear of the " study"--or are even 
told about it by members of the campa ign sta f f--and c omments 
are made to reporters . The data ta ke on a l i fe of their own , 
and staf f  people start believing them even when they are aware 
of the ir ser ious l imita tions . These  surveys (and s ome pro­
fess iona l ones  a s  wel l ) lend a ma g ica l ca st to a campa ign , 
rrruch l ike the effect  of rra gicians and a stro logers in the c ourts 
of medieval k ings . Good surveys are not magica l ,  and inferior 
ones  are ma g ica l on ly in the ir acceptance by unsuspecting 
pol itic ians • • • •  
Using inferior surveys in an attempt to manipu late publ ic 
opin ion is dangerous . 44 
A third rea s on why an in-house  poll ing operation can be a poor 
barga in is  that the data ' s  ana lys is and interpretation are a pt to be 
sketchy if performed at a l l .  A modern pol itica l pol l ster should  be 
more than an eng ineer or stat istic ian .  He is often ca l led upon a s  a 
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grand strateg ist if not a del phic ora c l e  who can tell  a cand idate wha t 
he needs to do pol it ica lly on the ba s is of the da ta c o l l ected . This is 
an area where the pr ominent pr ivate pollsters  are impres s ively skil lful 
and in-house pol l sters often inadequa te. 45 
But despite these  potentia l drawbacks , some experts say that in 
c erta in instances , in-hous e or volunteer-c onducted po l l s  can be worth­
while . 
Napol itan r ec onmtended that campa ign volunteers be u sed a s  inter­
viewers f or qu ick " tra cking" pol l s  that determine trends such  as 
movement among cand ida tes  and how d if ferent variables ar e a f fecting 
the vote . However , Na pol itan warned that "no one would  ba s e  his cam­
pa ign strategy on pol l s  l ike these . "46 
Another way to  use  volunteers and cut the cost  of a po ll is  f or a 
firm to ma ke ava ilable  a poll ing instrument and sampl e ,  and then tra in 
volunteers to adntin ister it . However , the results of such endeavors 
have been dec idedly ntixed , 47 and Sabato warned tha t partia l-services  
agreements are  r isky investments because "interviewer tra ining and 
per forma nce are abs olutely essentia l to a wel l-done poll . " 48 
There are a l s o  s ome experts who say that in-house  po l l ing can be 
worthwhile  not only in c erta in spec if ic situat ions or under l imited 
conditions , but a l s o  when the opera tion is des igned and a dmin istered 
completely in-house  and the data is used to  devise an  overa l l  campa ign 
strategy . One expert who bel ieves this is Van Riper . He recommended 
tha t a campa ign h ire  a reputable po ll ster if it ha s the money , but a l s o  
had this advic e for potentia l  candidates : 
I f  you can f ind l oca lly from ,  say ,  one of  the un ivers ities or 
one of the po ll ing or n�rketing research organ izations , a per­
s on qua l if ied to s erve as a profess iona l director or adviser, 
it is poss ible for h im to tra in and d irect a group of intel l i­
gent and wel l-educated volunteers . Such  an approach is  muc h  
less expens ive and c a n  do  4ood work when the supervis ion i s  
steady and w e l l  qua l if ied . 9 
Agranoff suggested three other methods of establishing in-house  
poll ing operations . One i s  to  use  tra ined volunteers  to do  nothing 
else  in a campa ign other than door-to-door interviewing . A s ec ond 
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method is to use  students to conduct the pol l  as part of a c la s s  pro-
j ec t .  In this ca se , the student or students in charge genera l ly 
partic ipate in a l l  pha ses of the survey--from drawing the sample  to  
presenting a wr itten report . And  a third method is  to turn the  pol l ing 
operation over to a wi l l ing volunteer or s et of volunteers . 50  
The poll  f or this thes is can  best be  descr ibed as a c ombina tion of  
Agranof f ' s sec ond and third methods--a student setting up  and mana g ing 
a pol l c onducted pr imari ly by campa ign volunteers . 
The precautions  that should be ta ken in conducting an  in-house 
pol l--and the author d id try to ta ke those precautions--cann ot be 
emphas ized too strongly.  A granoff summar ized : " There are many who 
wou ld say pol l ing is too d if f icult to be l eft up to the ama teur or 
novic e .  This  is not qu ite true , un less  the carefu l steps of reading , 
understand ing , and seek ing advic e are not ta ken . " 51 
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CHAPTER I I I  
USE AND MISUSE OF POL IT ICAL POLLS 
Politica l c onsul tants , pol lsters , academics  and cand ida tes have 
s trong interests in determin ing how pol itical  polls  can be used ef-
fectively , and many have tr ied to c lass ify the var ious k inds of  useful 
informa t ion tha t pol l s  can provide (see Append ix A ) .  
This chapter examines the ba s ic areas on which experts genera 11 y 
a gree pol ls can provide useful strateg ic information . It a l s o  d is-
cusses the n� j or l imita tions  and misus es of po lls  and pol l  data . 
Usefu l Informa tion � Pol ls  
Useful informa tion from pol ls can be  c lass if ied into s ix genera l 
areas : ( 1 ) is sues (2 ) candidate support , (3 ) demographics,  (4 ) images , 
(5 ) opponents ' wea knesses , and ( 6 ) ma ss  media ha bits . 
Of these s ix ca tegor ies , most experts a gree tha t a s sess ing the 
important issues in a campa ign is the most important . 
Rol l  and Ca ntr il wrote : 
Probably no other kind of da ta are more important to  a 
cand idate than thos e tha t  portray the c oncerns of the peopl e .  
The cand idate  tha t effect ively addresses these concerns is 
the most l ikely winner . A l l  the secondary types of  pol l  data , 
such a s  tr ia l hea ts and candidate rec ogn it ion , wil l f ol l ow an 
upward trend if a ca nd idate ha s managed to t ie in effect ively 
to the publ ic ' s  view of  wha t the issues of rea l sa l ianc e  are . l 
Sha degg a greed that  the identif icat ion of issues is  " perha ps the 
mos t important of a l l  a spects of campa ign management , " and a dded : " If 
carried out succ essfu l ly ,  the results of • o • a survey w i l l  enable  [ a] 
candida te to spea k d irectly to the issues of greatest c onc ern in the 
minds of the peopl e he is try ing to reach . " 2 
Saba to po inted out tha t through issues poll ing , pol l sters can  
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wield c ons idera ble power in that the ir informat ion and ana lys is a ffec ts 
not only the choic e of issues in a campa ign but eventua l governmenta l 
policy .3 
Is sues pol l ing can be strateg ica l ly benef ic ia l  to campa igns in a t  
least  three area s . 
F irst , it can help a cand ida te narrow the is sues of a campa ign . 
Na pol itan expla ined : 
Ordinar ily a ca ndida te will  have ten or f ifteen ideas for 
progra ms o This is too ma ny to effectively util ize in a cam­
pa ign . To use  so many d ilutes the message of  a cand idate a nd 
causes some c onfus ion in the minds of voters . 
It is much  better to narrow the is sues on which [a cand ida te 
wishes] to campa ign to a manageable number , say f our or five , 
and concentrate on those o A pol l  can help  a cand ida te esta bl ish 
a l ist o f  prior it ie s o If he is c ontempla ting f ifteen issues , 
a nd a pol l  shows tha t voters strongly favor f ive , then it ta kes 
no spec ia l genius to rec ogn ize tha t the f ive the voters favor 
are the ones the cand idate shou ld empha s ize .4 
Bes ides suggest ing what issues to empha s ize , Na pol itan further 
po inted out a pol l ca n a l so suggest what issues to de-empha s iz e  in 
ca ses when an  is sue  favored by a cand idate is opposed by the voters . 5 
The sec ond area where is sues po l l ing is strateg ica l ly benef ic ia l 
to a campa ign is in helping a cand idate " pos it ion" himself  on issues , 
tha t is , f ind ing the be st context w ithin which to a ddress issues .6 
Rol l and Cantr il sa id in this regard : " Survey research can  ma ke 
important c ontr ibutions by trying out arguments and a ppea ls on the pub-
l ie to f ind out wh ich are the most effect ive in convincing the peopl e 
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of the soundness of  one ' s pos ition . " ? Schwartzman sa id much the same 
thing , that pol l s  can hel p a candidate modula te campa ign a ppea l s  by· 
showing which are having an impact  and which are ambiguous . s 
The third area where is sues pol l ing is benef ic ia l is in deternlin­
ing the intens ity of feel ing on particular is sues . Rol l a nd Cantr il 
sa id that this k ind of  mea surement can help  prevent a cand idate from 
overempha s izing an  issue in instanc es when the d irec tion of  opin ion is 
overwhelmingly c lear , but only a few people care  very str ong ly one way 
or another . 9 
The sec ond important category of poll  information is a s sess ing the 
overa l l  strength of a ca ndidate w ith the e l ectorate .  This is usua l ly 
done by mea sur ing his support in a tr ia l heat with his opponent . 
This k ind of information helps a cand idate by ind icat ing f luctu­
at ions in voter loya lties lO and chec king where and when progress is 
being madeo1 1  
Rol l  and Ca ntr il po inted out tha t in eva lua ting this k ind o f  data 
it is part icularly important to pay attention to the " no opin ion" or 
"undec ided" perc entages because  " the ir fluctuation is often a be l l ­
whether to chang ing l oya lties s inc e people tend t o  go  through an  unde­
c ided pha s e  in the process of shift ing from one ma n to another . " 12  
Bes ides this  function , tr ia l hea t data can  benef it a campa ign in 
three  sec ondary ways : fund ra is ing , volunteer motivat ion and pub­
l ic ity o 13 
Regard ing the f irst of these area s , a tr ia l heat show ing a ca nd i­
date in the lea d  can  a id that  candida te in ra is ing campa ign funds . 
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Parkinson expla ined : " Everyone l ikes to back  the winner; if your po l l  
shows you the front runner , thos e campa ign dol lars w il l  c ome eas ier o ·u l4 
Agranoff  pointed out tha t ma ny cand idates bel ieve tha t th is is the most 
important benefit they w i l l  ga in from a pol l  and tha t ma ny expens ive 
pol l s  are ta ken s imply to obta in tr ia l heat f igures for fund ra is ing . 15  
Tria l heat data can  a l so benef it a campa ign in  susta in ing volunteer 
enthus ia s rrl o  Park inson expla ined that pos it ive f igures can show volun­
teers " the l ight at the end of  the tunnel" and encoura ge  them to  keep 
working . He further pointed out that " conversely , it is  not a lways 
dama g ing to be runn ing behind if the margin is not too great .  These  
results can  be  used to help  re-ded icate volunteers for an  even greater 
push . " 16  
The third s ec ondary benef it of tria l hea t  da ta is  publ ic ity for 
the campa ign . Parkinson sa id that rel eas ing pol l  results is an  " ea sy 
way to ma ke the pres s"  a s  very few things in a campa ign are a s  news­
worthy a s  a po l l . l7  
Ro l l  and Ca ntr i l  sa id that these three s ec ondary benef its are  
particularly important to a campa ign in  the very ear ly go ing when it  is  
trying to  get  off  the ground and the very late  going when it  is a t­
tempting a f ina l  dr ive to bring the candidate over the top . l8 
The third importa nt type of po ll  information is demogra phic s , tha t 
is , showing the overa l l  demogra phic brea kdown of the electorate and 
a s sess ing the a ttitudes of  these groups . This k ind of  informa tion can 
be c l osely related to the f irst two kinds exarr1ined in this cha pter o 
Spec if ica l ly ,  demogra phic breakdowns can provide three types of 
information va lua ble  to a campa ign o 
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The f irst is key-group breakdowns which show the overa ll  char­
a cter istics of  the constituency , inc lud ing area of res idenc e ,  age , s ex ,  
income , party a f fil iation , ra c e ,  rel ig ion ,  na tiona l ity , occupa tion and 
any other c lass if ica tion deemed relevant to a cand ida te ' s  campa ign 
plan . l9  
The sec ond i s  how these  particu lar  groups fee l  about a cand ida te 
and var ious campa ign is sues . 20 
And the third is ident ifying the demogra phic and a tt itudina l ma ke­
up of supporters and potent ia l " sw itchers , "  that is , voters who are 
most l ikely to switch the ir a l legianc e  from one candidate to a nother . 21  
This k ind of  information can strateg ica lly benef it a campa ign in 
tha t it permits the targeting and ref inement of campa ign a ppea ls . 
There are severa l ways it can do this . 
For example ,  demographic informat ion can enable a campa ign to 
f igure out just where and how a w inning ma j ority can be put together22 
by revea l ing which is sues a ppea l to which groups . This permits a cam­
pa ign to zero  in on a part icular group for which a particu lar issue ha s 
strong a ppea l .23 
It can a l s o  show which issues are "working" f or a campa ign , that 
is , which issues are f irming up the s ol id ba s e  of support f or a cand i­
date , which are br ing ing voters over to the candidate and which are 
los ing votes o24 
Another way demogra phic informat ion can be us ed is in p in po inting 
the groups w ith which a campa ign should be most conc erned and the area s 
where a candidate  should be spending t ime . It ca n do this by show ing 
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exactly where the undec ided voters ar e most heavily c oncentrated , wha t 
c oncerns them the mos t ,  and to which appea ls  they are most recept ive .25 
The fourth category of important information is the determina t ion 
of cand idates ' images . In this area , pol l s  can ind icate wha t the pub-
l ie thinks of  the cand idates , how many are famil iar w ith the ir names , 
wha t voters know of the ir rec ords and what qua l ities about them are 
l iked and d is l iked .26 
The strateg ic va lue of  this information is po inted out by pol it i.:;. 
ca l sc ientist Elmer E .  Cornwel l ,  Jr . :  
A po l it ica l leader ' s successful ly proj ected a ppearanc e of c om­
petenc e ,  c oncern , s incer ity , his ima ge in a word , can carry a 
far greater impact  than his utterances . The skil lful execut ive 
w il l , thus , do a l l  tha t he can to create and proj ect a favor­
able  image f or himself , to bu ild up and conserve what  might be 
termed his " image  ca pita l . "27 
By revea l ing what a cand ida te ' s image is and how it can best be 
cultivated and proj ected , pol l s  can thus provide campa ign strateg ists 
with vita l inforn� t ion .  
Somewha t related t o  the issues and ima ges categor ies is the f i fth 
category of pol l  information :  a sses s ing the wea knesses  of a cand i-
date ' s opponents . In this regard , Schwartzman sa id : " Survey data can 
indica te w ith some spec if ic ity the content of the most ef fective a t­
tac ks on [ an] opponent . "28 
There are severa l d i fferent d irections such atta cks can go . For 
exampl e ,  data may s ometimes ind icate the advisabil ity of a tta ck ing an  
opponent ' s  leader or party ra ther than the opponent himself .29 Or , a 
campa ign could be d irected a ga inst an  opponent on the bas is of unpopu­
lar issues strongly ident if ied w ith h im.3° Furthermore ,  Rol l  and 
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Cantr il po inted out tha t " even when the oppos ition is not s o  c l early 
perc eived as holding a c ontr overs ia l or unpopular pos it ion , the sur­
vey techn ique can provide useful ins ights a s  to where vulnerabil ities 
may begin to appear o "3 1  
The s ixth and f ina l area o f  important information i s  determining 
the med ia hab its of the e lectorate . 
By revea l ing where voters rec e ive most of the ir information about 
pol itic s  and which spec if ic med ia outl ets they use ,  it is  pos s ible  to 
determine hON those med ia s ources  and outl ets can be used most effec­
tively . There are three  ways pol l  data can be used to this end . 
The f irst is  to use  the data a s  overa l l  time and spa c e  plac ement 
gu ides for buying the most popular outlets on the most popular k inds of 
med ia . 32 
A sec ond is to cros stabulate the med ia -sourc e  data w ith other po l l  
data to  determine how targeted groups o f  people--espec ia lly unde­
c ideds--can best be reached through the media . 33 
And a third is to use  cr osstabulations to buy televis ion a nd rad io 
t ime at  the part icular hours when targeted groups are most heavily c on­
centrated in the view ing and l isten ing aud ienc e of a part icular med ia 
outlet .34 
Limitat ions of  Pol l s and Pol l  Data 
The factors tha t l imit a po l l ' s ef fectiveness can a l s o  be grouped 
into s ix genera l area s . There are : ( 1 ) the misus e of tr ia l heat data , 
(2 ) the misuse of is sues data , (3 )  the ephemera l nature of  a po ll ' s  
accura cy , ( 4 )  errors in des ign and ana lys is , ( 5 ) underuse  o f  pol l  
data , and ( 6 )  overrelying o n  pol l  data . 
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The mos t severe l imitat ion of pol l data is in a s sess ing a candi­
date ' s strength . 
Rol l  and Cantr il  sa id tha t ,  a l though the results of tr ia l heat 
questions ar e the po l l  da ta most reported by the pres s and often of  the 
greatest c onc ern to the cand idate , there is perha ps no other f ind ing 
less  accurate and less  relevant to campa ign planners . They expla ined : 
" S ince spec if ic cand idate choice  questions are usua l ly a sked for the 
f irst t ime before a campa ign beg ins , the results from them usua l ly do  
not provide a rea l istic a s ses sment of  the potentia l strength o f  the 
candidates . "35 They further warned that such data are c erta inly no 
bas is upon which to ma ke po l itica l c ommitments or f irm dec is ions re­
garding campa ign stra tegy . 36 
Such tria l heats can be b ia sed aga inst the non incurrilient , Rol l  and 
Cantr il c ontended , because such a cand idate " usua l ly is l es s  wel l-known , 
and it is not unt il the campa ign is in ful l  swing that the publ ic be­
comes rea l ly aware of h im . "37 
Tria l heats can  a l s o  be bia sed aga inst an  incumbent or better­
known potent ia l cand idate .  This is part icularly true when a cand ida te 
ha s ta ken unpopular actions but hasn ' t yet ha d the opportun ity to 
expla in the reas ons for thos e actions or rec ount pa st a c c ompl ishments .38 
Rol l  and Cantr il  further noted that pre-campa ign tr ia l heat 
measurements are espec ia l ly poor indicators of candidate strength in 
pr imary el ections . They po int to two factors which ma ke this s o :  
One is tha t tra dit iona l party l oya l ties are not opera tive , 
and , thus , voter preferenc es tend to shift more frequent ly 
and for more superf ic ia l  rea s ons . A second aspect is the 
opportunity a pr imary election a ffords ma ny peopl e to vote 
in a protest mood , w ithout feel ing the same s ens e of  re­
spons ibil ity and f ina l ity that dec is ions in a genera l 
elect ion involve .39 
The obvious c onc lus ion from this d iscuss ion is tha t tria l heat 
30 
data are hopelessly inadequa te for proj ect ing the actua l percenta ge of 
the vote tha t a ca ndidate will  rece ive . Among the experts , " utterly 
useless"  is the key descr ipt ive phrase .  
Shadegg sa id : " Publ ic opin ion sampl ings that attempt to  pred ict 
the winner in an  e l ection contest are utterly useless  to a cand idate 
and an unnec essary wa ste of  money . "40 Sabato  added : "A ' hors e  ra c e '  
pol l  months ( or years ) before a n  elect ion i s  utterly useless  a s  a pre-
dictive devic e .  "41 
Because such s ound ings cannot pred ict an  elect ion , they ar e a poor 
ba s is for na king a dec is ion about runn ing f or off ic e .  Saba to sa id : 
"One of  the worst dec is ions a pol itic ian ca n ma ke on the ba s is of po lls  
is  whether to  run or not . u42 This view is shared by Rol l  a nd Ca ntr il , 
who stated that tr ia l heat f igures are not a "rel iabl e ba s e  for such a 
dec is ion . "43 
The va lue of tr ia l hea t sc ores is l imited in another way and that 
is in the ir publ ic ity va lue . 
Earl ier in th is cha pter , it was po inted out tha t one of the sec ond-
ary benef its of tria l heat da ta is campa ign publ ic ity .  However , one 
should  not take this to mean that publ ic iz ing the f igures w i l l  create 
bandwagon ef fect . Ro l l  and Cantr il sa id :  
There is no f irm evidence that  pol l f ind ings--whether 
l eaked from private surveys or from the nationa l ly syndi­
cated pol l s--d irectly a f fect the e lectorate . The publ ic is 
impress ionable  in ma ny respects , but be ing influenc ed by 
pol ls is not one of them. Voters na ke up the ir minds for a 
nunilier of rea s ons , most of which involve relatively stra ight 
forward ca lcula tions of s e lf-interest . Voting for a w inner 
in the pol ls is hardly a ma j or mot ivating force . 44 
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Publ ic iz ing tr ia l heat s cores can a ls o  harm a campa ign ' s organ i-
zat ion and fund ra is ing . On the one hand , a pol l showing a cand idate 
to be well ahead c ould  wea ken a campa ign by promoting c omplac ency and 
thus dr ive away campa ign volunteers  and f inanc ia l c ontr ibutions . 45 On 
the other hand , a poor sho.Ning in a pol l  can a ls o  hurt a campa ign by 
demora l iz ing the organ ization and revea l ing to potentia l c ontr ibutors 
the ir investment would  not pay off . 46 
The second genera l category of po ll  data misuse is in the area of 
issues . The bas ic fa ilure of some strateg ists here  is plac ing too 
much empha s is on a cand idate ' s  pos it ions on is sues o This can be a mis-
ta ke because , as Shadegg expla ined , voters do not requ ire that cand i-
dates agree w ith them , only that they rec ognize and a pprec iate their 
fears and problems and ind icate some understanding of these  problems .47 
This feel ing is  very w idesprea d ,  acc ord ing to Na pol ita n .  He sa id 
that invariably voters prefer ,  by a marg in of four or f ive to one , an 
honest pers on who can c ope w ith s itua t ions to one whose pos itions on 
the is sues is the same as theirs .48 
This is not to say ,  of c our s e ,  that voters are not c onc erned about 
issues . E lectron ic media producer Tony Schwartz sa id :  "A l l  our re-
search revea ls tha t people are c onsumed by issues . "  However , he added : 
"When it comes time to choose  the person to be elected , voters are 
looking for the man best capabl e of  dea l ing with the issues . "49 
( Ita 1 ics mine . ) 
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The third genera l l imita t ion of pol l da ta is its extreme ly tra ns ­
itory na ture . Putt ing it succ inctly , Parkinson sa id a po l l  " is on ly 
a s  good a s  the day . it wa s ta ken . " 50 
This ha s two important impl ications for strateg ists . F irst , dra ­
ma tic pol l  fluctua tions j ust a fter ma j or events wil l not usua l ly have 
the la sting s ignif icance  o ften attributed to them, and it is dangerous 
to a s sume that they w il l ; 5 1  and sec ond , dur ing the cruc ia l la st weeks 
of a campa ign , publ ic a ttitudes are shifting fa st and are d if f icult 
to mea sur e , 52 mean ing tha t po ll sters can have a hard t ime trying to 
get a ha ndl e  on publ ic sentiment . 
The fourth l imitation is the high potentia l f or errors in both 
the des ign and ana lys is of a pol l .  Sabato  c ompared pol l s  t o  c omputers , 
in that no matter how awed one bec omes by the ir impressive qua l ities , 
one should keep in mind they can only do what they are progranm�d to 
do . 53 
In pol l  da ta , there are two k inds of error .  The f irst is sampl ing 
error , which is the d ifference between the estimate (the va lue based on 
the sample ) and the parameter (the true population va lue ) . A gra,nof f 
sa id : " Genera lly in campa ign pol l s  an error estima te of about 3 per­
cent is to lera ted , a lthough in some ca ses poll sters  have been known to 
reduce the s ize of  the ir samples and accept a 4 or 5 percent error . " 54 
Thus strateg ists must c ontend w ith the fact that even the best-des igned 
po l l  wi l l  be accurate on ly within three percentage po ints , if that much.  
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The sec ond type of error in po ll data is non-sampl ing error . It 
ar ises because of  poor quest ionna ire des ign ,  sl oppy interviewing , poor 
c od ing and ana lytic a l  mistakes . Poll sters take many precaut ions to 
prevent this k ind  of  error fr om creeping into the ir results , 55 but it 
is  a lways present to some degree . 
One k ind of  non-sampl ing error that is  particularly prone to ar ise  
is  poor ana lys is of the da ta by the pol lster himself . Napol itan sa id 
one way this k ind of error ar ises  is when the poll  results are " so 
c omplex , s o  involved , s o  deta i led ,  so  cumbersome that they can ' t be 
used effectively by the peopl e  who have to use them. " 56 He added : 
I don ' t have a l ot of sympathy for a cademic pol l sters who do  
the survey , turn over a voluminous report , and d isappear • • • •  
if the report is  s o  fat ,  and the key facts are hidden or un­
notic ed ,  or not ca l l ed to  the attention of the reader , then 
there has been a c orrm1unications breakdown that could  negate the 
va lue of the whole  po ll . 57 
Another way ana lyt ica l mistakes can occur is when a pol l ster be� 
c omes bia s ed and l os es his  objectivity. Sa bato sa id pol l sters  often 
bec ome too c lose to  the ir candida tes to rema in suf f ic iently obj ect ive 
and that they a l s o  devel op a stake in their ana lyses , a s ituat ion which 
can hurt the ir c l ients . 58 Pol lster Mervin F ield expla ined : 
If a pol lster has done an early survey and ma de rec ommendations 
on how the campa ign should go , then as a c ounsel or he ' s  c om­
mitted to that c ourse of  action • • • •  Every pol l he ta kes 
therea fter is  a test of those rec orrm1enda tions . If the pol ic ies 
aren ' t working , the huma n thing to do is to say the evidence is 
not c l ear-cut . 59 
The f i fth probl em enc ountered with pol ls is that-- incr ed ible as it 
may seem--the results are sometimes not used in developing the campa ign 
strategy .  
Schwartzman expla ined : 
Many candidates pay only l ip s ervic e to pol itica l surveys . 
They prefer to make bas ic campa ign dec is ions on " gut re­
sponse" or on the advice of trusted po l itica l intima tes , 
even though they may ma ke an investment , sometimes a s ize­
able  one , in research s imply becaus e it is expected or 
might keep a c ontr ibutor ha ppy . 60 
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Napol itan f inds thi s  sort of behavior on the part of pol it ic ians 
particularly irks ome , and sa id :  
My pet irritat ion is the candidate or campa ign mana ger who c om­
mis sions a pol l ,  gets the results , and l ocks the report in the 
bottom l eft-hand drawer of his desk , pu l l ing it out occa s iona l ly 
to show a c igar-chomping crony--but never g iving the results to 
his  rad io or tel evis ion producers  or his advert is ing a gency or 
f ield  men . Sheer stupid ity may be a c l iche ,  but tha t ' s the 
descr iption that f its  this kind of behavior . 61 
The s ixth and f ina l problem area is  the c onverse of  the f i fth : 
the overempha s is of pol l  da ta to the detr iment of other releva nt 
factors in campa ign dec is ion ma king . Rol l  and Cantr i l  sa id this k ind 
of probl em is part icu larly prone to occur when pol it ic ians see in the 
pol l  results hints as to the d ir ect ion a campa ign can g o . 62 
There are three reas ons why overempha s iz ing the importance of pol l  
data can be a mista ke . 
The f irst is s imply tha t a pol l  is only a tool , and a s  Schwartzman 
po inted out : " The exi stence of good research cannot by itse lf guar-
antee intel l igent dec is ion-ma king . "  Schwartzman add ,ed that  s ince it is 
only a tool , a pol l  must be used skil lfully if it is to be effect ive . 63 
Parkinson a l so  warned po l it ic ians not to bec ome s o  begu i l ed with pol l  
results that  "they bec ome the end ra ther than the mea ns . " 64 H e  sa id 
they should be used " only as a coa l  miner uses his he lmet l ight--to 
f ind the way out of the tunnel . " 65 
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A sec ond rea s on why survey da ta shou ld not be  overempha s ized is  
tha t they are  often ambiguous and not tota l ly conc lus ive . In c ases  
where a pol l  shows a s ignif icant amount of  honest c onfus ion or d i s in­
terest on the part of voters , any strategy ba sed on poll  da ta is 
obviously of l im ited ef fectiveness . 66 
A third rea s on is that  there are other factors in devis ing a cam­
pa ign stra tegy tha t should not be ignored or neg lected at the expense 
of pol l  da ta o For example ,  S chwartzman sa id that " intu it ion is  some­
times abs olutely nec essary to ant ic ipate trends bef ore research data 
can fu l ly document them . " 67 Sabato  added : "Opinion surveys can  never 
substitute for good sense and thoughtful study . Nor f or c onsc ience , it 
must be hoped o A fter a l l ,  today ' s  prof ile  in c ourage  rra y be w e l l  
within tomorrow ' s opin ion ma instream. " 68 This view i s  a l so  shared by 
profess iona l pol l ster Robert Teeter , who c ommented that he doesn ' t 
think pol l s  " should  ever overr ide good judgment or repla c e  peopl e ' s 
bra ins . "  69 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Devel oping a survey methodol ogy is a compl ex process  involving 
many steps and requ ir ing ma ny dec is ions . This chapter expla ins in 
deta il the methodol ogy us ed for this survey and how that methodol ogy 
wa s devised o 
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Each section of  the cha pter expla ins one particular step . These  
inc lude :  se lecting the bas ic survey technique ; s e lecting the sampl ing 
technique ; stratify ing a nd drawing the sample ; c onstruct ing the 
questionna ire ; interview ing ; and c oding , ta bula ting and a na lyz ing the 
data o 
Sel ect ion of Ba s ic Survey Techn ique 
The f irst ma j or step in devel oping a survey methodol ogy i s  dec id­
ing whether to c onduct  the survey by rna il , fa ce-to-face  interviews or 
te lephone interviews o The select ion of the telephone method f or this 
survey wa s not d if f icult  because of the d isadvanta ges inherent in the 
other two techniques . Add it iona lly ,  the telephone method ha d unique  
advantages and la cked ma j or d isadvantages o 
An examination of  the two techn iques not chos en shows that  the 
ma il survey ha s the most s evere d isadvanta ges . 
Ma il surveys are genera lly c ons idered unacceptable  for pol itica l  
res earch pr irrar ily because o f  the ir l ow return rate . A gra noff  sa id : 
" Even when a pol it ica l ly interested group is  the target audi enc e [ of a 
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ma il  survey] the return rate rarely exc eeds 50 perc ent . For a survey 
of a ll voters , the return rate might be 15 to 20 perc ent . " l 
Such a l ow return rate means that the returned que stionna ires 
will  not be representa tive of the popula tion be ing surveyed and there­
fore a poor ba s is f or drawing any k ind of c onc lus ion .2 
The d isadvantages  of the fac e-to-face interview ing method are not 
near ly as grea t ,  and in fa ct ,  this technique has been the trad it iona lly  
preferred one  for obta in ing pol it ica l ly stra teg ic informa t ion . 
Rol l and Cantri l  sa id tha t face-to-face  interview ing is "much 
preferable" to the telephone method when attempting to marsha l  infer­
rna t ion around which a campa ign strategy can be formed . 3 A l ong the same 
l ines , Napol itan sa id that the fac e-to-face technique is " the best 
method by far ,  in depth pol l ing , a lthough some pol l sters  c oncentrate 
effect ively on telephone pol l s  and c la im that their results  are 
equa l ly sat isfactory . "4 
However , util izat ion of  the face-to-face  method ha s dec l ined in 
rec ent years as the telephone method ha s increa s ed in popu lar ity . 
A ma j or reas on for this is c ost . Saba to sa id:  " The switch to a 
tel ephoning standard is  one of the changes be ing wrought in the pol it i­
c a l  pol l ing industry a s  a result  of s kyrocketing pr ic es . Po l l ing costs 
have more than doubled from 1972 to 1 978 , far outstr ipp ing the average 
inf lation rate . " 5 
In examining c osts , Sa bato  found tha t "a  forty-f ive minute [ fac e­
to-fac e] benchnark  survey , at $20 to $35 per interview , ca n eas ily run 
to s ix f igures , though a campa ign vers ion is usua l ly sca l ed down to  
$50 , 000 or l ess . "  But on the other hand , he sa id : "A twenty-minute 
fol low-up telephone survey with 600 interviews at $ 15  to $23 apiec e  
costs between $ 1 5 , 000 a nd $20 , 000 o " 6 
From his research,  Sa bato reported tha t the tide of opin ion in 
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the pol l ing ranks ha s begun to turn away from fa c e-to-fa ce  interview ing 
and that "a lmost a l l pol itica l pol lsters now use the te lephone c on-
s istently . o • •  In-home pol l ing is  just too expens ive anymore for 
even monied campa igns . " ? 
The c ost  fa ctor a lone  wa s rea son enough not to use the fac e-to-
fa ce  technique for this proj ect . 
Another rea s on why the face-to-face  method wa s not used is the 
difficulty of recru it ing qua l if ied interviewers . Soc ia l sc ienc e re-
searcher Don Dil lma n sa id the " ski l l s  needed for c onduct ing f ie ld 
interviews are grea t" and  that  " few peopl e" have them .B 
The high level of c ompetenc e and str ingent qua l if icat ions needed 
for fac e-to-fac e  interview ing means tha t a survey us ing a mateur and 
volunteer interviewers--such a s  this one--would be better off  us ing 
the telephone o Pol it ica l operat ive Cha rles G .  Atkins expla ined : 
The probl em with having interviewers conduct pol l s in per­
s on i s  tha t ama teur interviewers are  too l ike! y to revea 1 to  
the respondent what answer i s  des ired to  each question o Shifts 
in posture , changes in tone or voic e l evel , and other persona l 
manner isms (usua l ly unconsc ious ) can ea s ily g ive an interviewer ' s  
persona l opin ion and thus influence the answer the respondent 
g ives . While  an exper ienc ed interviewer might obta in better re­
sults in person than on the phone , the reverse is the c a s e  with 
an amateur o 9 
Another problem with us ing amateurs to conduct face-to-fac e  inter-
views is the fa ct  tha t the monitor ing and supervis ing needed by in-
experienced interviewers is prec luded o With a telephone survey , "a 
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supervis or s itt ing in the same room with three or four tel ephone in­
terviewer s ha s the opportun ity to judge and correct the techn iques of 
the interviewers ,  and to mon itor pol l  results as they c ome in . " lO 
Bes ides the c ost  and r ig id personnel requirements , the l og istic a l  
problems o f  recru iting a nd send ing out interviewers t o  a l l  parts of 
the state is a f ina l rea s on why the fa c e-to-fa ce  method was not used 
for this projec t .  
The tel ephone survey method ha s severa l adva nta ges over the other 
two techniques  in a dd it ion to being less  expens ive and eas ier to do 
w ith volunteers . 
The f irst of  these is  speed . Tel ephone surveys can  be c ompl eted 
in as l ittl e as 24 hours as opposed to severa l weeks for the other 
methods . 1 1  
A s ec ond adva nta ge  i s  that a telephone survey ' s  sampl e can  be more 
geographica l ly dispersed and ,  therefore , more representat ive than a 
face-to-face  survey . In a fa c e-to-face  survey interviews must be 
" c lustered" at a s e l ect  few geogra phic points . But w ith a tel ephone 
survey , s elected ind ividua l s  can  be widely d ispersed thr oughout the 
survey area in proportion to their rea l nurriliers . 12 
A th ird advantage  of  tel ephone surveys is tha t the qua l ity of data 
is a s  good if not better tha n face-to-face  surveys . Two stud ies in 
particular bear this out .  
A compar ison study of telephone and fa c e-to-fac e  surveys by soc ia l  
sc ienc e researcher There sa Rogers showed tha t the telephone method was 
strong in severa l ways . Rogers reported that "respondents can  and do 
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answer c ompl ex items on the telephone , "  and that " thos e interviewed in 
person are somewha t more l ikely to g ive soc ia l ly des irable a nswers 
than those interviewed by the phone . " l3 
The same study showed that an interviewer ' s  styl e ,  whether judged 
" cool" ( ta sk-or iented ) or "warm" ( person-or iented ) a ppears to have l ess  
of an  effect on responses  g iven over the  telephone tha n fa c e-to-face . l4 
Rogers a l so  conc luded tha t "vot ing da ta obta ined by tel ephone are 
s l ightly more l ike ly to be accurate than thos e obta ined by a fac e-to-
face  interview . " l5  
In another study ,  Dil lman f ound one more area in  which te lephone 
survey data are super ior :  
The tel ephone interview is the best method in terms o f  the 
abil ity to c ontrol c ontamina t ion . In most cases only the re­
spondent hears the question ,  ma king it d if f icult for others to 
understand the quest ions or a f fect the answers . Even if another 
person is on an extens ion telephone , tha t person ha s l ittl e  
chance t o  of fer advice  ina smuch a s  extens ions are usua l ly l ocated 
in separate rooms , ma king d irect conversation with the respondent 
difficult . l6  
Des pite the a dvanta ges j ust c ited--and the increa s ing ly w idespread  
use of the tel ephone in  surveys notw ithsta nd ing--this rr1ethod a ls o  ha s 
its d isadvanta ges . 
The one usua l ly c ons idered most ser ious is tha t people w ithout 
telephones cannot be reached . This can bia s  a survey s ince " s pec if i-
ca l ly nonwhite c itizens , peopl e in s outhern states , those w ith lower 
inc omes , the l esser educated , younger adults and people in sma l l  c om-
mun ities are less  l ikely to have telephones than the ir c ounterparts in 
the population . " l7 
A lso ,  the l ength of the interview is l imited in a te lephone sur-
vey . A granoff sa id :  
A tel ephone pol l genera l ly does not a l low for the l ength , 
breadth , and depth of an  interview tha t an in-the-f ield 
door-to-door survey a l lows . Most campa ign plann ing pol l s  
requ ire about 30  t o  40 minutes o f  interview ing t o  obta in 
s ignif icant plann ing ma ter ia l ;  a telephone interview rarely 
exceeds 10  minutes . l8 
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Another d isadvanta ge is tha t respondents may be les s nega t ive over 
the te lephone than they would be in person .  Rol l and Cantr i l  ca l l ed 
this the most d isturbing def ic iency of telephone surveys and sa id tha t 
"w ithout the rapport establ ished in the pers ona l interview , there is a 
tendency for s ome people to g ive l ess negative answers , part icular ly 
when it comes to the ir views of pol itica l persona l it ies . " l 9  
None o f  these were ma j or d isadva ntages in this survey , however , 
a nd a l l c ould be mitigated to s ome degree . 
Rea ching a l l  potent ia l re�pondents is much les s of a pr obl em than 
it wa s 1 0  or 20 years ago  because most households now have tele­
phones--about 95  perc ent nationw ide o2° Furthermore ,  s ome res earch 
ha s found that people  in households without telephones are less l ikely 
to vote anyway ,21  thereby d i luting whatever bia s ing ef fect te lephone 
ownership may have o 
Some pol l sters c la im that l imited interview l ength is  not rea l ly 
a problem because overly long interviews produce too much  data to be 
pra ct ica l .  One of these pol lsters is Vincent Bregl io of Dec is ion Ma k-
ing Informa tion who c ontended tha t in-person interviews often produc e 
" information overkil l • • •  too much informat ion for a campa ign to  
ha ndle . "  A telephone survey , on the other ha nd , he sa id , " g ives a 
campa ign about the r ight amount of da ta . "22 
The tendency of peopl e to be less negat ive in telephone inter­
views wa s the most s er ious d isadva nta ge for this survey . Extra care 
in the wording of the questions and in the ana lys is of the data a p­
peared to be the best ways of c oping with any potentia l problems . 
Sel ection of Sampl ing Techn igue 
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In c onstructing a sample f or a telephone survey such a s  this one , 
one can select  households e ither through a procedure ca l l ed "ra ndom 
digit d ia l ing" (RDD ) or from telephone d ir ector ies o The latter method 
wa s used f or this  survey pr imar ily because of the s ign if icant d isad­
vantages of RDD . Furthermore ,  the d isa dvantages a s soc iated w ith 
te lephone d irector ies were found to be not a s  s ignif icant for this 
type of survey as they might be for others . 
The most s er ious shortc oming of RDD is that it wa stes a great dea l 
of time and ef fort by forc ing interviewers to  ca l l  unused and nonres i­
dent ia l  te lephones .23 In one study of RDD , only 2 1 .3 percent of 
30 , 000 random numbers d ia l ed were resident ia l households . Non­
households and nonworking numbers tota l led 5 .3  percent a nd 73 . 4 per­
cent , respect ively . 24 
This probl em wa s a l so evident in gra duate student John Cra ft ' s 
1977 statewide po l l  in Mis s is s ippi .  Cra ft reported in his  the s is that  
ca l l ing sample hous eholds from a c omputer-generated l i st o f  random 
numbers created delays when telephone equ ipment rang on nonex istent 
numbers severa l t imes pr ior to an  operator report ing a no-longer-in­
service or nonex istent number .25 Cra ft ' s attempt at u s ing RDD f or 
c onstruct ing his sample  wa s so unsucc essful that he abandoned it a nd 
us ed a telephone-d irectory ba sed sample .26 
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A s ec ond shortc oming of RDD is the d if f iculty in determining 
whether nurr�er s are res identia l or nonres identia l in the ca s e  of 
not-at-homes .  This ma kes the ca lculat ion of respons e rate s a nd de­
c is ions regard ing f ol l ow-up ca l ls more difficu lt .27 Cra ft a ls o  had 
this probl em .  H e  reported that bus ines ses _which c losed at  n ight were 
impos s ible  to different iate from no-answer res identia l households .2B 
A third , l e ss serious  drawback  is that households with a s ec ond 
number , such a s  a " teen" phone , are more l ikely to be ca l led .29 
These f irst two d isadvanta ges can be dea lt with to s ome degree by 
us ing numbers in telephone d irectories to se lect the random numbers to 
be d ia l ed . For example ,  a telephone number c ould  be ra ndomly s e l ected 
frorr1 the d irectory and then the la st digit a ltered thus ensur ing that 
unused blocks of numbers would not be ca l led .30 This techn ique  creates 
an add it iona l probl em ,  though , as  new exchanges just made  operationa l 
by the telephone c ompany are missed .3 1  This  problem would  have been a 
s er ious one in this  survey because the South Da kota Publ ic Util ities 
Commiss ion ' s most  rec ent off ic ia l l isting of three-d ig it pre f ixes  f or 
telephone exchanges d id not inc lude severa l that had rec ently been 
ma de operat iona l .32 
The shortcomings of RDD a lone would have been suf f ic ient justif i­
cation for us ing a telephone-directory ba sed sample .  But in a dd ition 
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to this , research a lso  indica ted tha t the def ic ienc ies trad it iona l ly 
a s soc iated wit h  the telephone d irectory methodology e ither wou ld not · 
be s ignif icant in this particular survey or c ould  be les sened by ta k­
ing extra precaut ions in the sampl e selection . 
One of those  tra d itiona l defic ienc ies is that new l is t ings are 
not inc luded in d irector ies while  those who have moved s ince a 
d irectory was pub l i shed are l isted .33 This is not a s  much  of a problem 
for a South Dakota survey s ince popula tion turnover in rura l area s  is  
s l ight .34 Furthermore ,  b ia s  a ga inst persons  not l isted in the la test 
d irectory is less  ser ious for a pre-election survey of potentia l voters 
s ince persons not l isted are less  l ikely to be reg istered voters .35  
A second shortcoming o f  tel ephone d irectories is  that o f  b ia s  
resu lting from the omiss ion o f  nonl isted and nonpubl ished numbers .3 6  
Once a ga in , this i s  not a b ig probl em i n  South Dakota because  peopl e 
l iving in rura l a rea s are  more l ike ly to  be l isted in a tel ephone 
directory than those l iving in large c ities . 37 Sta tistic s  from North­
western Bel l  Tel ephone Company show tha t only 4 .3  percent of  the 
175 , 796 res identia l telephones in South Da kota serviced by it are 
e ither nonl isted or nonpubl ished o38 
A third shortc oming is multiple l i stings--numbers l isted in more 
than one d irectory .39  Aga in this is more of a problem in urban areas 
than rura l areas40 where fewer te lephone d irector ies are publ ished . 
And this  problem can be  ea s ily overcome by ta king extra care in se lect­
ing the sample ,  s k ipping over those numbers that are l isted in other 
d irector ie s o 
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A fourth shortcoming w ith d irector ies is that telephone d irectory 
service area s do not foll ow pol itica l boundaries . 41 This ca n be a 
ma j or probl em for po l it ica l surveys42 and c ould have been f or this one 
in particular . For exampl e ,  S outh Da kota households servic ed by 
Minnesota telephone exchanges had to  be inc luded in the sarrtpl e  and , 
c onversely ,  Minnes ota households servic ed by South Da kota exchanges  had 
to be exc luded . 
Aga in ,  this probl em can be overcome by ta king extra care in 
select ing the sampl e .  In this survey , telephone director ies from 
bordering sta tes were used s o  that a s  many South Da kota r es idents 
s erviced by out-of-sta te telephone c ompanies as pos s ible  wou ld be  in­
c luded o Add itiona l ly ,  non-South Dakota res idents were carefu l ly 
screened out when s e lections from South Da kota telephone d ir ector ies  
were be ing made .  
To  summar ize , random d igit d ia l ing is  genera l ly c ons idered a less­
biased method for c onstructing a sampl e ,  but for this k ind of  a survey 
in a state  l ike South Ia kota , us ing telephone d ir ector ies wa s deemed a 
more practica l method . M:irketing research expert A .  B .  B lankenship , a 
strong a dvocate of random d ig it d ia l ing , ha s sa id that in rura l areas 
" the bia s  introduced by sampl ing d irector ies is l ikely to be s o  l ittl e  
a s: t o  ma ke the added c ost of  random digit d ia l ing unwarra nted . " 43 
Stratif ication � Drawing of Sample 
A fter dec id ing to bas e  the sample on tel ephone d irector ie s ,  the 
next ta sk  in c onstruct ing the sample wa s to co l lect  data on the number 
of res ident ia l tel ephones in each South Da kota te lephone excha nge o  In 
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this way,  the tota l populat ion of the universe be ing sampled--South 
Da kota hous eho lds with telephones--c ou ld be ca lculated as  we l l  a s  the 
populations of the various subsets which would be used in strat ifying 
the sample--the telephone exchanges . 
This information wa s obta ined from the 1981  year-end reports of 
more than 40 South Da kota telephone c ompa nies a s  submitted to the South 
Dakota Publ ic Ut il ities Corrm\is s ion and from Northwestern Be l l  Telephone 
Company , which services  over three-fourths of the telephones in S outh 
Da kota . 
To ensure that the f igures would  reflect only South Da kota house­
holds with te l ephones ,  a ll non-South Da kota households s erviced by 
South Da kota te lephone c ompanies were exc luded from the ca lculat ions , 
and South Da kota househo lds s erviced by non-South Da kota te lephone 
c ompanies were inc luded . 
In determining the s ize of the sample , it was dec ided that three 
households for every 1 , 000 would be se lected . This f igure was chosen 
for two reas ons : ( 1 ) such a f igure would ma ke it relative ly easy to 
ca lculate the nurriDer of households tha t should be selected from each 
stratum, and  (2 ) a sample  of tha t s ize ( 698 , ba sed on  232 , 638 r esi­
tentia l ma in sta tions ) wou ld be  about the largest that c ould be  
practica l ly surveyed f or the proj ect . 
Due to random variances  within the individua l stra ta , the actua l 
number of  households selected for the sample was 696 . The sampl ing 
error for a survey w ith that s ize sample would be plus-or-minus 4 per­
cent at a 95 percent c onfidence leve l . However , the a ctua l sampl ing 
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error for the survey wa s about 5 percent because completed interviews 
were obta ined from only 41 1 of  the 696 househo lds .44 
The next step wa s to stratify the sample  to ensure tha t a l l area s  
of the sta te would b e  represented . 
This enta iled ,  f irst ,  a s s igning each exchange to one of 21  tele-
·phone d irector ies c onta in ing South Da kota households . A lmost a l l of 
the te lephone d irector ies  were current and only three were more than 
one year old . The lack of s evera l out-of-state d irector ies in South 
Da kota Sta te Un ivers ity ' s Br iggs L ibrary forced the exc lus ion of s ever­
a l  exchanges serviced by out-of-state telephone c ompan ies . However , 
these exchange s ,  pr inc ipa l ly a l ong the North Da kota border ,  c onta ined 
only 567 S outh Da kota households , or less  than three-tenths of one per­
cent of the un iverse . 
A fter be ing a s s igned to a d irectory , each exchange had to be 
pla c ed in a stra tum from which a c erta in portion of the sample wa s to 
be se lected.  The nun�er of  households selected from ea ch stra tum was 
determined on this ba s is :  167-500 (households in stratum ) , one house­
hold f or sample ; 501-833 , two households ; 834-1 , 166,  three households ; 
1 167-1500, four households ; etc . 
Each exchange w ith at lea st 834 households--enough to have three 
households from it selected for the sample--automatica l ly became a 
stratum. There were 45 such exchanges , ma king for a l ike number of 
strata . These 45 strata a c counted for 488 of the santple  households or 
about 70 percent of the tota l .  
The rest of the exchanges--those with fewer than 834 hous e-
holds--were then placed in stra ta with other exchanges on the ba s is of 
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two cr iter ia :  phone d irector ies  and geogra phic area . That is , ea ch 
stratum wa s constructed so that it c onta ined exchanges from the same 
phone d irectory that were a l so geogra phica l ly c ontiguous , or , i f  this 
were not pos s ibl e ,  at l ea st in the same genera l geographic area . 
The on ly other del ibera te man ipula tion of the pla cement o f  ex­
changes within strata wa s that exchanges serving Ind ian reservat ions 
were kept together whenever pos s ibl e .  This wa s done so  that this 
population group--the most s ign if icant in the state in terms of cul­
tura l and ethn ic d ifferences--would be properly represented in  the 
sample o  
One other minor po int should be ment ioned with regard to the num­
ber of sample households selected w ithin each stratum. The Gordon , 
Nebra ska , stratum--conta in ing only 109 households--wa s we ighted to  
represent a l l  325 S outh Da kota households served by Nebraska telephone 
c ompanies . This was because  none of the other South Da kota exchanges 
served by Nebra ska te l ephone c ompanies wa s l isted in any of the 
d irector ies  on f i l e  a t  the Br iggs L ibrary. 
The tota l nunilier of  strata--l isted in Append ix B--wa s 96 . 
The next ta sk  was to select the ind ividua l households  tha t would 
be surveyed o  
To d o  this , the number o f  pages o f  res identia l l ist ings for ea ch 
stratum wa s ca lculated o Adjustments were ma de for pa ges that were only 
partly ful l and for pa ges  c onta ining government l isting s . 
A pa ge number for a particular stratum was se lected us ing a table 
of random nuniliers . More ra ndom numbers were then used to  s e l ect  a 
c olumn from the pa ge and a rovv from the c olumn . 
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In this last part of  the procedur e ,  se lecting the row , spec ia l 
care wa s ta ken to avoid c ount ing bus ines s l istings and office  numbers· 
for doctors , attorneys and the l ike . A l so , s econd ma in sta tions , such 
as " teen" phones , and dupl icate l i stings of the same number , such a s  
when a husband and w if e  have separate l ist ings , wer e skipped . 
Some s l ight adj ustments were ma de in this procedure for some of 
the strata tha t c onta ined more tha n one exchange . 
Usua l ly the exchanges in these stra ta were interspersed through­
out a d irectory and not grouped together in one pla c e .  I n  these  
instances , each exchange was a s s igned a ser ies of  nurr�ers , such as  
1 -63 ,  64-122 , etc . ,  ba sed on  the number of households it  c onta ined , 
each number s igni fy ing 1 0  households . Then a random number was used 
to  sel ect one of the exchanges w ithin the stratum. A fter the exchange  
was chos en , then more random number s were used to  se lect a page , 
c olumn and row,  much  l ike  before .  
Occas iona l ly,  shortcuts were ta ken in the selection procedur e .  
For example i n  ca ses when an  exchange had only tw o  pa ges , ea ch w ith 
three c olurrms of nuniliers , the f irst step of choos ing a pa ge by random 
nurrilier wa s skipped and instead , a number wa s us ed to select  one of  the 
s ix c olumns . 
After a household had been se lected , pert inent facts about it were 
rec orded . These inc luded the telephone number , l a st name of the 
res ident , and the directory, te lephone exchange and TV n� rket in which 
it wa s loca ted . Thi s inforna tion wa s typed onto la bels  that  were a f­
f ixed to  each questionna ir e .  
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Quest ionna ir e Construction : Genera l Gu ide lines 
The quest ionna ir e ( see Append ix C ) wa s des igned pr imar ily in ac�  
cordance with a procedure expla ined in  Dil lman • s  � and Telephone 
Surveys ca l led the " Tota l Des ign Method . "  Guidel ines from Rol l  a nd 
Ca ntr il ' s  Pol l s :  The ir Us e and Misus e  in Pol itic s  a n d  Blankenship ' s  
Profess iona l Telephone Surveys were a l so  used in the questionna ire ' s 
c onstruct ion . 
The subj ects addres sed by the questionna ire were ba s ed on i ssues 
and demogra phic inf ormat ion deemed relevant to the campa ign a s  a greed 
upon by the author and O ' Connor campa ign offic ia l s . 
In developing the questionna ire ,  the word ings of  the questions 
were kept as s imple a s pos s ible  to ma ke them more ea s i ly under stood .45 
Questions were a l s o  worded s o  that they read we l l  and sounded we l l .  46 
They were grouped together by topic in order to avo id c onfus ing re­
spondents by switching  abruptly from one topic to another . 47 
Tra ns itiona l phra ses were used l ibera l ly to a id in the overa l l  
fl ow o f  the interview . 48 Open-ended and genera l quest ions wer e  pla ced 
before c l osed-ended and spec i f ic questions on the same topic t o  prevent 
quest ions from bia s ing ea ch other .49 And when there wa s a pos s ibil ity 
that two questions might b ia s  each other , the more important question 
wa s placed f irst. 50 
Before its use in the survey , the questionna ire wa s pretested and 
revised twice to correct previous ly undetected bia s  in the quest ions , 
el iminate unnec essary quest ions and ma ke word ing changes . 
Questionna ire Construction :  Sect ion � 
Sect ion Brea kdown 
What f ol lows is an examination of ea ch section of the question-
na ire highl ighting some of the more pertinent a spects related to 
c ontent and
.
word ing : 
Hel l o .  My name is  and I ' m ca l l ing you ton ight 
from S ioux Fa l l s  as part of a research proj ect for a gra dua te 
student .  
What  we ' re d o ing is ta k ing a statew ide survey to  f ind out 
how South Da kotans  feel  a bout the ir pol it ica l leaders  and 
about various state is sues . Your te lephone number was drawn 
by chance ,  and your name wil l not be used o 
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Naming the c ity from which the interviewer is  ca l l ing is  important 
in that l ong d istance  telephone ca l ls have a greater impact  on most 
people . 5 1  
The ca l ler ident ify ing himsel f and expla in ing a l ittle  about the 
study helps to legitimize the survey and establ ish a certa in bond of 
trust w ith the respondent , thereby encourag ing the respondent to con­
t inue with the interview . 52 
To be sure that our survey is ac curate , it is important 
that  we interview a man in some households and a woman in 
others . To f ind out who I need to ta lk to in your household , 
I need to a s k  two short questions . 
The f irst one is , how many people 18 years old and older 
l ive in your household includ ing yourself? 
How many of them are men? 
OK, a ccord ing to the research method be ing used for our 
survey , I need to ta lk  to the in your household . 
[ Depending on who the interviewer is ta lking to , s evera l 
more questions are a sked to br ing the proper per son to the 
te lephone g ] 
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The procedur e this survey used to s e lect which member of  a house-
hold to interview was bas ed on the Trolda hl-Carter method suggested by 
Dil lma n . 53 This method re l ies on a ser ies of matrices  that indicate 
which person in the household should  be interviewed depending on the 
number and sex of the adu lts l iving there ( see Append ix D ) . 
To determine who should be interviewed , the interviewer pla ces  
one o f  the matr ic es on  the a ppropr iate space  on the quest ionna ire ,  
as ks the two questions indica ted and then f inds the intersect ion po int 
on the ne trix c orresponding to the nunilier of  adults and men . 
Trolda hl and Carter devised four netr ices  to be used in rotat ion 
w ith this method , ea ch ma tr ix to be used in turn . This i s  a l s o  the 
proc edure suggested by Dil lman . However , in 1975 s oc ia l  sc ience re-
s earcher Barbara Bryant suggested a mod if ication in the Troldahl-Carter 
method which ma kes it s l ightly more a ccurate . 54 This mod i f ication ,  
adopted by Cra ft55 and by this  survey , ca l l s for skipping the f ourth 
matrix every other turn . Instea d  of instructing the interviewers to 
skip the fourth netr ix ,  though , this survey s imply used a s even-natrix 
rotation with na tric es  5 ,  6 and 7 be ing identica l to 1 , 2 and 3 .  
The questions I need to a sk should ta ke only about f ive 
minutes . But before starting them, I want to ment ion tha t I 
would be ha ppy to answer any questions you might have about 
the study e ither now or later .  OK? 
This  paragra ph is  bas ica l ly a c ontinua tion of the introduction . 
Giving a conservative but rea s onable time estinete helps reduce a 
respondent ' s  mis g ivings about be ing interviewed . The offer to answer 
questions is made  to provide the res pondent with an opportun ity to 
learn any informa tion he or she wou ld l ike to know before the inter­
view starts and to hel p  establ ish ra pport . 56 
1 .  F irst ,  I wou ld l ike to a sk you if you ha ppen to be regis­
tered to vote in  South Da kota a t  the present time? 
2 .  Do you think you w i l l  be voting in the genera l e l ect ion 
being he ld this Novenilier? 
The purpose  of these  two que stions was to screen out from the 
sampl e those persons who were l ea st l ikely to vote . S ince this sur-
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vey ' s purpose  wa s to devise a pol it ica l strategy a imed at pers ons w ith 
a high probabil ity of voting , persons answer ing "n'?" to e ither of thes e 
questions were exc luded from answer ing any further ques tions . 
3 .  In tha t e lect ion , the two candidates running for governor 
are Mike O ' Connor and B i l l  Janklow .  Now if the e lect ion 
were be ing held today , which one of those two candidates 
would you ra ther see w in , O ' Connor or Janklow? 
3a . [ If the respondent says he or she doesn ' t  know] Wel l ,  
which cnad ida te do you think you lean  towards a s  of right 
now? 
This quest ion wa s vita l to the survey ' s ana lys is , not so  much  for 
showing which cand ida te wa s ahead ,  but for ident ifying the undec ideds 
and Janklow- leaners --two groups important to the O ' Connor campa ign . 
It should  a l so  be noted that the answer choices  were rotated : in 
ha lf  the quest ionna ir es O ' Connor wa s named f irst and in the other ha lf  
Janklow wa s na med f irst . This was to  prevent a bia s  tha t may occur 
when one cand ida te ' s  name is a lways read f irst . 57 
4.  The two candida tes for Congress in this fa l l ' s e l ect ion 
are Tom Da schle and Cl int Roberts . Once aga in , if the 
e lection were being he ld today,  which one would you 
rather see w in ,  Da schl e or Roberts? 
4a . [ If the respondent says he or she doesn ' t  know] Wel l ,  
which candidate  do you think you l ean  towards a s  of  
r ight now? 
This que stion s erved three purposes . 
F irst ,  the survey needed at  l east one question not d irectly re-
la ted to the governor ' s  race  in order to avo id seeming to be s olely 
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c oncerned w ith that one subj ect . If respondents became suspic ious that 
this was the ca s e ,  it might have bia sed their answers . 58 
Second , the question provided an additiona l check on the va l id ity 
of  the da ta of the governor ' s  race  quest ions . 
And third , it made it poss ible  to compare the strength of the c on-
gress iona l ca nd ida tes with the gubernator ia l candidates for cross-
tabulation . 
The answer cho ices for this quest ion ,  too ,  were rota ted . 
5 .  • • •  How would  you rate the kind o f  j ob Bil l Janklow i s  
doing a s  governor? Would  you say he ' s  doing a n  exc e l l ent 
j ob ,  good j ob ,  fa ir j ob ,  or poor job? 
The primary purpose of this question wa s to determine how vulner-
able Janklow wou ld be to charges tha t his overa ll  j ob perforna nce wa s 
not good . 
6 .  Next , can you te l l  me anything in particular that you l ike 
a bout Bi l l  Jankl ow? ( PROBE IF NECESSARY , BUT NOT TOO ----
HARD, e . g .  " In just your own persona l opinion , "  " Judg ing 
by wha t you ' ve heard or rea d , "  "Can you think of any­
thing at  a l l? "  "Your opinion i s  as  good a s  the next 
person ' s" ) .  
7 .  Can you te l l  me anything in particu lar that you d is l ike 
about Bil l  Ja nklow? (AGA IN ,  PROBE IF NECESSARY BUT NOT 
TOO HARD ) .  
These questions were asked to l earn Janklow ' s ima ge among South 
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Da kota voters o They were open-ended so  a s  to obta in words and phra ses  
that people wou ld spontaneously suggest to descr ibe him and  thereby 
give data which would more a ccura tely reflect the ir true  fee l ings about 
him. 59 
The add it iona l instructions regard ing probing were inc luded be-
cause open-ended questions of this type usua l ly requ ire pers istent 
probing by the interviewer . Otherw ise ,  the responses are l iab le  to be 
inc omplete , uninterpretable  or irrelevant . 6° However , it wa s recom-
mended that  for these  two questions the probing should not be too hard 
because rrany of the respondents honestly might not be able  to think 
of things they e ither l iked or d i s l iked about Jankl ow .  
8 .  As you know , there are a l ot o f  important probl ems that the 
governor and state l egis la ture have to dea l  with every year . 
But in your opin ion , what  is  the most important problem 
fac ing South Dakota r ight now that  the governor and state 
leg is lature need to do  s omething about? ( PROBE IF NECES­
SARY , e . g . ,  " In just your own persona l opinion , "  • • • ) .  
9 .  Now ,  wha t would  you say is the second most important probl em 
tha t the governor and state leg is lature need to do  s omething 
about? (AGA IN , PROBE IF NECESSARY ) .  
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These two questions were the heart and soul  of the survey . The ir 
purpose  wa s to provide the a l l- important data regard ing wha t issues · 
were  on the minds of South Dakota voters . Respondents were a sked to 
name both the f irst and sec ond most important problems in order to 
ga in more c omprehens ive da ta . Here aga in ,  the questions were  open-
ended and probing wa s needed . 
10 .  A lot of  people in South Da kota are c oncerned about the 
farm economy . Some people are saying tha t the governor 
and sta te leg is la tur e should be do ing a lot more to he l p  
the farmer . Others say tha t state government is  a lready 
do ing about a s  much a s  it can .  Which is c los er t o  your 
opin ion , tha t the governor and state  leg is lature shou ld 
be do ing a l ot more to help  the farmer , or that they ' re  
a lready doing a bout a s  much a s  they can? 
1 1 . • • •  Governor Janklow ha s been in the news a l ot for 
getting into arguments w ith po l it ica l leaders from other 
states . S ome people  think that because of these  argu­
ments , Governor Janklow is ma king too many enemies f or 
South Da kota . They say that a l l  his argu ing is doing 
more harm than good and tha t he picks f ights  with other 
states when he doesn ' t have to . Other people don ' t mind 
it very much that Governor Jankl ow gets into these  argu­
ments . They say that it shows he ' s  fighting for South 
Da kota and sticking up for the state ' s interests . Which 
is c loser to your pos ition ,  that Governor Janklow ' s 
f ighting with other states is  do ing South D3. kota more 
harm than good , or tha t it ' s not hurting South Da kota 
very much if a t  a l l? 
12 . Governor Janklow ha s worked out s evera l a greements w ith 
large corpora t ions on some very big projects . Some 
people are very c oncerned about the fa ct that these  
agreements were worked out in  secret . Other people say 
that these  kinds of  dea l s  have to be worked out in s ecret 
and tha t this isn ' t anything to be conc erned about . How 
do  you fee l  about Governor Jankl ow working out a l l these 
a greements in secret? Wou ld you say you are fa irly c on­
cerned or not c oncerned very much? 
13 . Some people  think tha t a lthough Governor Ja nklow may have 
gotten a l ot of things done over the la st  four years , he 
sometimes acts too wild and unpredictabl e .  They say tha t 
his way of d o ing things is bound to get South Da kota into 
troubl e in the long  run . Other people say they aren ' t 
bothered very much by how Governor Janklow acts . They say 
tha t as long as he seems to be getting results , the way 
he gets things don e doesn ' t ma tter very much .  How d o  you 
feel  about this? Would you say tha t  the way Governor 
Jankl ow gets things done bothers you a lot , or tha t it 
doesn ' t bother you very much if at  a l l? 
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Thes e  four questions were a sked to f ind out the voter s ' a ttitudes 
w ith regard to some of  Janklow ' s po l ic ies and actions , thereby deter-
min ing how vu lnerable Janklow might be in each of these  area s . 
For each quest ion , s ome informa tion about the particular i ssue  was 
g iven before the question was a s ked . This wa s done so tha t respondents 
would know about the issue more ful ly and thus be able to provide more 
thoughtful responses . 61 
It a ls o  might be noted that only two answer ca tegorie s  were pro-
vided for ea ch of  these questions . This wa s because it wa s felt that 
two choices would be suff ic ient for a ll owing the respondents to pro-
vide the inforn� tion sought, wherea s more choices would have na de  both 
the interviewing and data ana lys is  needlessly c omplex . 
14 . • • •  people in South Dakota usua l ly get most of  their 
informa tion a bout sta te pol it ic s  and government from 
either rad io ,  televis ion ,  da ily newspa pers or weekly 
newspa per s .  Front which one of those sources do you get 
most  of your information on South Da kota pol it ics? 
This question wa s a sked to determine the media preferences  of  the 
electorate . 
1 5 .  Next , we ' d  l ike to know s omething about where you l ive . 
Do you l ive on a fa rm or ra nch ;  a town with l es s  than 
1000 people ; a town with between 1000 and 5000 people ;  
between 5 , 000 and 20 , 000 people ; or over 20 , 000? 
1 6 .  Next we ' d  l ike to know which one of  these a ge categor ies  
you are  in : 18  to  29 years o ld ; 30  to  44 years old ; 45 
to 64 ; or over 65? 
17 . Now we ' d  l ike to get a very genera l idea about your fam­
ily income . Is your fami ly income under $5 , 000 ; between 
5 and $ 15 , 000 ; between 15 and $25 , 000 ; or over $25 , 000? 
18 . And f ina l ly ,  would  you mind te l l ing me whether you gener­
a l ly c ons ider yourself  to be a Republ ican ,  Democra t or 
Independent? 
1 9 .  INDICATE SEX OF RESPONDENT . 
20 . AD! NUMBER (FROM LA BEL ON FIRST PAGE ) . 
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This f ina l section of the questionna ir e was a imed a t  obta ining a 
variety of demogra phic information cons idered pertinent to campa ign 
strategy . The "AD!" referred to in Item 20 is a tel evis ion market ' s 
" area of dominant inf luence . "  The two pr imary TV ma rkets in South 
Dakota are S ioux Fa l l s ( " SF" in the answer category for Item 20 a s  
shcmn in the c omplete questionna ire in Appendix C ) and Rapid City 
( "RC" ) . A dditiona l ly ,  the S ioux City ,  Iowa ( " IA" ) , and B ismarc k ,  
North Da kota ( "ND" ) , TV markets a l so  reach into South Da kota and domin-
ate in a f ew counties . 
These questions were ordered so  that what was thought to  be the 
more obj ectionable persona l questions--age ,  income and party a f fil i-
ation--were a s ked la st  in order to prevent premature termina tion of 
the interview by the respondent . 62 
fv'any pol l s  ask  more demogra phic quest ions , but it wa s thought 
that for this survey , any further questions of  t his  type wou ld have 
yie lded l ittl e  usefu l  information for the amount of time and effort 
that would have been requ ired to obta in and ana lyze the data . 
Interviewing 
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Interviewers for this pro j ect  were recru ited from 64 persons  who 
had s igned up to be O ' Connor volunteers . Twenty-two vo lunteers a greed 
to he lp  with the project  a lthough only 14 a ctua lly d id any interview­
ing o  In addit ion to these 14 , tw o  O ' Connor sta ffers and the author 
d id some interview ing . 
A lmost a l l  of the te lephone ca l l s  were ne de from the O ' Connor 
campa ign headquarter s l ocated in the Western M3 1 1  in S ioux Fa l l s .  F ive 
telephone l ine s wer e  ava ilable for use  by the interviewers , a lthough 
dur ing only one interviewing per iod were a l l five actua l ly u sed . 
Two volunteers who were espec ia l ly exper ienced and c ompetent d id 
interview ing from their homes . It was thought that by us ing thes e 
persons to ca l l  sample  households in the S i oux Fa lls  area , the proj ect  
would be  completed more qu ickly . It is doubtful tha t this had much of 
an effect ,  though.  
A dditiona l ly ,  the author ma de severa l phone ca l l s  from his a part­
ment in Aurora , S outh Da kota . 
The interview ing began Monday ,  August 16 ,  and cont inued through 
Thursday , August 26 . Ca l l s  were na de every day except Sunday when the 
O ' Connor headquarters wa s c losed . 
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Most of the ca l l s  were ma de in the evening between 6 : 00 a nd 10 : 00 .  
From 6 : 00 to 9 : 00 most ca l l s  were d irected to sampl e households in the 
Centra l T ime Zone . Households in the Mounta in Time Zone , where it wa s 
an hour ear l ier , were c ontacted ma inly between 9 : 00 a nd 10 : 00  S i oux 
Fa l ls t ime . This d ivis ion provided for the most effic ient use o f  the 
interviewers ' t ime s inc e they were able to work in f our-hour shifts63 
yet sti l l  c ontact a l l  the households dur ing the pr ime interview ing 
hours between 6 a nd 9 P . M. l oca l t ime . 64 
On Monday and Tuesday of the sec ond week of interview ing , phone 
ca l l s  were a l so ma de in the a fternoon to contact households  where there 
had been no answer in the evening o On Wednesday and Thursday of  the 
s ec ond week--the f ina l two days of interview ing--ca l ls were made  in 
the morning , afternoon and even ing in order to rea ch as many n ot-at­
homes a s  pos s ible . 
The tra in ing of  the interviewers wa s cons idered one o f  the most 
important a spects of  the proj ect .  This wa s in accordance w ith severa l 
of the experts ' rec onmenda tions , inc lud ing Sabato , who sa id that the 
interviewers ' degree of ski l l and tra ining is absolutely cr itica l to 
the qua l ity of a pol l ' s  data o 65 
There were two tra ining sess ions for interviewers . At the f irst 
one on the evening of the Fr iday ,  August 13 , three persons a ttended . 
At the sec ond one , hel d  the even ing of Sunday ,  August 1 5 , s ix a ttended . 
A l l  other interviewers were tra ined on the f irst n ight they came in to 
ma ke ca l ls o 
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As  a part of the tra in ing ,  interviewers were g iven three handout 
sheets : " Instructions for Interviewers " ( see Appendix E ) , " Poss ible 
Answers to Reas ons for Refusa l" (Append ix F ) , and "Wha t the Respondent 
Might L ike to  Know" (Appendix G ) . Much of the informa tion in these  
mater ia ls  was l ifted from Dil lma n ' s Mail  and Telephone Surveys .  
After the interviewers had bec ome famil iar with the handout mater­
ia ls , other pol ic ies were expla ined , inc luding the procedures  f or 
f il l ing out the " Ca l l  Rec ord " and us ing the matr ices  to s e l ect the 
proper respondent . This la st ta sk  wa s the most. d iff icult  for the in­
terviewers to ma ster ,  a lthough a l l  of them eventua l ly were  able  to use  
the rra tr ices  with l ittle trouble .  
The questionna ire wa s a l so  reviewed s ection by section with 
problem areas highl ighted . F ina l ly ,  each interviewer c onducted a 
pra ctice  interview with e ither the author or another interviewer . 
Other than the po l ic ies with regard to households in the Mounta in 
and Centra l T ime Zones and the S ioux Fa l l s  ca l l ing area , households 
were not ca l led in any spec ia l order . 
A fter ea ch household  in the sample had been c a l l ed at l ea st onc e , 
not-a t-homes were  ca l led a s ec ond time . A fter that ser ies of  ca l ls wa s 
c ompleted , the rema in ing not-at-homes were ca l led a third t ime , and so 
on . At  the proj ect ' s c onc lus ion ,  ea ch not-at-home had been ca l l ed at  
lea st seven more t imes dur ing the 1 1-day interviewing per iod . When 
c ompared with other surveys , this repres ents a very strong effort to 
reach a 11 sample  households . Blankenship, for example , rec orrunends that 
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only two ca l l-ba c ks be ma de to not-at-homes , 66 and Cra ft in his survey 
made at lea st two but no more tha n f our ca l l -ba cks to not-at-homes . 67 
Dur ing each interview ing per iod , the author period ica l ly went 
ar ound to ea ch interviewing stat ion and picked up quest ionna ires  for 
households that had been ca l l ed .  He reviewed the questionna ire s  to 
ma ke sure  that a l l of the data wa s leg ibly and properly rec orded  and 
then placed them in one of five sta cks : interview c ompleted ( these 
inc luded respondents who had answered " no" to questions one or two ) ,  
refusa l/d isconnected/nonres identia l ,  no answer--Mounta in T ime Zone , no  
answer--Centra l T ime Zone and ca l l-back-at-spec if ied-time . 
At the c onc lus ion of  each  day ' s interviewing ,  a rec ord wa s made  
of  who ha d been interviewing on  that day and how many ca l ls resulted in 
completed interviews , refusa l s  and disc onnections . Running tota ls  were 
a l so kept for these la st  three categor ies ( see Appendix H ) . 
Cod ing 
Throughout the interviewing per iod , separate da i ly rec ord s were 
ma de of the answers  to quest ions s ix through nine , the open-ended 
questions . 
By the middl e  o f  the f irst week , a c lear pa ttern of  the more pop­
ular responses ha d emerged . A few cod ing categor ies for eac h  que st ion 
were then establ ished and a numer ica l  c ode wa s a s s igned to s ome of  the 
responses . 
A fter the survey wa s c ompleted and a l l the prel iminary c od ing had 
been done , a separa te l isting wa s na de of a l l the answers which ha d not 
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yet been plac ed in a c od ing category and a ss igned a number . A fter 
reviewing these answers and ana lyz ing them further , the rest of the 
cod ing categor ies wer e  determined and a l l  of the rema in ing answers 
were categor ized and a s s igned a number . The la st step  in this process  
was to wr ite the c ode nurrbers on each  questionna ire .  
The nurrber o f  c od ing categor ies for each question wa s l imited t o  
ten , n� inly because  i t  would have been difficult for the c omputer to 
process  the da ta for more than ten categorie s .  Furthermore , more cate­
gories wou ld have s ign if icantly conlpl ica ted the data ' s  ana lys is while  
yielding only marg ina lly useful information . 
Tabulations 
The in it ia l stra ight-run ta bu la tion of the quest ionna ires , as we l l  
a s one cros stabulat ion , wa s done manua lly . 
The f irst step  in tabulating the responses wa s to s ort a l l  the 
c ompleted questionna ires into ca tegor ies on the bas is of answers to 
the f irst three quest ions . This made it poss ibl e to do the overa l l  
frequency tabula tion and question-three cr osstabulat ion s imulta neous ly .  
Percenta ges for each  response  ca tegory were a l so ca lcul ated . 
A s ec ond stra ight-run tabulation wa s la ter made by the SDSU 
Computer Center . The c omputer center a l so crosstabulated answers f or 
questions three and f ive . 
� Ana lys is 
A fter a l l the needed frequenc ies and percentages ha d been ca lcu­
la ted , the data wa s ana lyzed in a 12-page report ( see A ppend ix I ) . 
In writing it,  the author strove to present the most pertinent 
and relevant da ta from the survey in a form tha t wou ld be practica l 
and understandable  to campa ign of f ic ia l s . 
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The ana lysis  and recommendations , ba sed on the author ' s knowledge 
of  pol l ing research a s  presented in Cha pter III and his best j udgment 
regarding the po l it ic a l  s ituat ion in South Da kota , keyed pr inc ipa lly 
on the responses o f  the entire sample a s  a whole and of those persons 
who identif ied themselves in quest ion three as being undec ided or 
leaning-to-Janklow .  
Because the O ' Connor campa ign ha d underwr itten most of the expen­
ses for the survey and had provided the fa c i l ities and volunteers for 
the interviewing pha s e ,  it wa s agreed that the results of the survey 
and the report would be kept c onfidentia l unti l  a fter the e l ec tion . 
The report was del ivered to the O ' Connor campa ign Friday , Septem­
ber 3 ,  e ight days a fter the completion of the survey . 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
A survey ' s  f indings can be eva luated in a variety of area s .  In 
this  cha pter , the findings o f  this survey are presented in terms of 
cost , response rate and data . 
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In the f irst section , the survey ' s cost is ca lculated and c ompared 
w ith the pol l ing costs incurred by another South Da kota pol itica l cam­
pa ign . 
The next section pr esents the survey ' s response  ra te in s evera l 
different f orms and c ompares it to the response rates of s imilar sur-
veys . 
The f ina l sect ion presents the s urvey ' s results item by item and 
brief ly discusses the ramif ications of  the data . 
£2.§1 
One of  the ma j or benefits that sh-ould a ccrue to a campa ign which 
does an in-house  po l l  is  the saving of  a substantia l amount of money . 
The amount of  money the O ' Connor campa ign saved can be ca lculated 
by comparing the c ost  of this pol l to the c ost  of a po ll  ta ken for the 
campa ign of Rep .  Tom Da schle by an outs ide po ll ster . Da schle  was the 
Democratic cand idate for South Da kota ' s  lone  congress iona l s eat  in 1 982 . 
There were two ma j or expenses for the O ' Connor in-house  pol l :  
l ong d istance te l ephone ca l l s  and printing the questionna ire s .  
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The O ' Connor campa ign purcha s ed a spec ia l " gold l ine" l ong 
d istance  te lephone service from Northwestern Bell  Te lephone Compa ny · 
to accommodate the needs of the pol l . This permitted the campa ign to 
ma ke in-st�te long d ista nce ca lls  at a fla t per-hour rate which varied 
depend ing on the t ime of  day the c a l l s  were made . 
Ac cord ing to the O ' Connor campa ign ' s telephone bi l l  for the month 
of August , the cost of the ca lls  ma de under the gold-l ine  serv ice , 
inc luding insta l lation ,  wa s $455 . 00 .  S ince nearly a l l  of  these  ca l l s 
were nade  for the survey , this f igure can be taken a s  a l ibera l est i­
mate of the tel ephone expenses  incurred by the survey . A large por tion 
of the survey ' s ca l ls were a l so ma de on the campa ign ' s in-sta te WATS 
l ine  which cost $71 5 . 00 per month . But s ince its use  for the survey 
did not enta il any extra expense for the O ' Connor campa ign ,  its cost 
was not f igured into the survey ' s  overa l l  cost . 
The s econd ma j or expens e for the po l l  wa s the pr int ing of  the 
questionna ires . This wa s done at the South Da kota State  Univers ity 
Pr int La b and c ost  $185 .43 .  
Adding the cost o f  the long-d ista nce tel ephone service and print­
ing , plus $30 to have the quest ionna ir e labels typed and approx imately 
$20 for mi sc el la neous  expenses ,  such a s  suppl ies and copying , gives the 
survey a tota l c ost  of $69 1 .43 or roughly $700.  
A campa ign want ing to adopt this methodology and us e a ful l -t ime 
pa id sta ffer to orga nize  a nd direct a po ll ing proj ect might a l so  want 
to include in its co�t est imations one and one-ha l f  to two month ' s 
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sa lary for tha t sta ffer ,  s ince this is the a pprox ima te amount of time 
the sta ffer wi l l  need to spend on the pr oj ect . 
The Da schle campa ign , by c ompar ison , spent a tota l of $25 , 000 on 
po ll ing : $6 , 000 f or in-house  "tracking" pol l s  and $ 19 , 000 for in­
depth pol l s  ta ken by a profess iona l pol l ing f irm . 1 
One of the in-depth pol ls ta ken by the Da schle campa ign wa s done 
part ia lly in-house and c ost  $2 , 500 . For this survey , volunteers d id 
the interviewing whil e the po l l ing f irm des igned the sample a nd ana l­
yzed the data .2 
Another in-depth survey wa s done c ompletely by the po ll ing f irm . 
Its c ost  wa s $10 , 000 .3 
The c ost  of a third in-depth survey wa s spl it w ith the South 
Da kota Democrat ic Party . The Da schle campa ign ' s share of the c ost  of 
this po ll  was $6 , 500 .4 
Subtracting the a pprox imate c ost of this thes is ' po ll  ta ken for 
the O ' Connor campa ign--$700--from the c ost of the Da schle  campa ign ' s 
sec ond in-depth survey--$10 , 000--leaves $9 ,300 a s  the a pprox imate 
amount of  money the O ' Connor campa ign saved by doing a completely in­
house po ll  instead of hir ing a profess iona l pol lster to execute a l l  
pha ses  o f  a po ll . 
Response Ra te 
A deta il ed br ea kdown of the f ina l dispos ition of ca l l s  to the 696 
sample hous eholds is g iven in Ta ble 1 .  
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TABLE 1 
F INAL DISPOS ITION OF CALLS 
% 
Completed and part ia l ly 
c ompleted interviews 41 1 59 . 1  
Not el igibl e 93 13 . 4  
Nonres ident ia l 3 0 .4 
Disc onnected 60 8 . 6  
Refusa ls  92 13 . 2  
No  answer/busy 36  5 . 2  
Unaccounted 1 0 . 1 
Of the 696 sampl e households , c ompleted or partia l ly c ompl eted 
interviews were obta ined w ith res pondents in 411 or about 59 percent . 
Res pondents in 93 hous eholds , or about 13 percent , were ine l ig ibl e 
(not reg istered to vote or not pla nning to vote in the genera l elec-
t ion ) . Respondents refused to be  interviewed in  92 households , or 
about 13 percent . In 60 households , or about 9 percent , the te lephones 
were d isc onnected , and in 36 households or about 5 percent , the tele-
phones  were e ither not answered or were a lways busy . 
It is d iff icult to judge how the response rate for this survey 
compares to other surveys because of the variety of methods used in 
computing response  ra tes . 5 The dispos ition of ca l ls for this survey , 
however, wa s s imilar to  that of John Cra ft ' s  survey , the brea kdown for 
which is g iven in Ta ble  2 .  
TABLE 2 
F INAL DISPOS IT ION OF CALLS FOR CRAFT' S 
MISS ISS IPPI  OP IN ION POLL 
Compl eted and unc ompleted interviews 292 
No el igible respondent 10 
Bus ines s  2 
Not-in-service 55 
Refusa ls  64 
No answer 57 
% 
60 . 8  
2 . 0  
0 . 4  
1 1 . 5  
13 .3 
12 . 0  
SOURCE : John M. Cra ft ,  "A Mis s iss ippi Opin ion Pol l"  ( M.A o 
the s is , Un ivers ity of Miss iss ippi , 1 979 ) ,  P •  179 . 
There were two ma j or differences between the response  rate of  
Cra ft ' s survey and the survey for this thesis . 
F irst,  the survey for this thes is had a much greater percenta ge 
of  ine l ig ible  respondents , more tha n 13 percent a s  opposed to 2 per-
cent for Cra ft . This  wa s probably because anyone over the a ge of 18  
was el ig ibl e for the Cra ft survey and only reg istered S outh Dakota 
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voters who planned to vote in the November genera l  e l ection were e l ig-
ibl e  for this survey . 
Sec ond , this thes is ' survey had a much  lower percentage  of no 
answers , about 5 percent as opposed to 12 percent for Cra ft . This  wa s 
probably because more ca l l-back  a ttempts were made for this  survey--a t 
least  seven to every no-answer/busy household--than for Cra ft ' s which,  
a s  noted in the pr evious chapter , ma de a t  least two but no  more tha n 
four ca l l-back  attempts . 
If one ca lcu lates the response rate by ta king the number of c om-
pl eted interviews a s  a percenta ge of the entire sample ,  this  survey ' s  
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response ra te was 59 . 1 percent . However , there are severa l other 
methods for ca lculating survey response ra te s ,  two of  which w i l l  now -
be expla ined in the c ontext of this survey . 
Under one method , descr ibed by Dillman , the respons e rate is  ob-
ta ined by ca lcula ting the percenta ge of c ontacts with e l ig ible  
respondents that resu lt in c ompleted interviews . Di l lman says that  
this procedure " provides a more d irect  ind icator of a method ' s  
res ponse-induc ing ca pa bi l ities"  than s imply determining the percenta ge 
of  the prig ina l sample from whom c ompleted interviews were obta ined . 6 
Under this method , this survey ' s response rate would  be c a lcu-
lated thusly :  
41 1 (number of c ompl eted interviews ) 
69 6 (number in sample) - 192 (nonel igible  and  nonreachable ) = 81 •
5% 
This figure i s  very c lose  to the 78 percent response ra te obta ined 
by Di llnan  in a s imilar survey on cand idates and issues perta ining to 
a statewide  genera l e l ection in Wa shington .7 
Another method of  ca lculating response rates is  used by the Adver­
tising Research Founda tion . As descr ibed by Bla nkenship, 8 this method 
takes the number of c ompleted interviews a s  a percenta ge  of  tota l 
sample households  minus these s ix categories :  
1 .  Confirmed nonworking numbers ( 60 )  
2 .  Conf irmed nonhousehold numbers (3 ) 
3 .  Dupl ica te nuniliers ( 0 )  
4 .  Inel igibl e households ( 93 ) 
5 . Estima ted proportion of nonreached households that represent 
nonhouseho lds ( 0 )  
6 .  Estima ted proportion of  ine l igibl e households among house­
holds whose e l ig ibil ity was established (24 )  
(Nuniliers in par entheses ind ica te households in this survey 
fa l l ing into each  category . )  
The f igure for ca tegory s ix wa s obta ined by a dd ing together the 
nunilier of refusa ls  and no-answer/busy households ( 128 ) ,  and multi-
plying that f igure by the percenta ge of  nonel igibl es among the 504 
households where el ig ibil ity was established ( 1 8 .4 ) .  
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Us ing this techn ique ,  this survey ' s  response rate would be  ca lcu-
lated thusly :  
4 1 1  ( number of  c ompleted interviews ) 
= 79 . 7% 696 ( number in sample ) - 1 80 ( tota l of  s ix categor ies ) 
This  rate is thre e-tenths of one percent lower than the 80 percent 
min imum completion ra te which a study needs to have in order to be a p­
proved by the A dvert is ing Research Foundat ion . 9 
Survey Results 
In this section , the results for each of the 20 items on the 
questionna ire wi l l  be pres ented and br ief ly d iscussed . These results 
perta in to the sample as  a whole . A further breakdown by subgroups for 
s ome of  the quest ions is  pres ented in the report to the O ' Connor cam-
pa ign in Appendix  I .  
TABLE 3 
QUEST ION ONE : REGISTERED TO VOTE IN SOUTH DAKOTA 
Yes 
No 
419 
85 
% 
83 . 1  
1 6 . 9  
80 
As  Tabl e 3 shows , over 83 percent of the respondents sa id they 
were currently reg istered to vote in South Da kota . The 85 persons who 
sa id they were not reg istered were not a sked any further questions . 
TABLE 4 
QUESTION TWO: PLAN TO VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION 
Yes 
No 
411  
8 
% 
98 . 1  
1 . 9 
Ta ble 4 shows that over 98 percent of the respondents who sa id 
they were registered a l so  sa id tha t they pla nned to vote in the genera l 
election . A ga in , the persons responding "no" to this question wer e  not 
a sked any further questions . 
Although only e ight respondents were el iminated because o f  this 
question , it should  be noted that  this reduced the non-sampl ing error 
by near ly two percenta ge points . 
TABLE 5 
QUESTION THREE : PREFERRED GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE 
% 
O' Connor 81  1 9 . 7  
Lean O ' Connor 24 5 . 8  
Lean Ja nklow 49 1 1 . 9  
Jankl ow 201 48 . 9  
Refused 8 1 . 9  
Undec ided 48 11 .7  
Table  5 shows that near ly one-ha lf  of the sample wa s l ined up  
f irmly behind Jankl ow at  the start of  the campa ign . This wa s ind ica+ 
tive of the extreme d i f f iculty of the O ' Connor campa ign ' s ta sk .  
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Much o f  the ana lys is of the report to the O ' Connor campa ign 
(Appendix I ) keyed on the responses of  those 97 respondents who iden� 
tif ied themselves as be ing e ither undec ided or leaning to Janklow .  
This undec ided/Ja nklow-l eaner subgroup wa s the logica l one f or the 
campa ign to target a s  they would be more l ikely to switch into the 
"O" Connor" or "Lean O ' Connor" categories than the f irm Janklow sup-
porters . 
Combining ea ch cand idate ' s  " l eaners" and f irm supporters a nd a p-
port ioning the " refused" a nd " undec ided" respondents to the cand ida tes 
in equa l proportions to their support gives Janklow a 70 . 4  percent 
preference leve l to O ' Connor ' s 29 . 6  percent . These  f igures were only 
0 . 5  percent off  from the actua l percenta ge of the tota l vote ea ch can­
didate rece ived on election day--70 . 9  percent vs . 29 . 1  percentlO _ _  mean-
ing tha t the overa l l  shift in voter sentiment wa s very sma l l dur ing the 
c ourse  of the campa ign .  
TABLE 6 
QUESTION FOUR: PREFERRED CONGRESS IONAL CANDIDATE 
% 
Da schle 181 44. 0  
Lean Daschle 17 4 . 1 
Lean Roberts 21  5 . 1  
Roberts 144 35 . 0  
Refused 9 2 . 2  
Undec ided 39 9 . 5  
Tabl e  6 shows that the congres s iona l ra ce wa s much c l oser than the 
gubernator ia l ,  a lthough it should be noted that Da schle hel d  a 
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n ine-perc entage point l ead  among respondents who were f irmly behind 
one of the two candidates . 
Combin ing the " leaners" and f irm supporters and a pportion ing  the 
"refused" and " undec ided" in this race g ives Da schle 54 . 5  percent to 
Roberts ' 45 . 5  percent . These f igures were 2 . 9  percent off  from the 
a ctua l vote perc enta ges , which were 5 1 . 6  percent for Da schle and 48 . 4 
percent for Roberts . 1 1  This  indicates that the overa l l  shift in voter 
s entiment was much greater for this contest than it wa s for the 
Janklow-O ' Connor race . 
TABLE 7 
QUESTION F IVE : RAT ING OF JANKLOW AS GOVERNOR 
% 
Excel l ent 58 14 . 1 
Good 209 50 . 9  
Fa ir 1 1 1  27 . 0  
Poor 20 4 . 9  
Refused 3 0 . 7  
Undec ided 10 2 . 4  
The most str iking fact indicated by the f igures in Table  7 i s  the 
sampl e ' s overwhe lmingly h igh rating of Janklow' s performance a s  gover-
nor with 65 percent saying that he was do ing e ither a good or excel l ent 
j ob .  This was another indication of how d ifficult it would  be for 
O ' Connor to defeat  Jankl ow .  
TABLE 8 
QUESTION S IX :  JANKLOW ' S J'IOST L IKED QUALITIES 
Forthr ight , outspoken , says wha t he thinks 
Effect ive , forcefu l , man-of-action 
Spec if ic po l ic ies and a ctions 
Coura ge , guts 
Consc ient ious , trying hard , do ing his best 
Competent , done a good j ob 
Honest , keeps h is word 
Down-to-earth, a pproachable  
Misce l laneous 
Don ' t know , can ' t say , nothing  
124 
38  
29 
23 
1 6  
14  
13 
5 
3 1  
1 18 
% 
3 0 . 2  
9 . 2  
7 . 1 
5 . 6  
3 . 9  
3 . 4  
3 .2 
1 . 2 
7 . 5  
28 . 7  
83 
Table  8 shows that  Janklow ' s outspoken , forthr ight manner was the 
qua l ity l iked best about him by the sample . It was c ited by over 30  
percent of the respondents . His effectiveness ; spec i f ic po l ic ies and 
actions ; and c ourage were  the next three most frequently mentioned 
l ikeable qua lities o 
TABLE 9 
QUESTION SEVEN:  JANKLOW ' S MOST DISL IKED QUAL ITIES 
Speaks before he thinks , ta lks too much 
Persona l ity--arrogant , c ocky ,  ta ct les s ,  
s elf-centered 
Spec if ic po l ic ies  and a ctions 
Way he does things , style , s ecretism, 
not profess iona l 
Ra ilroad dea l 
Speed ing , dr iving hab its , obeying laws 
Rash,  impetuous 
Overkil l ,  goes too far 
Miscel laneous 
Don ' t  know , can ' t say , noth ing 
42 
32 
29 
17 
14 
14  
9 
4 
26 
224 
% 
1 0 . 2  
7 . 8  
7 . 1 
4 . 1 
3 . 4  
3 . 4  
2 . 2  
1 . 0 
6 . 3 
54. 5  
Table  9 shows tha t Janklow ' s most l iked qua l ity--forthr ightness 
and outspokenness--wa s ,  ironica l ly ,  a lmost the same as his  most 
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dis l iked qua l ity--tha t of speak ing before he thinks or " shooting-
from-the-hip , " wh ich wa s c ited by about 10 percent of  the sample . His  
genera l persona l ity and spec if ic po l ic ies and actions as  governor were 
the next two most frequently mentioned disl iked qua l it ies , ea ch  c ited 
by about 7 percent of  the respondents . 
It should be noted that a rr� j ority of  the respondents--54 . 5  
percent--did not name a qua l ity . This is c ons istent w ith what is 
frequently c ited as a shortc oming of telephone surveys--that people 
are reluctant to n� ke negat ive corrm�nts about a subj ect .  
TABLE 1 0  
QUEST IONS E IGHT AND NINE : MOST IMPORTANT AND SECOND MOST 
IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FACING SOUTH DAKOTA 
Most 2nd Most  
Important Important 
Probl em Probl em 
% % 
Farm prices , he lp  fa rmers , 
farm problems 106 25 . 8  55 13 . 4  1 61 
Unemployment , more j obs , 
industr ia l devel opment 68 1 6 . 5  44 10 . 7 112  
Water development , water 
r ights , irr igation 43 10 . 5  37 9 . 0  80 
Taxes ,  tax rel ief ,  sta te 
f inanc ia l probl ems 47 1 1 .4  3 1 7 . 5  78 
Economy ( genera 1 ) , inf lation , 
interest rates 27 6 . 6  1 8  4 . 4  45 
Highways , f ix roads , 
br idges 14 3 .4 17 4 . 1 3 1  
Education 11 2 . 7 1 5  3 . 6  26 
ETS I pipe l ine 14 3 .4 7 1 . 7  2 1  
Misce llaneous 35 8 . 5  67 1 6 . 3  102 
Don ' t know 46 11 .2 120 29 Q 2 166 
Tota l 
% 
39 .2  
27 . 2  
19 . 5  
18 . 9  
1 1 . 0  
7 . 5  
6 . 3  
5 . 1  
24. 8  
40 .4  
85 
Table  10 shows that the poor state of the farm economy wa s ea s i ly 
the number one issue fa c ing South Da kota a c cord ing to the sample w ith 
near ly 40 percent c iting it a s  e ither the most or second most  important 
probl em. 
Three other probl ems wer e a lso  ment ioned frequently : unemploy-
ment , inc lud ing the need for more j obs and industr ia l deve lopment ,  
c ited by about 27  percent ; water deve lopment , c ited by about 1 9  per-
c ent ; and taxes ,  inc lud ing the state ' s f inanc ia l probl ems in  genera l ,  
c ited by about 1 9  percent . 
TABLE 1 1  
QUESTION TEN:  STATE GOVERNMENT SHOULD 
DO MORE TO HELP FARMERS 
Should  be d o ing more 
Doing a s  much a s  it can 
Refused 
Don ' t know 
166 
211  
8 
25 
% 
46 . 4  
51 .3 
1 . 9 
6 . 3  
The data in  Ta ble  1 1  he lp  pla ce the farm probl em in  it s  proper 
perspective with regard to the gubernator ia l ra ce . It is interesting 
to note that whi l e  the sample  overwhelming ly chose the farm problem a s  
the number one probl em i n  the state , a s l ight ma j or ity--about 51  
percent--sa id that the state government wa s a lrea dy doing about a s  
much a s  it c ou ld  or should in this ar ea . The pol itica l impl icat ion 
here--an important one for the O ' Connor campa ign-- is that voters were 
not go ing to be upset with the governor because of the farm ec onomy ' s 
poor c ond ition . 
TABLE 12 
QUESTION ELEVEN : JANKLOW ' S ARGU ING HARMING STATE 
Arguing doing more harm tha n good 
Argu ing not hurting very much 
Refused 
Don ' t  know 
93 
281 
1 1  
26 
% 
22 . 6  
68 . 4 
2 . 7  
6 . 3  
Janklow had been cr it ic ized in  some c ircles for pick ing f ights 
with pol itica l l eaders from other states . Yet Table 12 shows that  a 
s o l id ma j or ity of the sample ,  over 68 percent , wa s not very upset 
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about Janklow '  s a ct ions in this area , implying that it was not a good 
campa ign issue for O ' Connor . 
TABLE 13 
QUESTION TWELVE: CONCERN ABOUT JANKLOW MAKING SECRET DEALS 
Fa irly c oncerned 
Not c oncerned very much 
Refused 
Don ' t know 
178 
191  
13 
29 
% 
43 .3 
46 . 5  
3 . 2 
7 . 1  
Another issue  on which some persons thought Jankl ow  might be 
vulnerable  was his negot iat ion of s ecret dea ls w ith large out-of-state 
c orporat ions . Table  13 shows that a s izeable portion of  the 
sample--over 40 percent--thought that Janklow ' s secretiveness  wa s 
something to be c oncerned about , implying tha t this i s sue might be a 
better one for the O ' Connor campa ign . 
TABLE 14 
QUEST ION THIRTEEN:  BOTHERED BY JANKLOW ' S METHODS 
Bothers a lot 
· Doesn ' t  bother very much 
Refus ed 
Don ' t  know 
1 1 0  
270 
15  
16  
% 
26 . 8  
65 . 7  
3 . 6  
3 . 9  
The da ta in Table  14 indicate tha t a sol id ma j or ity o f  the 
sample--a lmost 66 percent--wa s not bothered very much  by Janklow ' s 
style  in the way he gets things done . As  was the case  f or que st ion 
1 1 ,  these f i gures imply that this a lso  wa s not a good is sue  for 
O' Connor . 
TABLE 15 
QUESTION FOURTEEN : CHIEF SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
ON SOUTH DA KOTA POLITICS 
Ra dio 82 20 . 0  
Te l evis ion 15 1  36 . 7  
Da ily newspa per 153 37 . 2  
Weekly newspaper 5 1 .2 
Refused 10 2 .4  
Don ' t know 10  2 . 4  
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The f igures in Ta ble  15 show that te l evis ion and da i ly newspa pers 
were a lmost in a dead  heat  a s  far as being  the chief source  of infor-
ma tion on S outh Da kota po l it ic s  among the respondents w ith each be ing 
c ited by a bout 37 percent . Ra dio wa s c ited by about 20 perc ent and 
weekly newspapers by only a l ittle more than one percent . 
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TABLE 16 
QUEST IONS F IFTEEN THROUGH E IGHTEEN ; 
ITEMS N INETEEN AND TWENTY : 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFOR�TION 
% 
Res idence 
Farm or ranch 1 06 25 . 8  
Under 1 , 000 54 13 . 1  
1 , 000-5 , 000 72 17 . 5  
5 , 000-20 , 000 68 1 6 . 5  
Over 20 , 000 1 02 24 . 8  
Refused 7 1 . 7 
Don ' t  know 2 0 . 5  
Age 
1 8-29 7 1  17 . 3  
30-44 100 24 .3  
45-64 146 35 . 5  
Over 65 85 20 .7  
Refused 9 2 . 2  
Family Inc ome 
Under $5 , 000 20 4 . 9  
$5 , 000-$1 5 , 000 120 29 . 2  
$ 15 , 000-$25 , 000 129 3 1 .4 
Over $25 , 000 88 21 .4  
Refused 35 8 . 5  
Don ' t  know 19  4 . 6  
Party Aff i l iation 
Republ ican 155 37 . 7  
Democra t 156 3 8 . 0  
Independent 78 19 . 0  
Refused 15  3 . 6  
Don ' t know 7 1 . 9 
� 
Ma le 212 51 . 6  
Fema le  194 47 o2  
Not indicated 5 1 .2 
TV Market ADI  
S ioux Fa l l s  3 12 75 . 9  
Rapid C ity 88 21 .4  
Bismarck ,  North Da kota 4 1 . 0 
S ioux C ity , Iowa 7 1 . 7  
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The ma j or purpose  in obta ining the demogra phic informa t ion pre­
sented in Tabl e 16 wa s to pin point ea ch cand ida te ' s  strengths and 
weaknesses among va r ious subgroups of the e lectorate . This informa t ion 
is found in the report to the O ' Connor campa ign in Appendix I .  
Unfortunate ly , i t  i s  not pos s ible  t o  compare this data with demo­
gra phic data from the state as a whole because persons  who were not 
registered or d id not intend to vote were screened out by questions one 
and two . This means that the 41 1 respondents who d id g ive demogra phic 
information were not representat ive of the state ' s popu lat ion . 
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CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
The goa ls  of this ca s e  study were : ( 1 ) to design a methodology 
for a statewide po l l  in South Da kota tha t c ould be used in devis ing a 
strategy for a polit ica l campa ign , and (2 ) to demons trate that in­
house  poll ing is a viable  option f or a pol itica l campa ign w ith l imited 
f inanc ia l resource s o  
This  chapter examines how the case  study accompl ished these  ob­
j ec t ives . It a l s o  d iscusses the survey ' s  strength� and weaknesses , 
of fers suggest ions for improving the methodology , presents c onc lus ions 
and ma kes rec on�endat ions for further study . 
Summary of Paper 
The author bel ieves tha t this case  study wa s successfu l . 
F irst ,  the proj ec t ' s methodology wa s sound . A s  mentioned in 
Cha pter IV , the methodol ogy wa s ba s ed on techniques outl ined in 
Dil ln�n ' s  Ma il � Te l ephone Surveys .  The se techniques have been 
shown to be rel iabl e and practica l in conducting survey research.  
In  add ition to being theoretica l ly sound , the methodology was 
a lso  practica l .  There were few difficu lties in doing the survey . 
The inf orma t ion needed for c onstruct ing a stra tif ied proport iona l 
random sample  wa s readi ly ava ilable  and there were no unforeseen c om­
pl ications in obta ining it . 
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Despite the fact that the O ' Connor campa ign d id not genera te a s  
much volunteer support a s  ma ny other statewide campa igns , a suffic ient 
number of c ompetent interviewers were recruited . 
The overa l l  res ponse ra te for the survey wa s s imilar to  that ob­
ta ined by other statewide  surveys of the genera l  public . Tha t is 
another indica tion of the s oundness of the survey ' s methodology .  
The c ost  o f  the survey was wel l  be low the pr ice a n  outs ide po ll­
ster would have charged . This  is  important in  that the l ower c ost  of  
in-house pol l ing is usua l ly c ited a s  its  greatest advanta ge .  
It  is a lmost impos s ible  to  know whether the survey data a ccurately 
reflected the sent iments of the South Da kota electorate . It s hould be 
noted , however , that the a ctua l vote percenta ges were very c lose to the 
percenta ges obta ined by the survey for both the congress iona l and 
gubernator ia l  c ontests . Furthermore ,  the survey da ta c learly showed 
that Janklow wa s very popular a nd had few vulnerable po ints , mean ing 
tha t he wou ld be d i ff icult  to defeat o The s ize of the Janklow land­
s l ide proved this to be the cas e .  
Overa l l , the execut i on of this ca s e  study and the data obta ined 
by it strongly indica te that this methodology d id esta bl ish a credible 
in-house poll ing opera t ion and tha t such a n  operation can be worthwhile  
f or a campa ign w ith l imited funds . 
Strengths 
Bes ides accompl i shing its broad obj ectives , there are  s evera l 
spec i f ic a spects of the case  study tha t stand out . 
One of these  wa s the sampling pha s e  of the methodology . It wa s 
strong in two ar ea s .  
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F irst ,  the s ize  of the sampl e--696--wa s large for a statew ide is­
sues survey . Cra ft ' s survey had a sample  of 480 , 1 and an  Augustana 
Research Inst itute statewide pol it ica l survey tha t a sked many questions 
s imilar to the ones in this survey ha d a sample of 505 .2 This c a se  
study ' s larger-s ized sample meant tha t its sampl ing error wa s sma l ler . 
The large number of strata-- 96--ensured that the sample  would be 
representa tive of a l l geogra phic areas of the state . This meant that 
the survey wa s l e s s  suscept ible  to bia s ca used by overrepresent ing or 
underrepresenting a spec if ic reg ion . 
The interview ing phase  of the project was succes sfu l  in · tha t most 
of the interviewers understood the ir dut ies qu ickly and performed ade­
quate ly despite the ir lack  of experience o  The deta i l ed wr itten 
instructions and tra in ing sess ions he lped in this regard . 
Severa l a spects of the proj ect re la ted to the quest ionna ire were 
executed wel l .  Suggestions from campa ign offic ia ls helped ensure  that 
a ll quest ions were re levant o The quest ionna ire itself  wa s long enough 
to addre ss  the most s ignif icant issues of the campa ign , but n ot so long 
as to interfere w ith the respons e rate . Except for the s e lection of 
the respondent through the ma tr ix , interviewers had few problems follow­
ing the que stionna ir e ' s  des ign . Pretesting the quest ionna ire twice 
helped ma ke sure that questions were proper ly worded a nd in a l og ica l 
sequence o 
Some a spects of  the response rate were nota bly better than what  
might have been expected . 
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The percenta ge of  no  answers-�5 .2 percent--was substantia l ly l ess  
than the 12 . 0  percent which Cra ft reported for his survey .3 The 5 . 2  
percent f igure a l s o  c ompares favorably w ith the 4 to 7 percent that 
Dil lman  sa id  he usua l ly ha s in statewide surveys ba s ed on d irectory 
l istings . 4 The l ow percenta ge of  no answers was probably due to the 
large number of ca l l -bac ks made under this survey ' s  methodo l ogy .  
Another a spect o f  the response rate that carne out wel l  wa s the l ow 
percenta ge of refusa ls . Sa bato sa id those who are unava ilab l e  or re­
fuse to be pol l ed usua l ly tota l between 25 to 35 percent for telephone 
samples . 5 For this survey , that percenta ge was 18 .4 percent . The 
refusa l ra te ( 13 .2  percent ) wa s only s l ightly less  than Cra ft ' s ( 13 .3 
percent ) , 6 but it should  be remembered tha t Cra ft ' s survey wa s .!l2,1 
pol itica l or po l it ica lly sponsored .  
The f ina l strong point of the survey wa s the presentat i on o f  data 
in the report to the O ' Connor campa ign (A ppendix I ) .  The report was 
long enough to be thorough and inc lude  a l l of the most rel eva nt data , 
but not s o  l ong a s  to  be bogged down w ith trivia l deta i l s . In the re­
port ,  the author tried to highlight a l l the aspects of the data that 
had practica l relevance f or strateg ic campa ign purpos es . 
Wea knesses  
The most s igni f icant wea kness o f  the survey wa s its  t iming . For 
ma ximum effectivenes s ,  an in-depth, " benchmark" survey shou ld be  taken 
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in the in it ia l sta ges of a campa ign , ear ly surrmter at the la test .  This 
study wa s taken in la te August . 
The t iming of the survey a ls o  caused probl ems in that it  c o in­
c ided w ith a statewide canva s s/survey by the campa ign of Rep . Tom 
Da schl e .  Respondents who had just been ca l l ed by the Da schle  campa ign 
were frequently irritated about being "bothered" a ga in by another 
po l itica l survey . This probably had a negat ive effect on the response  
rate . 
Another problem related to t iming wa s tha t the survey took nearly 
two weeks to c omplete . A survey taken over such a long per iod of time 
is more l ikely to be b ia sed because a ma j or news event break ing dur ing 
the course  of the survey might e f fect s ome of the answers . Fortunate­
ly , though, such an  event did not ta ke pla c e .  
The only ma j or wea knes s  with regard to  the sample  was tha t--a s  
rrtenti oned in Cha pter IV--567 South Da kota households s erved by out-of­
state phone c ompa n ies were not inc luded in the un iverse  becaus e the 
Briggs L ibrary d id not have the phone director ies needed . 
There were two probl ems rela ted to interviewing . 
F irst ,  s evera l of the interviewers d id not show up on the days 
they had promised . This was a ma j or rea son for the survey ta k ing 
longer than it should have . 
Another problem was the poor supervis ion of the interviewers . 
This wa s because the author , who wa s respons ible for supervis ing , wa s 
usua l ly interviewing respondents himself and not able  to monitor the 
other interviewers as c losely as they should have been . This  problem 
wa s a ggravated by the fact that two persons were doing interviewing 
from their homes and cou ld not be mon itored at a l l .  
96 
The greatest wea kness  in the questionna ire wa s that  question 
number 1 1  was worded poorly .  This error was not detected in e ither of 
the pretests . The question a sks : "Which is c loser to your pos ition ,  
that Governor Janklow ' s fighting with other states i s  do ing S outh 
Dakota more harm tha n good , or tha t it ' s  not hurting S outh Da kota very 
much  if at a l l? " The error is in tha t the two answer ca tegor ies  are 
not mutua l ly exc lus ive . That is , someone could be l ieve tha t Governor 
Ja nkl ow ' s a ctions are do ing the state more harm than good , yet a t  the 
same t ime , are not hurt ing South Da kota very much .  The question 
should have been reworded to read " • • •  doing South Da kota � 1£i 
more harm than good • • • " in order to ma ke the distinct ion between 
the two answer categor ies more c lear . However , the respondents seemed 
to have l ittle trouble  answering the question as it wa s or i g ina l ly 
worded and no interviewers reported any problems with it . 
Improvements 
Interviewing and questionna ire content are the ma in a s pects of the 
survey tha t c ould be improved if it were done a ga in . 
Doing a l l of the interviewing from a centra l fa c il ity would be the 
most s igni f icant improvement tha t c ould be made . It wa s or ig ina l ly 
thought that by letting two interviewers ma ke ca l l s from their homes , 
more ca l l s  cou ld be ma de  in less t ime and the survey cou ld be c ompl eted 
quicker . But the f ive telephones at  the hea dquarters were a lmost never 
a l l  in use  s inru ltaneous ly so it is doubtful that this strategy saved 
any time . Furthermore ,  it wa s not poss ible  to supervis e the inter­
viewers who were ca l l ing from the ir homes , to monitor the ir pr ogress  
or edit the ir questionna ires  immedia tely a fter each interview . 
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This . s egment of the proj ect  was d isappointing . It should be a l­
tered for any repl ica tion of  this study . 
A better-f inanced campa ign should cons ider hir ing interviewers 
ra ther than us ing vo lunteers for severa l rea s ons . 
It would a l l ow the survey to be completed more quickly because  the 
process  of hir ing pa id interviewers would take less  t ime than recru it­
ing unpa id vo lunteers . Furthermore ,  pa id interviewers would  be more 
l ikely to show up f or their shifts , thus interviewing stations wou ld 
se ldom be vacant dur ing interviewing per iods . 
Pa id interviewers would a l so  improve the survey by a l lowing the 
supervis or to be free to do nothing except n1on itor the interviewers and 
ed it c ompleted quest ionna ires . 
It should be po inted out tha t us ing volunteer interviewers was not 
impractica l or unworkabl e ;  the volunteers for this proj ect d id perform 
sat is factorily . Nonethe les s ,  u s ing hired interviewers for an  in-house 
pol l ing operation would result in a more eff ic ient interviewing process  
a s  we l l  a s  fewer probl ems for the campa ign sta ffer in charge o f  the 
pol l .  
Severa l minor changes  would have improved the quest ionna ire .  
One particular sect ion tha t coul d have been better wa s the intro­
duction . Here , the fact tha t each  househo ld was only one of about 700 
in South Da kota that  wa s being ca l l ed shou ld have been ment ioned . This  
wou ld have helped d i stingu ish this kind of sc ientific survey from a 
voter ca nvas s  that c a l l s  every househo ld in a given area and fre­
quently is  referred to by the person ca ll ing as a " po l l . "  
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The fact tha t the survey wa s ta ken in connect ion w ith a ma ster ' s  
thes is should a l so have been mentioned as  spec if ic informa tion of  this  
type enhances a survey ' s  cred ibil ity and prestige . 
Mentioning South Da kota Sta te Un ivers ity in the introduct ion would 
a ls o  have helped the survey ' s  cred ibil ity and improved the response  
rate . Because this survey was a ls o  pol itica lly sponsored ,  it  wa s de­
c ided that SDSU shou ld not be  ment ioned . But in any academic survey , 
the name of the sponsor ing institution tends to legitimize the study , 7 
and should be inc luded in the introduction if a t a ll pos s ibl e .  
Under the survey ' s  or ig ina l methodo logy , persons who responded 
" no" to e ither questions one or two were  not asked any other questions . 
In retrospect ,  it a ppears tha t it would have been benef ic ia l  to have 
asked these persons questions 14 through 18 in order to obta in demo­
gra phic information .  This wou ld have made  pos s ible  a c ompar ison of 
the demogra phic chara cter istic s  of the sample and the sta te ' s popu­
lation at-large . 
The faulty word ing of quest ion 1 1  wa s ment ioned ear l ier in this 
cha pter . The word ings of questions 12 and 13 were a ls o  s l ightly 
bia sed ,  a lthough in a very subtle way that wa s not detected in e ither 
of the pretests . 
The questions were biased in tha t they as sumed a mild a nt i-Ja nklow 
attitude on the part of the respondents . Very s l ight word ing changes 
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in a l l  three of these questions would have ta ken care of thi s  probl em. 
Fortunate ly, the results of  these  questions showed that this  bia s ing 
ha d very l ittle i f  any effect on the respondents . 
Conc lusions 
This case  study found that establ ishing an in-house survey for a 
po l itica l campa ign is f ea s ib le .  Such a survey can provide va luable  
da ta for devis ing campa ign strategy , but does requ ire  a grea t amount 
of time and effort on the part of at l east  one campa ign worker . 
This study a l s o  showed tha t Dil lman ' s  bas ic te lephone survey 
techniques can be used to c onstruc t a standard ized methodol ogy for mak­
ing statewide  surveys of  S outh Dakota households . 
An in-house pol l can be set up so  tha t it achieves an  adequate 
response rate . It ca n a ls o  be substantia l ly l ess  expens ive than a 
profess iona l pol l .  
The use  o f  unpa id vol unteer interviewers for an  in-house po l l  can 
be satisfactory . But us ing pa id interviewers would probably provide 
for a more effic ient po l l ing operation and be we ll worth the a dd itiona l 
expense .  A l l interview ing should be done in a centra l fa c i l ity so  tha t 
interviewers can be properly supervised and ea ch completed quest ion­
na ire reviewed a s  soon a fter the interview a s  poss ible . 
A pol itica l survey should be timed s o  that it is  ta ken ear ly in a 
campa ign and does not c o inc ide w ith any ma j or canvass ing e f fort by 
another campa ign . A survey should be planned and organ ized so  tha t it 
can be c ompleted in a s  short a time as pos s ible .  
On the ba s is of his experience in doing  th is ca se  study , the 
author can ma ke two f ina l suggestions for campa igns cons ider ing in� 
house po ll ing : 
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F irst , a l ow-budget campa ign that has one or two per s ons w ith an  
interest in  po ll ing and the time to  ta ke on  such a large-sca l e  proj ect 
would grea tly benef it by c onducting an  in-house po l l .  
Second , a campa ign tha t is we ll-financed and/or la c ks a sta ffer 
or volunteer with the t ime , interest and knowledge to s et up  a pol l ing 
opera tion would be better off  h ir ing a pro fess iona l pol l ster i f  it 
dec ides to po ll  at a l l . 
Recommenda t ions for Further Study 
Few aca demic studies  have been done on in-house  pol itic a l  pol l ing . 
This thesis  suggests severa l area s  for further study . 
One would be a study of candidates and campa igns tha t have used 
in-house pol l ing . Such a survey c ould address severa l  questions in­
c lud ing :  Wha t  k inds of po ll ing techn iques are most popular? Are 
campa igns that do their own pol l ing genera lly sa tisf ied w ith the data 
they obta in? How much does the typica l in-house pol l c os t? Wha t  are 
the most popular rea s ons for do ing in-house pol l s? 
This  ca s e  study focused on a statew ide  campa ign . Another re­
s earcher may wish to establ ish an in-house po ll  for a campa ign on a 
lower leve l ,  suc h  a s  leg i s lat ive distr ict , c ounty or c ity . Such a 
study could be of  grea t practica l use , s ince cand idates for lower of­
f ices  se ldom do any forma l po l l ing . However , deve loping a fea s ibl e ,  
inexpens ive pol l ing methodo logy for this k ind of campa ign would 
probably be a greater cha l l enge s ince such campa igns usua l ly ha ve 
s evere ly l imited resources . 
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There is some doubt among po l l sters and pol itic ians as  to  whether 
in-house po l l s  produce the sante k ind of da ta as profes siona l pol ls . 
To deterntine i f  d iscrepa nc ies  do ex ist , a s tudy could c ompare data 
from an in-house pol l  with data from a profess iona l po ll  for the same 
campa ign . Such a study could point out the s pec if ic area s where in­
house pol l ing da ta are l ikely to d iffer from data obta ined by an  
outs ide , profes s iona l po l l ster . 
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Appendix A 
Cla s s if ication schemes of ways pol l  informa tion ca n be used pol it i-
ca lly .  
Charles  W .  Rol l ,  Jr . and Albert H .  Cantri l ' s " Meaningful Uses  o f  Pol ls 
in Pol it ic s , " ta ken from Po lls : Their Use and Misus e in Pol itics  PP • 
39-63 . 
A .  Determining the concerns of the peopl e 
B .  M:lximizing pol itica l strength 
c .  Obta in ing information on image 
Do  Assess ing the impa ct of a third ca nd idate 
F .  Pos ition ing the issue 
G .  Targeting the oppos ition ' s  wea kness 
M:lrsha l l  Loeb and W il l iam Saf ire ' s " F ive Important Obj ectives of  Sur-
veys and Pol l s "  from P lunging into Po l itics  ta ken from Handbook of 
Pra ctica l P o l itic s ,  P •  127 . 
A .  Eva luate one cand idate ' s  prospects  c ompared to  another ' s 
B o  Regular ly measure  a party ' s and cand ida te ' s  strength 
c .  Portray a party ' s ima ge and suggest des ireabl e  changes 
D .  Advise about the ef fect of campa ign issues and tactics  on the 
publ ic 
E .  Narrow issues 
Stephen Shadegg ' s  "Area s Where Publ ic Opin ion Sampl ing Should Be an  
Essentia l Part of  Campa ign Planning" ta ken from The New !:i.2Y! to Win .§..!1 
Elect ion ,  P •  133 . 
A .  Ima ge of the cand idate 
B .  Identifying the ma j or c oncerns o f  the c onst ituency 
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Ha nk Parkinson 's "Five Types  of Stud ies Useful in a Campa ign" taken from 
W inning Your Campa ign , pp .  151-153 ,  155 . 
A .  Soc io-ec onomic prof iles  or demogra phic stud ies 
B.  Voting habit research 
c. Opponent research 
D .  Is sue research 
E .  Identity stud ies  
Lou is Harris ' " Three  Types of  Poll  Informa tion us ed by Candidates to 
Plan Campa igns" taken from � Management of Election. Campa igns , P• 126 . 
A .  Key group brea kdowns 
B. Cand ida te irr� ges 
c .  Def inition of  key issues 
Robert A granof f ' s " Informa tion from Pol ls  That Can Be Used f or Campa ign 
Pla nn ing Purposes"  ta ken from The Management of Elect ion Campa igns , P •  
13 1 .  
A .  Important issues to stres s  in the campa ign , and to  which 
groups 
B .  L ikely vote switchers to the cand idate 
c .  How to campa ign among various groups 
Do Where geogra phica lly to place empha s is 
E .  How important party , cand idate and issue quest ions seem to be 
in the campa ign 
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F .  Ca ndidate persona l ity informat ion , inc lud ing wha t to stres s 
in advert is ing 
G. Important qua l ities of the offic e sought to stres s 
H .  H ow  much candida te name fami l iar ity needs t o  b e  pursued 
I. Wha t is known and unknown about the candidate ' s  r ec ord and 
therefore should be empha s ized 
Jo Potentia l a ppea ls  to increas e the nurr�er of switchers 
K .  Which voter types are undec ided--their characteristics  and 
is sue pr eferences  
L .  The characteristic s  and issue preferences  of t icket spl itters 
M. Important sources of media - informa tion for various voter types 
N. Media ha bits  of  var ious voters 
Larry Jo  Sa bato ' s  "Two Bas ic Ways a Po ll  A ids a Cand ida te" ta ken from 
The � of Po l itica l Consultants , p. 86 . 
A .  Determine s most l ikely ma j ority c oa l ition 
B .  Suggests ways to a ppea l to c oa l ition 
Cha rles  G .  Atkins ' " Types of Data which an Amateur Pol l  Can Determine" 
ta ken from Gett ing Elected , P•  1 16 .  
A .  Which of  s evera l i ssues are most  important to the e lectora te 
B. Wha t  voter attitude is on a given is sue 
c. How we l l  known a candidate is in relation to  his opponent or 
to other po l itic ia ns 
D .  What  are the strengths and wea knes ses in a cand idate ' s  publ ic 
ima ge 
E .  Which i ssues ar e strongly a s soc ia ted with a particular candi­
da te 
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Edward Schwartzma n ' s "Which Deci s ions Shou ld Be Subj ected to Research" 
ta ken from Campa ign Cra ftsma nship, PP • 93-99.  
A .  Which groups to a ppea l to and which themes to use  
B .  .Whose endorsement is he lpful 
c .  Where to s pend time 
D .  Modula ting c ampa ign themes 
E .  Establ ish ing an  opponent ' s  vu lnerabil ity 
F .  When , wher e ,  and to whom to ma il  po l it ica l l itera ture 
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Appendix li 
Stra ta 
Stratum No . Un its No . Sel ected 
In Stratum For Sample  
( 1 )  Si oux Fa l l s  33 , 127 99 
( 2 ) Ra pid City 24, 544 74 
Bla ck  Hawk 
E l l sworth A ir Force Bas e  
(3 ) Aberde en 10 , 964 33 
( 4 )  Brookings 7 , 713 23 
Rura l Brookings 
( 5 )  Watertown 7 , 250 22 
( 6 ) Mitchell  6 , 1 02 1 8  
(7 ) Huron 6 , 057 18 
( 8 ) Pierre 5 , 323 16  
. Ft . Pierre 
( 9 )  Yankton 5 , 27 6  1 6  
( 10 )  Deadwood 3 , 335  10  
Lead 
( 1 1 ) Vermil l ion 3 , 289 10  
( 12 )  Spearf ish 3 , 207 10  
( 13 )  Madison 3 , 066 9 
( 14 )  Sturgis 2 , 821 8 
( 1 5 )  Milbank 2 , 398 7 
( 16 )  Winner 2 , 3 1 6  7 
Col ome 
Clearfield 
( 17 )  Redf ie ld 2 , 095 6 
108 
Stratum No . Un its No . Se lected 
In Stratum For Sample  
( 18 ) Belle  Fourche 2 , 090 6 
( 19 ) Hot Springs 1 , 952 6 
(20 ) Mobridge 1 , 688 5 
(21 ) Custer 1 , 483 4 
( 22 ) S isseton 1 , 447 4 
(23 ) F landreau 1 , 428 4 
( 24 ) De l l  Rapids 1 , 296 4 
(25 ) Webster 1 , 292 4 
(26 ) Clark 1 , 249 4 
Raymond 
( 27 ) Britton 1 , 241  4 
(28 ) Canton 1 , 5 17 5 
(29 ) Mi ller 1 , 2 15 4 
( 30 ) Platte 1 , 162 3 
Geddes 
(3 1 ) Brandon 1 , 160 3 
(32 ) Parkston 1 , 153 3 
(33 ) Chamber la in 1 , 125 3 
(34 ) Gregory 1 , 11 5  3 
(35 ) Lemmon 1 , 088 3 
(36 ) Harrisburg 1 , 053 3 
(37 ) Wa gner 1 , 040 3 
(38 ) Freema n  1 , 007 3 
(39 ) Howard 969 3 
Cartha ge 
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Stratum No . Un its No . Se l ected 
In  Stra tum For Samp�e 
(40 ) Arl ington 917 3 
(41 ) Bryant 901 3 
(42 )  Elk  Po int 874 3 
( 43 )  Gettysburg 870 3 
(44 ) Wess ington Spr ings 846 3 
( 45 ) Hartford 840 3 
( 46 )  A lsen 5 , 754 17 
Beresford 
Rura l Beresford 
Chance l l or 
Da vis 
Flyger 
Hurley 
Irene 
Lennox 
Monroe 
Parker 
Vol in 
Wa konda 
Worthing 
( 47 ) Academy 2 , 1 50 6 
Delmont 
Fort Thompson 
Gann Va l l ey 
Kimba l l  
New Hol land 
Pukwana 
Stickney 
White La ke 
(48 ) Andover 2,0·25 6 
C la remont 
Columbia 
Conde 
Ferney 
Groton 
Hec la 
Houghton 
Turton 
1 10 
Stratum No . Un its No.. Selected 
In Stra tum For Sample 
(49 ) A lpena 1 , 569 5 
Artes ian  
Fedora 
Forestburg 
Letcher 
Woonsoc ket 
( 50 )  Bison 1 , 170 4 
Buf fa lo  
Camp Crook 
Meadow 
Sorum 
( 51 ) Faulkton 745 2 
Orient 
( 52 ) Ardmore 1 , 078 3 
Buf fa lo  Ga p 
Edgemont 
Oelr ichs 
Ora l 
( 53 ) Colton 1 , 563 5 
Humboldt 
Va l l ey Spr ings 
( 54 ) Astor ia 3 , 072 9 
Bra ndt 
Clear La ke 
E lkton 
Estell ine 
. Gary 
Goodwin 
Toronto 
White 
( 55 ) Avon 1 , 832 5 
Scotland 
Springf ield 
( 56 ) Mis s i on 849 3 
Ros ebud 
( 57 ) Bonesteel 1 , 326 4 
Bnrke 
Witten 
1 1 1  
Stratum No . Un its No . Selected 
In Stra tum For Sample  
( 58 )  Tabor 1 , 302 4 
Tynda l l  
Lestervi l le 
( 59 )  Hermosa 1 , 3 18 4 
Hil l City 
Keystone 
( 60 )  Armour 2 , 562 8 
Cors ica 
La ke ·Andes 
P ickstown 
Tripp 
Plankinton 
( 61 ) Al exandria 734 2 
Ethan 
( 62 )  Re l ia nce 4 10 1 
Kennebec 
( 63 )  White River 419 1 
W ood 
( 64 ) Glenham 1 , 740 5 
Herre id 
Hosmer 
Leola 
Long La ke 
Mound City 
Po l l ock  
( 65 )  Bruce 2 , 389 7 
De Smet 
E:rwin 
Lake Preston 
S ina i 
Volga 
( 66 )  Ea g le  Butte 1 , 264 4 
Dupree 
South Dupree 
Isabe l  
La Plant 
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Stratum No . Units No . Se lected 
In Stratum For Sample  
( 67 ) Newel l  1 , 070 3 
Nisland 
Whitewood 
( 68 ) Bristol 2 , 037 6 
Langford 
Pierpont 
Ros lyn 
Waubay 
( 69 )  Cre sbard 596 3 
Doland 
Mell ette 
( 70 ) Hoven 694 2 
Lebanon 
Onaka 
Seneca 
Tol stoy 
( 7 1 ) Bowdle  2 , 778 8 
Eureka 
Ipswich 
Java 
Roscoe 
Selby 
( 72 ) Mc intosh 1 , 1 86 4 
McLaughl in 
Morristown 
Timber Lake 
( 73 )  Freder ick 351 1 
( 74 ) Clare City 2 , 1 10 6 
New Effington 
Peever 
Rosholt 
Summit 
Veblen 
W ilmot 
( 75 ) Ca stlewood 967 3 
Hayti 
La ke Norden 
1 13 
Stratum No . Un its No . Se lected 
In Stra tum For Sample  
(76 ) Bradley 1 , 095 3 
Florence 
Revil lo 
South Shore 
Stockholm 
Strandburg 
( 77 ) Cavour 1 , 665 5 
Hitchcock 
Iroquois 
Tulare 
Wes s ington 
Wolsey 
( 78 ) Hayes 1 , 176 4 
Murdo 
Presho 
Vivian 
(79 ) Blunt 1 , 923 6 
Harro ld 
Highmore 
On ida 
Ree Heights 
( 80 ) A lcester 908 3 
Hudson 
( 81 ) Centerville  1 , 125 3 
Viborg 
( 82 ) Bridgewater 2 , 686 8 
Canistota 
Canova 
Center 
Jvarion 
Sa l em 
Spencer 
( 83 ) Chester 1 , 646 5 
Colman 
Nunda 
Oldham 
Ramona 
Wentworth 
Winfred 
1 14 
Stra tum No . Un its No . Se lected 
In Stratum For San.lple  
( 84 )  Ba ltic 1 , 657 5 
Crooks 
Garretson 
( 85 ) Menno 614 2 
( 86 )  Belvidere 1 , 528 5 
Inter ior 
Kadoka 
Midland 
Mil esville  
Phil ip 
( 87 )  Kyle  1 , 658 5 
Long Va l l ey 
Martin 
P ine  Ridge 
( 88 ) Cre ighton 1 , 090 3 
New Underwood 
Quinn 
Wa l l  
Wa sta 
W icksvil le  
( 89 ) Enn ing 786 2 
Fa ith 
fv1a urine 
( 90 ) Mt . Vernon 359 1 
( 91 ) Clayton 403 1 
Emery 
( 92 ) Jef ferson 393 1 
( 93 ) North Sioux City 782 . 2 
( 94 )  Akron , Iowa 255 1 
Hawarden , I owa 
( 95 ) Ortonvill e ,  Minne sota 381 1 
( 96 ) Gordon , Nebra ska 109 1 
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Append ix C 
Que stionna ire 
H e l lo . My· name is and I ' m calling you t onigh t  from Sioux Falls as part 
of a research p roj e c t  for a �..Aakota...&.tat�Unt-veTBi't'y graduat e  student . 
What we ' re  doing is taking a statewide survey to find out heM Sooth Dalmtans feel 
about their political leaders and about various state issues . Your telephone nUlTber was drawn by chance , am your nane will not be used. 
# 
'Io be sure that our survey is accurate , it is inp>rtant that we interview a man in 
some oouseholds and a \t.OIIBn in others . To find out who I need to talk to in your 
oousehold, I need to ask boo short questions . (NEXT PA�) 
._.., ___  ..,,..,.,.,., . ...c.,.-- �------.,....� .; ...... ....... -.------- ----- ----recall--.:-::�11 
date tine 
t i 
t 
{ 
interviewer result code 
I 
,..... __ ....:...----�-------+----- -·-----------· -. .- . · - ·- � - . . ,
.
,. , . . . · ! ·· 
i \-• . .. . _ _ .. �-�----- �--- ..  · · �- ... _ . _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ --·-- ... -� .. ---- t - ----r I ! 
·:--- - -· 
I 
' I l ·- - - - - .. · --· -·- - - · · · - - - ··- · --· -··· ·· · · · �------.... .. ... · - · -" '  __ . . _ __ -- ., .. -----··r 
! ___ ...._ __ ... _,._ __ _.. -.-.""C-.\o.. ·-� ·- .__ �- ........ -..., ,..-w;�w....._ _...,.�._,_,.,_� . ... ... \._..�� .. �-..�.1 I I 
L_-f_-. _ _ _ _ -J _ __ _ · �_ - - - - - - - - -· --· - - --- -·-- - � --- r-· · · -_ --- - - . . • • - - - -- -- - --- - --- +--- - - �  L__ - . J - - - . - . - - --- ,··--··- -·--- - -- - - � -- -- ·-�--- · -- ---·-·-- . J. . .  _ ._ .. . .. � 
Abbreviations : 
NA - No �  
NH - Not h:>ne 
WR - Will return (when) 
REF - Refused (when, why, 
at what point, M or 
F) 
IC - Interview 
ccrrpleted 
PIC - Partially 
Completed 
NR - Not a res­
idential · 
phone 
D IS::: - Disconnected 
Code for Recalls :  
A - nesp:mdent rot selected 
B - Resp:mdent selected only 
C - Have .talked with respondent 
(give any instl:uctions helpful 
for interview) 
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p. 2 
'Ihe first one is, ha,r rre.ny people 18 years old and older live in your household, 
including yourself? (CIRCLE �lER IN THIS R:W) 
How many o 
of them 
are men? 
(CIK'!E 
.ANSWER IN 
THIS (l)Iafi) 
1 
2 
3 
4+ 
1 2 3 4 or rrore 
(INSERI' l-1ATRIX) 
(INTERVIEWER: Na1'E CATEGORY Kr IN'lERESCl'ICN AND USE IN '!HIS SEN'IENCE) 
OK ,  a.<XX)rdi.ng to the research method being used for our survey, I need to talk to 
the in your household. 
(IF PEPSGl Ctl � 
IS �  SEX) 
t 
Would that be you? 
(IF PEFSCN CN LINE IS � SEX) 
.--------- YES I 
� c.-� --------- -----)� May I speak with that person? r -- - - ··· - - - . ·-·- - - - -- - - - - --· ···- --
WHEN SEIEC'IED PEFSCN. ANSWEPS , 
PEPEAT FIFST 'lW) PARAGRAPHS 
OF INTOODUCriCN AND START 
INTERVIEW. 
- "·- YES 
�------m 
When may I call back to reach (hi.nVher) ? 
J 
So that I will knaN who to ask for, 
what is (his/her) narre? 
I '"'·-) STARr ntrERVIEW 
l 
(REPEAT NAME TO OOUBIE CHECK . IF 
RESPCNDENT OBJECI'S 'ID PPOVIDING NA"€ : 
"We only need the person ' s  first nane, 
the last name isn ' t  necessary . " )  
'nle questions I need to ask should take only about five minutes . But before 
starting t."lem, I want to mention that I �uld be happy to answer aey questions you 
might have about the study either n011 or later. OK? 
1. 
2.  
1 17 
p. 3  
First , I would W{e to as.'�{ you if you happen to l:e registered to vote in South 
Dakota at the present ti.Ire? 
l 1 
\V 
------- YES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
coo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 -------7 CTEPl1INA'IE nrmm"TIW , eg .  
"OK , that ' s  all -we need to 
know, thank you very It'llCh. " )  
CO you think you Will be voting in the general election being held this Noveni:ler? 
------------------YES . .  
' 
v 
. 1 
2 
3 .  In that election, the t:l«> candidates running for govemor � Mike  O ' Camor  and 
Bill Jankl.c:M. Now if the electiat were being held today, which ooe of t.� two 
candidates tNOuld you rather see win, O' Camor or Jankl.c:M? 
. . . . . 1  
r� ­
! 
---- - --·---------4 JANKl.a'l . •  4 
l 
3 .a. 
(refusal) • • •  • •  8
f� ----·--· (don' t krlow) ... ·�" . 
v 
Well, which candidate do you think you lean � 
as of right rGI? 
O' CCNNOR • • . 2  
. 3  
� 
(don ' t  know) • • • • • • • • • • • • •  9 
4 .  The two candidates for Congress in this fall ' s electioo are Tan I)asch!e and Clint 
Roberts . Once again, if the election were being held today, which ate T.Neuld you 
rather see win, Daschle or Roberts? 
-, ----·--
1 -� j 
v 
(next page ) 
r 1)1l.SCE.E • • 
------ -----------; � . 
4 . a. 
t t. ( refusal) 
..__ 
....------ (don ' t  krlcM) 
v' 
�lell, which candidate do you tr.ink you lean towards 
as of right nc:M? DASOIIE • • •  
� . . . .  
(don ' t  know) • 
. 1 
• 4 
• 8 
2 
• 3 
9 
p. 4 
Now I ' m  going to ask you a f£M questions about Govel:nor Bill Janklcw. 
5. First,hcw \\Ould you rate the kind of jab Bill Janklcw is doing as governor? Would 
you sey .he ' s  doing an excellent jab, good job , fair job, or poor job? 
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EXCELIENI' • 1 
• 2 
FAIR • • • 3 
POOR • 4 
(refusal) • • • 8 
( don '  t k:now) • • 
6 .  Next ,  can you tell ne anything in particular that you like about Bill Jankl.ow? 
(PFOBE IF NEc:::ES5AR{ , BUI' Nor 'roO HAP.D, eg. "In just you:r(;m personal <:pinion, "  
"Judging by what you've heard or read, " "Can you think of anything at all? " "Your 
<:pinion is as good as the next person ' s" )  
• 9 
7. Can you tell ne anything in particular that you dislike about Bill Jankl.ow? (1QIN , 
PRCBE IF NECESSARY BOT 001' '1m HARD. ) 
Now I ' m  going to ask you a few. questions about problems we ' re  facing here in Soub.., 
Dakota. 
. 
8.  As yc:u knew, there are a lot of i.Itp:>rtant prd:>l.ems that the gc>vemor and state 
legislature have to deal with every year. But in your opinion, what is the ItDst 
i.Irp?rtant problem facing South Dakota right now that the governor and state-­
legislature need to do sonething about? (ProBE IF NECESSARY , eg. "In just your own 
personal c:pinion, " "Judging by wf!.at you' ve  heard or read, "  "Your c:pinion is as good 
as the next person ' s , "  "Can you think of anything at all?" ) 
9 .  New, what \VOuld you say is the seccnd rrost ilrportant problem that the governor and 
state legislature need to do sc:::ceth.ing about? (AGAIN , ProBE IF NECESSARY .  ) 
1 19 
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10 .  A lot of pecple in South Dakota are ccclcernee al:out the fann ecalat¥ · S ate  pec:ple 
are saying that the governor and state legislature should be doing a lot rrore to 
help the fanrer. Others say that state govenment is already doing about· ·a5 much 
as it can. Which is closer to your c:pinion, that t.'le governor and state legis lature 
should be doing � lot rrore to help the fa.t:ner, or that they ' re  already doing � 
as ImJCh. as they can? 
SHOOLD BE oonm MJRE • • • 
00� AS MJCll AS THEY caN .  
(refusal) • •  
(<bn ' t know) 
. . . 1  
. . 2  
• . 8  
. 9  
Next ,  I ' d  like to ask you sene questions about sate of the things Govel:!lor J anklow 
has dale over the last few years . 
11 .  First, Govemor JanklOW' has been in the news a lot for getting in to  argunents with 
political leaders fran other states. Sate pecple think that because of these argunents, 
Governor JanklGT is .malting tOo many enemies for South Dakota. 'llley say trat all his 
arguing is doing rcore hal:m than good and that he picks fights with other states when 
he doesn ' t  have to. Other pecple dal ' t mind it very liilCh that Governor Janklow gets 
into these argments . 'n1ey say that it shows he ' s  fighting for South Dakota and 
sticking up for the state ' s  interests. Which is closer to your position,. that 
Governor Janklow' s fighting with other states is doing South Dakota ncre ha:an than 
gcx:xl. , or that it' s not hurtirig South Dakota very nuch if at all? 
M:"l£ � THAN a:xD • • • 
(refusal) • •  
(dal ' t  krlcw) . 
. 1 
2 
8 
• 9 
U .  Govemor JanklaN has worked out several agreem:mts wi th  large co�atialS a1 sate 
very big projects. Sate pecple are veey ccncemed about the fact that these agreern:mts 
were worked out in secret. Other pecple say that these kinds of deals have to l::::e 
wol:ked out in secret and that this isn ' t  anything to l::::e ccncemed about. HaN do you 
feel about Govemor Jank.loi working out all these agreem:mts in secret? �Tould you say 
you are fairly concerned or not concerned very much? 
FAIRLY a:Nc:EmED • • • •  
NOl' a:N<::EmED VERI MJCll. • 
(refusal) . . 
(dal ' t  know) • •  
• . 1  
• • •  2 
• . 8 
. 9 
13 .  
14 . 
15 .  
120 
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Sorre people think that although G::werrx::>r Janklow may have gotten a lot of things done 
over the last four years, he sorreti.mes acts too wild and unpredictable . They say 
that his way of doing things is bound to get Solth Dakota into trouble in the long 
run . Other people say they aren' t l::othered very nuch by how G::werrx>r Janklow acts . 
'!hey say that as long as he seems to be getting results ,  the way he gets things done 
doesn ' t  rca.tter Ver}· nuch . lbw do yo1 feel about this? �d you say that the way 
G:J\rernor Janklow gets things done l::others you a lot, or that it doesn ' t  bother you 
very nuch if at all? 
OOTHERS A u::tr. • . . 1 
� VERY M.1CH .  • • 2 
(refusal) • •  • • 8 
(don' t Jax>w • •  • • • 9 
I ' m  just atout finished, rut before I go, I w:::ul.d like to ask � just a few short 
questions about �self . 
First, people in Scuth Dakota usually get nest of their information about state 
p:>litics and cpverrment fran either radio, television, daily newspapers or ·weekJ.y 
newspapers . From which one of those sources oo � get nest of your inforna.ticn 
on Scuth Dakota p:>litics? (REPEAT COOICES IF NECESSARY. ) 
RADIO . • • •  . . . . .. . l 
TELEVISION • • • 2 
DAILY NEWSPAPER • •  3 
WEEKLY NEltlSPAPER • 4 
(refusal) • •  • • • 8 
(don ' t  knew) • 9 
Next, -we ' d  like to kn::::M sorrethinq about where you live . Do you live oo a fann or 
ranch 7  a town with less than 1000 people; a town with between 1000 ani 5000 people; 
between 5, 000 and 20 , 000 people; or over 20, 000? 
� OR  RAN:H. . . . . . . 
LESS 'l'HM 1000 . . 
1000 - 5000 . . . . . . . . 
5 , 000 - 20 , 000 . . 
OVER 20 , 000 . . . . 
(refusal) • . . 
(don ' t  know) . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
9 
121 
p. 7 
16 .  Next ,  we ' d  like to kn:Jw which one of these age catecpries you are in :  18 to 29 years 
old ; 30 to 44 years old; 45  to 64 ; or over 65? 
· 
18 - 29 • •  
30 - 44 • •  
45 - 64 • •  
C7JER 65 . 
(refusal) • • • 
. .  1 
. 2  
• • • .3  
. 4  
. . a  
17 . Now we 'd like to get a very general. idea al:xJut � family incorre . Is your family 
incane \mJer $5 , 000 ; between 5 arxi $ 15 , 000 ; between 15 arxi $25 , 000 ; or over $25 , 000? 
UNDER $ 5 , 000 • • • •  
$ 5 , 000 - $15 ,000 • • 
$ 15 , 000 - $25 , 000 
OVER $25 , 000 • •  
(refusal) • • • •  
(don ' t  know) • • 
. 1 
2 
• • 3 
• 4 
• • 8 
• • • 9 
18 .  Am. finally, \O.lld you mind tellinq ne whether yo.t generally consider yolrSelf to be 
a Replblican, Dem:x::rat or Iniependent? 
REPOBLICAN . . . 1 
DEM:X:RAT. • • • 2 
INDEPENDENl' • • • • 3 
(refusal) • • 8 
(don ' t  know) • • • 9 
OK, those are all the questions I have. YOl 've been very helpful . Thank ycAl for 
ycur time . Goodbye . 
19 .  IIDICATE SEX OF RESPC!mENI' 
20 .  · ADI NJMBER (EmM LABEL ON FIRST PAGE) 
� . .  
FEMALE .  
SF. 
R:. 
NO. • 
IA. 
. 1 
• • 2 . 
1 
• 2 
• 3 
• • 4 
woman 
man 
woman 
man 
woman 
man 
woman 
man 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Append ix D 
Matr ices  for Se lecting Res pondent 
olde st woman 
man 
oldest man 
youngest woman 
man 
o ldest  man 
youngest woman 
woman 
youngest man 
o ldest woman 
woman 
youngest man 
youngest woman 
man 
youngest man 
youngest man 
youngest woman 
oldest woman 
woman 
youngest man 
oldest woman 
man 
oldest man 
oldest man 
oldest woman 
youngest woman  
woman 
oldest man 
youngest woma n  
o ldest woman 
youngest man 
olde st man 
oldest man 
oldest woman  
man 
o ldest woman 
woman  or o ldest 
woman 
oldest man 
oldest woman 
youngest woman 
o ldes t  man 
youngest  man 
younge st man 
youngest woman 
man 
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youngest  woman 
wonan or youngest 
woma n  
youngest man 
woman 
man 
woman  
man 
woman  
man 
5 
6 
7 
o ldest  woman 
ma n 
oldest man 
youngest woman 
man 
o ldest man 
youngest woman 
woman  
youngest ma n 
youngest woma n 
man 
youngest man 
youngest man 
youngest woman 
oldest woman  
woman 
youngest man 
oldest woman 
man 
oldest man 
oldest man 
younge st woma n 
o ldest worna n 
youngest  man 
oldest man 
o ldest man 
oldest woman 
man 
o ldest woman  
woma n or oldest 
woma n  
oldest man 
o ldest woma n  
youngest woman 
o ldest  man 
youngest  man 
youngest man 
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INSTRJCTIONS roR IN'I'ERVll.WERS 
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As an interviewer , you will be participating in a scientifically designed poll which 
hopefully will give Mike sorre .inp)rtant infonra.ti.on which will be the basis for nuch 
of the ccuq;aign strategy this fall .  It has been designed by an SDSU graduate 
student , Jeff Bmckelsby, wb) will be analyzing the results for his naster ' s  thesis . 
M:lny of �· who are helping out on this project have previously done phoning fOr this 
or other gns. fb..1ever ,  the kirrl of pb:)ning ycu will be doinq for this project 
is probably quite different than �t yoo. have done before. The object of this 
survey is not to persuade people to vote for Mike, give them info abolt Mike, recruit 
volunteers or raise ncney. The object is to get a totally honest, forthright, 
unbiased acoountinq of how South Dakota voters really feel about their political 
leaders (ITBinly Janklow� and inp)rtant state issues . 
The {Xlone nLUTbers � will be calling, fowxi on the small label on the top of each 
questionnaire, are :r;:art of a scientifically selected probability sample drawn to 
represent a geograpti.c cross· section of the state. Beca1se this is a scientific 
SJrVey, there are a lot of Seemil'lqly picky rules that have to be fol.lowed. Hawever, 
these rules , nany of Wti.ch are listed bela.i, are necessary if ToNe are to obtain acOl-
rate infornation. 
· 
To cordlct this kin:i of a };X)ll usually costs several thcusani dollars . However, 
because all of the persons participating in the project, i.ncludinq the abov�ti.oned 
grc!duate stlldent, are donating their time, this };1:)11 is costing Mike very little . 
Please read through the rest· of these instmctians as well as the "What the Respond­
ent Might Like to Know" ani "Possible Answers to Reasons for Refusals" sheets ,  
especially the latter . If yo1 have any questions a.l:lout anything, please ask Jeff B .  
You are performing a tremerd:Jus serVice to Mike by helpinq cut with this project. 
Not only that, you are also helpinq the �gn to save a lot of mney . 
Thanks very nuch! ! 1 
I .  General Reminders 
A. 00 IDl' identify yoo.rself as an O 'Conrx>r volunteer or say that the survey is 
Eemq-sp::>nsored by the O 'Conrx>r caupti.gn. It' s not that we ' re being sneaky, 
it ' s  just that giving cu.t that inforrre.tion ccul.d severely bias the survey • 
. If anyone asks , say �"01 are helping out with a research project being corxhlcted 
by an SDSU student. (See �t the Resp=>ndent Might Like to Rncw") . 
B. Be <:!CJq)letel.y neutral in �· � ask. � cpestipns so tba.7 the r�t . 
will give his/her honest opl.nl.ons . Again� the � of this pa.rti.cul.ar proJect 
is not to persuade people , it ' s  to detel:mine how the people of South Dakota 
really feel abcut various can:lidates and issues relevant to the election. 
c .  As those of yoo. wb) are experienced phone callers know, the first minute of 
the int&View is the nest irci:ortant. This will be your best opp::>rt:unity to 
·�op sana rapp::>rt with the respondent am. obtain his/her confidence . 
Ycur self�onfidenc:e , voice tone , ani personal mannerisms will greatly influence 
the respon:ient ' s i.IInedia te reaction to the call . The first minute is when 
you nust convince the individual to cooperate and be inte.z:viervei before he 
rnsTRJCTIONS p. 2 
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has a chance to refuse and hang up . W\KE EVERY EFFORI' ro GET THE RESEONDENI' � COMPLETE � IN!'ERfJmw ! ! ! The nore refusals we have-;-� nDre' biased :the 
survey beCDIIeS . And a highly biased �ey might do us ncre haJ:m than good. 
'Ib)rc:ug:hly go over the "Possible Answers to Reasons for Refusals" sheet before 
you start phoning. 
D .  Read every question exactl.¥ as it is written on the questionnaire . However 1 
feel free to interject 110K , " "alright, " . "'tbf • • •  , " "Next • • •  1 " be0Heer1 questions 
and answers .  
E .  When recording responses , circle the a];propriate 1'DJili:)er in the right-h.ar¥i ma.rqin. 
F .  Do not refer to the last name written on the label. 'Ihe name is there only for 
� the  sanple and tal:ulations . 
G. Let tb! phone ri.nq six times before cx:untinq it as a "NJ � . " 
H. If a l'1ll'l'ber is blsy, tty it aqain in 10-15 m:im:tes .  
n .  Before ycu start • • •  
A. Have these instructions, "What the Resp:uXIent Might Like to Knew, " ani "Possible 
Answers to Reas:>ns for P.efUsa.ls" han:iy. 
B. Have t:loA:l sharpened pencils. 
III .  WOO to talk to 
A. In order to determine which liEl'l'ber of a hcusehold gets interviewed , we are 
usirx] a special set of matrices which have been especially designed -to 
.insure that surveys St¥=11 as o.trs d:>tain an aa::urate cross section. There 
are seven natrices altogether. Be sure to alternate them, using' each one 
in turn. To detemdne wbJ shalld be intmViewed, silt;U.y place the top matrix 
in the proper space on p. 2 of the questionnaire , ask the 2 questions listed, 
ani then note the person wh:Jm you need tc interview. It is extl:eme.ly 
important that this person an:i only this person be inteJ:vie'Ned. If that 
person is not there , filxi 01t when he/she might be reached for a call-back arXi 
record this info on the questionnarie. 
B .  Avoid goinq thrcugh the ernmeration process with a person wbJ is oot a IDe!l'1'ber 
of the txusehold (babysitters , etc. )  or yomq children. Ask wl'En the family 
(or psrents) will retllnl cud tell then you will call. back. 
N. When the respon:ient has trcAlble answering a cpest.ion • • •  
A. If the respondent asks you to interpret a question or perhaps asks abcut 
Janklow or specific thinqs he ' s  done , do not qive 01t � inforrration oot 
aJ.rea.dy contained in the question. Even n-yo.1 knew the answer ( " Is O 'Connor 
the Dem:x::rat? " ) , plead ignorance ( "I 'm soi:ry, l:::ut I don ' t  have that informa­
tion. All we need iS for yen to answer the cpestion the best ycu can. " ) • 
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B .  Resp:>rrlents may miss a word or G.o of a question or corrpletely miswxierstand 
it . If YQl suspect a question has been misunderstood, � might say , " I  think 
I may not have read the question correctly, so nay I read it again to nake s.1re? " 
v. The ' "horse ra:::e n questions , I11It'bers 3 ani 4 
A. Yc:u might note that for these questions , some of the questionnaires call for 
� to say� O 'Connor ' s  am Daschle ' s  names first ani others have Janklow ' s  
� ·� · naxres first . Thi s  was done intentionally to prerent biasinq the 
results . However, you. might also note that ��· naines in· the answer I;XJrti.on 
of the cpestions are listed in the � � in lx>th versions. 
B. If the respon:ient ' s  first reaction to one of these questialS is, "I don ' t  
know, " inmediately neve down to part "a" when rec:ordinq their response. 
For example , on cpestion 3 if someone initially says "I really don' t  JaxJw, " 
and then a ncment later - before :YQl 'Ve asked which � they lean - says 
" I  guess O 'Connor, " yc». slDul.d then circle resp:>nse " 2" Under .  3 . a .  
VI. The "open-erxled" cpestions, m.mi::ers 6,  7,  8 , and 9 
A. As a l:Ule , \..e want to keep the IliJII'i:Jer of "don ' t  1aXJWS" to a minimlm on these 
questions . This can be done by probing. However, on cpestions 6 ani 7 (what 
people like and dislike alxJut Janklow) don • t press too hard for a response 
when, in yo1r judgment, the r�t really can • t think of anything he/she 
likes or dislikes arout Janklow. "Don ' t  ki1Jw" responses should be less of a 
problem on questions 8 and 9 (the "inportant issues" questions) and on these 
yo.1 can probe a little harder . In the rare case when scmeone can ' t  give an 
answer to question 8 ,  oblria.lsly question 9 can be skitp!d. 
B. For the mst part, :rou will just need to write da.m a few key \<110rds for 
resp:>nses on questions 6 ani 7 ( "Says what he thinks" "Talks too auch" ) • 
However, if your haJxlwritinq is not the best, you may want to rp back an:i 
rewrite the responses nDre legibly after the inter.riew is coupleted. 
c .  On questions 8 and 9, sane respondents might name what are clearly national 
rather than state problems (defense spendin;J, social security) . If so ,  YQ1 
may want to re-read the · .cpestion (see "N. B. ) If they still qive the same 
answer ,  don ' t  sweat it . However, if a respon:ient cites a national economic 
problem (\.ll'leq)loynent, inflation, etc . )  go ahead an:i recx>rd their response. 
VII . Irate resp:>ndents 
A. If a respcn3ent .becoues i.nc:ensei, uses ablsive lan9Jage , etc . ,  be riice ,  stay 
cool ,  and don ' t  hang up if :YQ1 can possibly help it 1 As trose of yen wl'x> are 
experien=ed phoners know, this is not likely to happen, rut if it does ,  be 
patient. Maybe the person had a bad day, who knows. In aey case � might 
wmt to say s:xnethi.ng to the effect of , "Yes , I w'lderstam yoJ. do feel cpite 
strongly a.bcAlt this natter, n and g:J jn to the next cpestion. 
B. If all else fails �en dealing with an ab.lsive person, call for help or wait 
for the opportunity to say something to this effect: " I  think I · -:an un:ierstand 
your feelings and � n:::>t wanting to conplete the interview. But thank yo1 
· ; ... . �./ nuch anyway. Q:x)dbye. " 
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VIII . When yen hang up • • •  
A. Remetri::ler to circle the sex of the resondent and the appropriate ADI mmber. 
The ADI I1..1llber is fourd in the upper right-hand corner of the label on the 
first page. It tells what N na.rket area the respondent lives in. 
B.  Fill oo.t the call record on the first page , recording date, tim! , etc . , ani, 
if the l'Jlil'ber has to be called back, any pertinent infornation which might 
help a different interviewer . 
c. Pewrite any answers to open-ended questions which ycu suspect mi9lt be 
illegible . 
D. Place the c::otq?leted cpestionnaire 6n the stack to be picked up . Place 
call-backs on the sane stack, unless p1 yQlrself can call the IJ.l11Cer back 
later that sane night. 
IX. � you are done for the night • • •  
Check with Jeff B. to explain any call-backs that need special attention. 
Again, thanks very 1DlCh 1 1 1 1 1  
YCAJ..r help with this project is greatly appreciated ! ! !  1 1 1  
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POSSIBLE ANSWERS 'ID REAS)NS FOR REFUSALS 
REAS:>NS . ·POSSIBLE RES'FONSES 
TOO BUSY 
FEEL INM)E'.QUATE: DON ' T  KNCli' 
EN.XJW TO ANSWER 
00 ONE ELSE ' S BUSINESS 
VIJAT I THINK 
'KX:· OLD 
This should take only about five mi.mltes, but 
I 'm sorry to have caught ya1 at a bad time .  
I \\0\ll.d be happy to call back. When w::>Ul.d be 
a 9XXi time for me to call in the next day 
or ttr.o? 
'l'he questions are rot at all difficult. They 
nDStly corx:ern hJw yo1 feel al:ol.t issues ani 
political leaders rather---aim how nuch you 
know abc:ut certain things. Sene of the people 
� have  already interviewei had the same cxmcern 
yen have ,  but once � 9Jt started they didn ' t  
have any problems inq the quest ions . 
M:lybe I could just read you the first few 
questions so yw. c:s.n see what they are like . 
I'd  really like to talk to ya.1 because it ' s  
so- · . very irrq;x>rtant that � get the opinions 
of er� in the sample . Otherwise the results 
\tal '  t be vattc!; · kxl the SDSU student who ' s  
doinq this SJrVey really needs to have accurate 
results or else his pro;essors my · ID-; :.give their 
approval . 
I can certainly underst.ani. That ' s \ttly all these 
inter.riews are strictly confidential . Protec­
tinq people ' s  privacy is one of oo.r rrajor 
cc.ncenlS . And after the results are tabllated 
no si.nqle individual can t:Ner be identified. 
l ' m sorry to hear that. I � be happy to 
call back in a day or � . Ybll.d that be OK? 
(IF IENGlHY OR SERICXJS ILLNESS excuse yoirself 
and i.nii.cate they will !!?i be called again. ) 
Older people ' s  o�ns are just as inp:>rtant 
in this particular survey as anyone else.' s .  
In order for the results to be representative 
for all the residents of the . state, TNe have 
to be s.tre that older people have as nuch 
chance to give their opinion as an�ne else 
does . 
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WHAT THE RESPONDENI' MIGiT LIKE 'ID KOOW 
WHO I s  TAKING THIS SURVEY? WHAT' s  THE IURPOSE OF IT? 
This sw:vey is l:eing condlJcted for a graduate student at sosu wm ' s  going to 
analyze the results for his naster ' s tbesis . 
WHAT ' S  H NAME OF THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE �R THE SURVEY? CAN I TALK 'ro HD!? 
His name is Jeff Brockelsby and I 'm sure he ' d  be glad to talk to �. I can 
get him for you right rrJW if you ' d  like . {If Jeff isn ' t  aromd or is on the 
pl'Dne , tell the respondent Jeff will get back to h.:inVher as soon as he can. ) 
IS miS SURVEY CONNFX:TED 'ro A EOLITICAL CAMPAI� 
I 'm 9:Jrry, b.lt I 'm afraid I 'm not supposed to give wt that infomation 
because it might iilfluerx:e the kinds of answers that people give us . 
Everyone ' s  1"'l1li:ler \tBS drawn fmm the current telephone directories in use 
tlu:alghcut the state. The rrethod tNe use neans that every telephone I'l..ll1ber has 
: an ecpal chan::e of being drawn, and it is strictly be cl'lan=e that � · s  is 
one of them. 
1joHy 00 YCXJ NEED 'ro I<WW ID'l � PEDPLE LIVE HERE? 
Different households have different IJ.llt'bers of people living in them. Am if 
our survey is to be trul.y representative of all the people in the state , then 
in sate l:x:Juseh:>lds I need to talk to a nan. ani in others a w:man . Vllen ncre 
than t...o adults live in a l:x:Juseh:>ld, I need to talk tc the oldest one in sone 
arxl the �st in others. So to find cut whJ I need to talk to I first have 
to know :OOW mmy adults live in �  hol.seh:>ld and hew nany of them are rren. 
mY OON ' T  YCXJ INTERVmW MY (HUSBAID/WIFE/SJN/tWJGiTER, Em: . ) ?  
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We can ' t  do tha t  because it ' s  one of the things tha t  WJUl.d keep the surv ey  from 
being representative of the entire state . If tNe didn ' t  follow this selection 
procedure all of the ti.ne, 'Ne w::uld probably en:l up with too nany nen ,  or on 
the other hand too neny w::>men, of certain ages . 
IS THIS CONFIDENTIAL? 
Yes, nest definitely ! After the intex:view is COllpl.eted the answers are I;Ut 
onto a::mp.tter cards wi thou.t names . Then the cpestionnaires are thrown away. 
All the info:rtra.tion '.-Je CX)I'[It'ile is in the form of a certain percent "yes" arxl 
a certain t=ercent "no . "  In this fonn, no individual restDnse can ever be 
identified. 
CAN I GET A COPY OF THE RESULTS? 
I 'm sorry, l:ut we just aren ' t  going to be able to serrl cut copies of the resul.ts 
to erery person wro asks . Howev"er , the results will be on file at the sosu 
library SOiteti.rlE this fall . 
Append ix !:i 
Da i ly Interviewing Record 
Monday the 16th, 4 interviewers 
Completed and partia l ly c ompleted 
interviews/not e l ig ible 
Refusa ls  
Disc onnected/nonres identia l 
Tuesday the ll!h' 3 interviewers 
Completed and partia l ly completed 
interviews/not e l igible  
Refusa ls 
Disconnected/nonres identia l 
Wednesday the l§ih, 5 interviewers  
Completed and partia lly c ompleted · 
interviews/not e l i gible  
Refusa ls  
Disconnected/nonres identia l 
Thursday � 19th, 5 interviewers 
Completed and partia l ly c ompleted 
interviews/not e l ig ible  
Refusa ls  
Disconnected/nonres ident ia l 
Friday the 20th, 4 interviewers  
Completed and partia l ly c ompleted 
interviews/not e l igible  
Refusa ls  
Disconnected/nonres identia l 
S ioux Fa l l s  at-home ca l l s ,  f irst ha lf  
Compl eted and partia l ly compl eted 
interviews/not e l ig ibl e 
Refusa ls  
Disconnected/nonresidentia l 
Saturday the �' 1 interviewer 
Completed and partia l ly completed 
interviews/not e l ig ible  
Refusa ls  
Disc onnected/nonres identia l 
40 
8 
13 
32 
12 
1 1  
57 
15 
9 
73 
15  
13  
46 
1 1  
7 
20 
3 
1 
35 
3 
1 
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Cumulat ive 
40 
8 
13 
72 
20 
24 
129 
35 
33 
202 
50 
46 
248 
61 
53 
268 
64 
54 
303 
67 
55 
13 1  
Monday the �' 2 interviewers Cumulative 
Completed and partia l ly completed 
interviews/not el igible  46 349 
Refusa ls  0 67 
Disc onnected/nonresident ia l 3 58 
Tuesday the 24th , 4 interviewers 
Compl eted and partia l ly completed 
interviews/not el igible  66 415 
Refusa ls 9 76 
Disconnected/nonr esident ia l 0 58 
Wedne sday � �' 3 interviewers 
Completed and pa rtia l ly completed 
interviews/not e l igible 41 456 
Refusa ls 8 84 
Disconnected/nonr es identia l 0 58 
S ioux Fa ll s at-home ca ll s ,  s econd ha lf 
Completed and partia l ly  c ompleted 
interviews/not el ig ibl e 24 480 
Refusa ls  3 87 
Disconnected/nonres identia l 4 62 
Thursday the �' 1 interviewer 
Completed and partia lly completed 
interviews/not e l i g ibl e 23 503 
Refusa ls  5 92 
Disconnected/nonres identia l 2 64 
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AN ANALYS I S  
O F  POL I T I CAL ATT I TU DES 
I N  SOUTH DAKOTA 
P repa re d  fo r the Go verno r o • connor 82 Campa i gn 
by Je ff B ro c ke l s by 
S TR I CTLY CON FI DENTI AL 
132 
133 
Th e fo l l owi n g  re po rt i s  bas e d  o n  a s ta tew i de te l e p h o n e  s u rvey o f  S o u th Da k o ta 
ho u s e h o l ds taken Au g . 1 6 , 1 982  - Au g .  2 6 , 1 98 2  i n  S i o ux Fal l s ,  S . D .  
O f  t h e  696 ho u s e ho l ds c h o s en fo r t h e  s amp l e ,  c omp l e te d  i nte rv i ews we re o b ta i n e d  
i n  5 0 2 , ma k i n g fo r a comp l e t i on ra te o f  72 . 1% 
Th e co n te n ts of t h i s  re po r t  a re re s e r v e d  e xc l us i ve l y  fo r u s e  by t he Go ve rno r  
O ' C o nn o r  82 campa i gn un t i l Nov . 2 ,  198 2  o r  o the r no ti fi c a t i on to t h e  a ut ho r  
by campa i gn o ffi c i al s .  
O ' CONNOR 
LEAN O ' CONNOR 
LEAN JANKLOW 
JAN KLOW 
UNDE C I  OE D 
20 . 1 % --._ � 2 6 . 1 %  
6 . 0  
1 2 . 2 � 62 . 1  
49 . 9 ...----
1 1 . 9  1 1 . 9  
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As expected , Ja n k l ow i s  very st ron g  at  t h i s poi nt  i n  t he campa i gn .  H owever ,  the  
i mportance of  these fi gures s hou l d not  be overes t i mated : Ja nkl ow has  been  a very 
acti ve , wi de l y  recogn i zed a nd wel l - known i ncumbant , whereas O ' Conno r ' s  name  recog­
n i t i on i s  st i l l  qu i te l ow and  many res pondent s  reported that  they knew l i tt l e  a bo u t  
h i m . Th i s  s ho u l d cha n ge s i gn i fi can t l y  a s  t he  campa i gn pro gress es . 
Furthermore , t here i s  l i tt l e doubt that  Jan k l ow ' s  s u pport wi l l  deter i o ra te from i ts 
current h i gh l evel . The j o b  o f  t he O ' Connor campa i gn i s  s i mpl y to ma ke s u re that  
th i s  deter i orati on i s  l ar ge eno u gh to  get  the i r  man e l ected . 
Here ' s  how each cand i date ' s  s upport brea ks down demogra ph i ca l l y :  
Res i dence 
O ' Connor  Lean O ' Connor Lean Jank l ow Ja n k l ow Re fused Undec i ded 
Fa rm or ranch 1 5 . 1  8 . 5  1 4 . 2  5 1 . 9  . 9  9 . 4  
Less t han  1 000 1 3 . 0  1 . 9 5 . 6 5 9 . 3  0 2 0 . 4 
1 000 - 5000 2 2 . 2  2 . 8 1 1 . 1  5 0 . 0  0 1 3 . 9  
5 000  - 2 0 , 000 2 2 . 1  5 . 9 1 4 . 7  35 . 3  5 . 9 1 6 . 2  
Over 2 0 , 000 25 . 5  5 . 9 1 0 . 8  5 2 . 0  2 . 0  3 . 9  
O ' Conno r ' s s upport a ppea rs much s tronger i n  t he 3 l a rges t c i t i es ( S i oux  Fa l l s ,  Ra p i d 
C i ty and  Aberdeen ) where he i s  pre ferred by 3 1 . 4% ,  than i t  i s  i n  the sma l l towns unde r  
1000 w he re he i s  favored by o n l y  1 4 . 9% .  Th i s  i s  parti a l l y  d u e  to h i s  s t rength  i n  
h i s  hometown ba s e  o f  S i oux  Fa l l s . The fi gure for sma l l towns , however , cou l d  be 
mi s l ead i n g  due to the  sma l l n umber o f  res po ndents i n  t h i s s u bc l a ss i fi ca t i on . 
Ja nk l ow ' s  s u ppo rt i s  fa i r l y  cons i s tent i n  a l l catego r i es except for the 5000 -
20 , 000 ca te go ry where he i s  not i ceabl y wea ker . 
Age 
O ' Conno r Lean O ' Conno r  Lea n Jan k l ow Jan k l ow Re fused  U ndeci ded 
18  - 29  2 8 . 2 4 . 2  18 . 3  45 . 1  1 . 4  2 . 8 
30 - 44 2 0 . 0  7 . 0  1 4 . 0  5 0 . 0  0 9 . 0  
45 - 64  18 . 5  7 . 5 8 . 9  52 . 1  1 . 4  1 1 . 6  
Over  6 5  1 4 . 1 2 . 4  8 . 2 49 . 4  4 . 7  2 1 . 2  
O ' Connor ' s  s upport l oo k s  wea kest amo n g  sen i or ci t i zens . Th i s  i s  pa rti a l l y d ue to 
the fact that  a very l a rge propo rt i on of them - - 2 1 . 2% - - a re s t i l l  undec i ded . The 
propo rti on  of s en i or c i t i zens who a re undeci ded i s  s ubs tanti a l l y  h i gher  than it i s  for 
any other group . 
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I ncome 
O ' Connor Lean O ' Conno r Lean Jan kl ow Ja nk l ow Refu sed Undec i ded 
Under  $5000 25 . 0  1 0 . 0  5 . 0 40 . 0  0 2 0 . 0 
$5000 - $ 15 000 1 6 . 7 3 . 3  1 7 . 5  45 . 0  1 . 7  1 5 . 8  
$ 1 5000 - $25000 24 . 8  5 . 4 . 1 0 . 1  52 . 7  1 . 6 5 . 4 
Over $25000  1 9 . 3  8 . 0  1 1 . 4 56 . 8  1 . 1 3 . 4 
As wou l d be expected , Ja nk l ow i s  strongest i n  the h i ghest i ncome category and wea kest i n  
the l owest  i ncome category . But  for some reason , the s u rvey shows that  Ja nk l ow ' s  
s u pport i s  part i cul a r l y  s tron g  and  O ' Connor ' s  pa rt i c u l a r l y  wea k i n  the $5000 - $ 1 5 000  
ca tegory . The  mos t  pl a us i bl e  ex p l a na t i on for th i s  o ffhand i s  that  the fi gures for 
th i s  category a re c l ose  to the max i mum proba b i l i ty error . 
Party Affi l i a t i on 
O ' Connor Lean O ' Connor Lean Jan kl ow Jan k l ow Re fu s ed Undeci ded 
Republ i ca n  7 . 1 3 . 2  9 . 7  70 . 1  1 . 3  7 . 7 
Democrat 30 . 8  5 . 1 1 2 . 8  36 . 5  . 6  1 4 . 1  
I nde penden t  24 . 4  1 1 . 5  1 5 . 4  34 . 6  3 . 8  1 0 . 3 
Thi s po i nts  out a maj o r  a rea o f  concern for the  O ' Connor campa i gn :  keep i ng Democrats 
" i n  t he fol d . "  Cl o s e  to 80% of the Republ i cans  a re s up port i n g  Ja nk l ow ,  but on l y  a 
scant 35 . 9% of the Democrats  a re s uppo rt i n g  O ' Conno r . Even more startl i ng ,  36 . 5% o f  
the Democrats  say t hey a re fi rm Jankl ow su pporters . O ' Connor i s  do i n g  a l most a s  we l l  
w ith  the I ndependents a s  he i s  w i th the Democrats . 
These Democra ts mus t  be brou ght over i f  O ' Conno r i s  to have any chance of wi nni ng . 
Ma l e  
Fema 1 e 
O ' Connor 
1 9 . 8  
1 9 . 6  
Lean O ' Connor 
8 . 5  
2 . 6  
Lea n Jan k l ow Jankl ow Re fused 
1 0 . 8  49 . 1  2 . 8  
1 2 . 9  50 . 0  1 . 0  
Both O ' Connor and Jan k l ow su pporters are fa i rl y  even l y  d i s tri buted i n  bot h  s ex 
Geogra�hx 
O ' Con nor  Lea n O ' Connor Lean Jank l ow Ja nk l ow Refu s ed 
S i oux  Fa l l s  ADI  1 6 . 6  5 . 4 1 2 . 5  5 1 . 6  1 . 9  
Ra pi d C i ty ADI 2 9 . 5  6 . 8  1 0 . 2  42 . 0  2 . 3  
Undec i ded 
9 . 0  
1 3 . 9  
catego r i es . 
Undeci ded 
1 1 . 9  
9 . 1 
O ' Connor de fi n i te l y  a ppea rs stronger i n  t he Rap i d  C i ty TV ma rket ( the  extreme wes tern 
end o f  the  state)  th an  he i s  sta tewi de . Th i s  can pro ba bl y  be attri buted to the unpop­
ul ari ty of t he sta te-owned ra i l road a nd the gol d o re tax amon g West R i ver voters who 
hea vi l y  i ndenti fy Jan kl ow· w i th both i ss ues . 
Das ch l e  
Lean Das c h l e 
Lean Ro be rts 
Roberts 
Re fu s a l  
Undeci ded 
44 . 0% _ _.------::::. 48 . 1 %  
4 . 1  
4 . 9  ____ . 
-----
4 0 . 2  
35 . 3  
2 . 2  
9 . 5  
2 . 2  
9 . 5  
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Dasch l e  a ppea rs to be  qu i te s t rong  a t  t h i s  po i nt i n  t h e  campa i gn .  S ome comfo rt c a n  be 
taken from the  fact t ha t  nearl y 40% of the s tron g Jan kl ow s upporters a re a l so for 
Dasch l  e .  
Da sc h l e  Lean Da s c h l  e Lean Roberts Roberts Refu s ed Undec i ded 
Jank l ow ( fi rm ) 3 9 . 3  3 . 0  5 . 0  46 . 8  0 6 . 0  
T h i s 40% wou l d appear  to be a pri me target for O ' Conno r .  
Das c h l e  Lean Das c h l e Lean Ro berts Roberts Refu s ed Undeci ded 
Jan kl ow " l eaners"  
and undeci deds  38 . 1  8 . 2 7 . 2 22 . 7  2 . 1  2 1 . 6  
Das ch l e a l so h a s  a so l i d l ead  amo n g  the  Ja nk l ow " l eane rs " and undec i deds - - 46 . 3  vs . 
2 9 . 9  - - another very i mportant group for the  O ' Connor campa i gn whos e  att i t u des wi l l  
be no ted throu ghout t h i s  report . 
· 
Das c h l e Lean Da sch l e Lean Roberts Ro berts Refus ed Undec i ded 
O ' Connor ( fi rm ) 6 3 . 0  1 . 2 2 . 5  30 . 9  0 2 . 5  
I t  i s  a l so i nteres t i n g  to note tha t  nea r l y  one-t h i rd o f  O ' Co nnor ' s  s t ro n g  s u pporters 
a re a l so for Robe rt s . Th i s  gro up mos t  l i ke l y  cons i sts  ma i n l y  o f · t rad i t i o n a l  Repu bl i ­
can s  who a re h i gh l y  i rr i ta ted w i t h  Jan k l ow - - a th i rd i mpo rtant segment o f  the  e l ec­
torate for O ' Conno r . 
QUES TI ON FI V E  
How woul d you rate t h e  k i nd of job  Bi l l  Jan k l ow i s  do i ng as governo r ?  Wo u l d you say 
he ' s  do i n g  a excel l ent job , good job , fa i r  job , or poo r  job?  
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Excel l ent 
Good 
A 1 1  res pondents 
14 . 1% 
50 . 9  
2 7 . 0  
Jan kl ow l ea ners a nd undeci deds 
2 . 1 %  
Fa i r  
Poor 
Refused 
Don ' t  know 
4 . 9  
• 7 
2 . 4  
6 1 . 9  
25 . 8  
1 . 0  
2 . 1  
7 . 2  
The above fi gures are troubl i ng i n  that they show South  Da kota ns to be overwhel mi n gl y  
sat i sfi ed w i t h  the k i nd o f  job  B i l l  Jank l ow i s  do i n g -- 65 . 0% v s  3 1 . 9% .  The undeci deds 
and Jan k l ow l eaners express  t h i s sent i ment j u s t  as  strongl y .  
I n  order t o  w i n  O ' Connor obv i o us l y  ha s t o  l ure i nto h i s  camp a good  ma ny of  t hose  who 
rate Jank l ow as do i n g  a " good"  job . Th i s  tas k ,  a l though d i ffi cu l t , i s  not as  i mpos s i bl e  
as i t  fi rst mi gh t a ppear . 
O ' Connor Lean O ' Connor Lean Jan kl ow Jan k l ow Ref . Undeci ded 
Res pondents g1 v 1 n g  
Jan kl o w  " good " job  
ra t i n g  
7 . 7  3 . 8  1 7 . 2  57 . 4  2 . 4  
Fi rst o f  a l l , 1 1 . 5% o f  t he voters who rate Jank l ow a s  do i ng a good job  a re a l ready 
s upport i n g  O ' Connor a nd another 1 1 . 5% a re undec i ded . However , O ' Connor shou l d keep 
i n  mi nd  when attac k i n g  Jan kl ow that  the vast maj or i ty do percei ve Jank l ow a s  do i ng a 
sati s factory job  overa l l .  
QUESTION S I X  
Can you te l l  me anyth i ng i n  pa rt i cu l ar that you l i ke about  B i l l  Jan k l ow ?  
1 1 . 5  
Al l res pondents Jan kl ow l eaners and undec i deds 
Forthr i ght ,  outspo ken , 
says what he th i n ks 30 . 2% 3 3 . 7% 
E ffect i ve ,  forceful , 
man-of-act i o n  9 . 2  7 . ?. 
Consc ient i ous , tryi n g  
ha rd , do i n g  h i s  best 3 . 9  6 . 2  
S pec i fi c  po l i c i es , act i on s  7 . 1 8 . 2 
Down -to-ea rth , approacha bl e  1 . 2 1 . 0  
Honest , keeps h i s  word 3 . 2  0 
Competent , done a good job  3 . 4  2 . 1  
Coura ge , guts 5 . 6 8 . 2  
Don ' t  know , can ' t  say , 
noth i ng 28 . 7  34 . 0  
M i s cel l aneo u s  7 . 5 · 9 : 3  
The s i ng l e  most  po pu l a r  character tra i t  o f  Gov . Jan kl ow by a wi de margi n i s  h i s  
o utspoken , forhtri ght , tel l s - i t- l i ke- i t - i s , says -what - he-th i nks  ma nner . Thi s tra i t  
was named by 30 . 2% of  t he tota l sampl e ,  23 . 7% o f  the Jan k l ow l ea ners a n d  undec i deds , 
and even 23 . 8% o f  t he O ' Connor s upporters . Other we l l - l i ked Jan kl ow tra i ts , a s  s hown 
on the prev i ous  pa ge , i nc l uded h i s effect i venes s , con sc i enti ous atti tude , and courage . 
The opi n i on� o f  the  Jan k l ow l eaners and  undeci deds were not s i gn i fi cant l y  d i fferent 
from the total sampl e .  
QUESTION S EVEN 
Can you tel l me a nythi ng  i n  pa rt i cul ar tha t  you d i s l i ke a bout B i l l  Jan k l ow? 
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Al l respo ndents Jan kl ow 1 ea ners a n d  u n deci deds 
S peaks  be fore he thi n k s , 
ta l ks too much 10 . 2% 14 . 4% 
Ra i l  road deal 3 . 4  1 . 0  
Way he does th i n gs , s tyl e ,  
secreti sm , not profes s i ona l  4 . 1 3 . 1  
Pe rsonal i ty - a rrogant , coc ky , 
tactl ess , sel f-cente red 7 . 8  0 
S peed i n g ,  drv i ng habi ts , 
obey ing  l aws 3 . 4  3 . 1  
Rash , i mpetuous 2 . 2 2 . 1  
Overk i l l , goes too fa r 1 . 0 0 
S pec i fi c  po l i c i es ,  act i ons  7 . 1  5 . 2  
Don ' t  know , can ' t  say , 
noth i ng 54 . 5  64 . 9  
Mi s ce l l aneous 6 . 3· 6 . 2  
Very c l ose ly  t ied to Ja n k l ow ' s  mos t - l i ked tra i t ,  i ron i cal l y ,  i s  h i s mos t  d i s l i ked 
tra i t : that he  s peaks  be fore he t h i n k s , ta l ks too much or  " s hoots ft'()m the h i p . "  
How effect i ve l y  O ' Connor can ca p i ta l i ze on thi s i s  ques ti ona bl e s i nce i t  i s  more-or­
l es s  th is  same tra i t tha t  peo pl e al so fi nd very l i keab l e  in  Ja n kl ow .  Furthermo re , 
exactl y 50%af tho s e  who named th i s tra i t  a s  Ja nk l ow ' s  most  d i s l i kea bl e a l so  i dent i fi ed 
themsel ves as stron g Jan kl ow s uppo rters 
O ' Connor Lean O ' Connor Lean Jank l ow Jan k l ow Refused Undeci ded 
Res pondents sayi ng  
Jan k l ow ' s  ta l k i n g  
too much i s  h i s worst 
tra i t  14 . 3  2 . 4  9 . 5  5 0 . 0  0 
The tra i t  that a ppears to be mos t  dama gi ng to Jan kl ow , though , i s  h i s genera l s tyl e 
of do i n g  t hi ngs  ( secret i sm ,  not acti ng pro fes s i ona l ) .  Ove r two - t h i rds of  those  who 
named thi s tra i t  i denti fi ed themse l ves as O ' Connor s upporters . 
23 . 8  
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Res pondents sayi n g  
Jan k l ow ' s  styl e ,  
secret i sm ,  etc . i s  
h i s  wo rst t ra i t 
O ' Connor Lea n O ' Co nnor Lean Jan k l ow Ja n k l ow Re fused Undeci ded 
64 . 7  5 . 9 1 1 . 8  1 1 . 8  0 
The l a rge number o f  peop l e  who co ul dn ' t  o r  di dn ' t  name a s pec i fi c  tra i t  can be 
attri buted for the mos t  part to the fact that i n  tel epho ne su rveys of t h i s  k i nd ,  
res pon dents tend to s hy away from ma ki ng negati ve commen ts a bo ut a ny s u bject . 
QUESTI ONS E I GHT AN D N I NE 
5 . 9  
What i s  the most importa nt  probl em fac i ng South Da kota ri ght now t ha t  the  governor and  
state  l egi s l ature need  to do someth i ng a bout ?  • . .  Second  most  i mpo rta nt probl em . • .  ? 
Fa rm pri ces , he l p  fa rmers , 
farm probl ems 
Unempl oyment ,  mo re j o bs , 
i ndus tr i a l  deve l o pment  
Wa ter devel o pment , wa ter 
ri ghts , i rri gat i on  
Taxes , tax  rel i e f ,  state 
fi nanc i a l  probl ems 
H i ghways , fi x roads , bri d ges  
Economy { gene ra l ) ,  i n fl a t i o n , 
i nterest ra tes 
Educat ion  
ETS I 
Mi scel l aneous 
Don ' t  know , can ' t s ay 
Al l res pondents 
25 . 8% - 1 3 . 4% 
1 6 . 8  - 10 . 7  
1 0 . 5  - 9 . 0  
1 1 . 4 - 7 . 5  
3 . 4 - 4 . 1  
6 . 6  - 4 . 4  
2 . 7  - 3 . 6  
3 . 4  - 1 . 7 
8 . 5  - 1 6 . 3  
1 1 . 2  - 29 . 2  
Jan k l ow l eaners and undeci deds 
24 . 7% - 1 1 . 3% 
14 . 4  - 8 . 2  
6 . 2  - 9 . 3 
1 0 . 3  - 3 . 1  
1 . 0  - 4 . 1  
8 . 2  - 7 . 2  
3 . 1  - 3 . 1  
1 . 0  1 . 0  
13 . 4  - 1 7 . 5  
1 7 . 5  - 35 . 1  
( Fi rst fi gure i n  each  col umn i s  · percentage of res po ndents c i t i n g  p robl em a s  mos t 
i mpo rtant ; Second fi gure i s  percenta ge c i t i n g  i t  a s  second mo st  i mpo rta nt . ) 
By far and away , the  mos t  pres s i n g  probl em for South Da kota a ccordi n g  to the  s urvey i s  
the poo r  sta te o f  t he a gr i cul t ural  economy . Over one- fo urth named t h i s  a s  t he top  
prob l em and  nea r l y  40%% named i t  as  one  of  the  to p two probl ems fac i ng t he governor 
and  sta te l egi s l ature . Three o t her probl ems ran ked qu i te h i gh : unempl oyme nt ( the need 
for more jobs and i ndus t ri al devel o pment was a l so i ncorporated i n  th i s ca tego ry ) , 
wa te r devel o pment ,  and  taxes /f i nanc i a l  probl ems . 
I t  mi ght be noted that the  need for h i ghway repa i rs rece i ved a fa i r  number o f  ment i o ns , 
s i nce th i s i s  t he k i nd o f  i s s ue that can  be addressed easi l y  i n  a campa i gn .  
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Jan k l ow l eaners and  undec i deds a ga i n  vary l i tt l e from those  o f  the  rest o f  t h e  sampl e 
w i t h  two mi nor  except i ons : They we re somewhat  mo re i ncl i ned to name gen e r a l  econom i c  
probl ems ( ca tego ry 6 )  a n d  no  probl em a t  a l l ( category 9 ) . 
I n  addres s i n g Sou th Da kota ' s  n umber one  probl em , the O ' Connor campa i gn i s  fi rml y on  
the  ri ght  tra c k  with  the  gra i n  conso rt i um proposa l .  Add ress i ng t h e  n umber two 
prob l em coul d be a l i tt l e t r i c k i er i n  t hat  Ja n k l ow i s  wi de l y  perce i ved as hav i n g 
s i n gl e- handed l y  brou ght  severa l compan i es to S o u th Da kota and h i s  e ffor t s  i n  l ur i n g  
compa n i es to  move t o  S o u t h  Da kota h a v e  been wi de l y  publ i c i zed . O ' Conno r ' s  prev i ous  
support of  a corporate i ncome tax  coul d be  used a ga i ns t  h im i f  he attacks  J an kl ow 
head-on  on th i s  i s s ue . Neverthe l ess , i t  wo ul d be strong l y adv i s a b l e for the  O ' Conno r 
campa i gn to come o ut wi t h  some fi rm propos a l s  for att ract i ng new i ndustry to South  
Da kota . 
I n  s umma ry , t he O ' Connor campa i gn s ho u l d keep i n  m i n d  t hat the  c l oser  i t  s t i c ks to 
t ho s e  four  top i cs -- t h e  fa rm economy , unemp l oyment , wa ter deve l o pmen t , and  taxes  - ­
i n  s peeches , a dvert i s emen ts , i nterv i ews , etc . ,  t he  more peopl e w i l l  b e  l i sten i n g to 
what i s  be i n g s a i d .  
QUEST I ON TEN 
Wh i c h  i s  c l o ser  to you r  o p 1 n 1 on , t hat  t he governor and state l eg i s l a tu r e  s hou l d  
b e  doi n g  a l ot more t o  he l p the  farme r , o r  that  t hey ' re a l ready do i ng a bo ut a s  
much a s  t hey can ? 
Al l res pondents Jank l ow l ea ne rs a n d  undec i deds 
S hou l d  be  do i n g  mo re 40 . 4% 40 . 2  
Do i ng a s  much  a s  t hey c a n  5 1 . 3  47 . 4  
Re fu sed 1 . 9 3 . 1  
Don ' t  know 6 . 3  9 . 3  
Thes e  fi gures  pos e  a n  i nteres t i ng cha l l en ge to t h e  O ' Connor campa i gn .  Des p i te the  
poor state o f  t h e  fa rm economy , a major i ty o f  t h e  voters a ppea r  to  be  q u i te  w i l l i n g 
to l et Jan kl ow o ff the  hoo k on t h i s  matter . The re fo re , O ' Connor wi l l  h a ve to ma ke 
a strong e ffort to conv i nce  voters that  farm pri ces a re a l eg i t i mate  concern o f  
s t a te government , s i nce  1 )  much o f  t h e  O ' Con no r  campa i gn i s  ba sed on  t h e  need to 
establ i s h a mul ti - state  gra i n  cons o rt i um ,  and  2 )  mos t  voters wi l l  be q u i te recepti ve 
to Jan k l ow ' s a rgume n ts t ha t  he ' s  a l ready done pl enty for Sou th  Da kot a  a gr i cu l t u re , 
i e .  t he  ra i l roa d , etc . 
S u c h  a n  e ffort cou l d  be mo st frui tful , t hough , a s  30 . 8% o f  even the  s tron g J an k l ow 
s u ppo rters be l i eve  that  t h e  state government  s ho u l d be do i ng more to h e l p  the  
farmer and , a s  was p rev i o us l y  men t i o ned , the  s tate  o f  the  fa rm economy i s  by  far 
the  n umber one  i s s ue i n  t h e  s tate . 
S ho u l d do more 
Fi rm Jan k l ow s u ppo rters 30 . 8% 
Do i ng a s  much a s  c a n  
6 1 . 7% 
R e fused  O K  
1 . 0  6 . 5  
QUEST ION EL EVEN 
Wh i c h is c l oser  to you r  po s i t i on , that Governor Ja n k l ow ' s  fi ght i n g  wi t h  other s ta tes 
i s  do i n g  So uth Dakota more ha rm t ha n  good , or  that i t ' s  not h urt i n g  South  Da kota 
very muc h  i f  at  a l l ?  
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More harm than good  
Al l res pon dents 
2 2 . 6% 
Jankl ow l ea ners a nd u n deci deds 
1 4 . 4% 
Not h urt i n g very much 68 . 4  68 . 0  
Re fused 2 . 7  6 . 2  
Don ' t  know 6 . 3  1 1 . 3  
As t h e  a bove fi gures c l ear ly  s how , the va st  majo r i ty o f  Sou th Dakotans are not 
bot he red very much be Jank l ow ' s  combat i ve ,  argumentat i ve styl e i n  deal i ng wi th  
other  sta tes . Jan k l ow l eaners a nd undeci deds are equa l l y unbothered and even 39% 
o f  t he O ' Connor s upporters don ' t seem to mi nd very muc h . 
More harm than good Not h u rt i n g  much Refused Don ' t  know 
Fi rm O ' Connor supporters 5 6 . 8  39 . 5  0 3 . 7 
Th i s  woul d s u ggest t hat  Jank l ow ' s  i nterstate s pats w i t h  Ca l i fo rn i a , Mi ssouri , Nebras ka , 
e t .  a l . a re proba b l y  not  very good  vote- p roduct i ve i s s ues fo r the  O ' Connor campa i gn ,  
and cqul d even backfi re , a s  many vote rs s u pport Jan k l ow ' s  acti ons  i n  t h i s a rea . 
QUESTION TWELVE 
How do you fee l  a bo u t  Governo r Ja n k l ow wo rk i ng out  . • .  a greements in  secret ? Wou l d 
you s ay you a re fa i rl y  concerned or  not concerned very much ?  
Al l res pondents Jankl ow l eaners and  undec i deds 
Fa i rl y  concerned 43 . 3% 49 . 5% 
Not concerned very much 46 . 5  27 . 8  
Refused 3 . 2  4 . 1 
Don ' t  know 7 . 1  1 8 . 6  
Now w� come t o  a n  i s s ue that  de fi n i te l y  seems to h ave a good dea l o f  potent i a l  fo r 
hurt i n g  Jank l ow : h i s secret i v enes s . Except for the fi rm Jan k l ow s u pporters , a maj ori ty 
of  every segment o f  t h e  el �ctorate i s  " fa i rl y  concerned " about  Ja n k l ow ' s  secret 
dea l i n gs . 
O ' Connor Lean O ' Connor  Lean  Ja n k l ow Jan k l ow Ref .  Undec . 
Fa i r ly concerned 67 . 9  75 . 0  49 . 0  2 7 . 4  25 . 0  5 0 . 0  
Not concerned very muc h  2 8 . 4  1 6 . 7  32 . 7  66 . 2  5 0 . 0  22 . 9  
Remember tha t over  two -t h i rds o f  t hose  who sa i d  they d i dn ' t  l i ke Ja nk l ow ' s way o f  
do i n g  t h i ngs  - - i nc l ud i ng  h i s  secreti venes s - - i denti fi ed themsel ves a s  O ' Connor 
supporters . ( See a n a l ys i s  o n  q ues t i on 7 ) . 
C l ear l y ,  i f  Jan k l ow i s  v u l nerabl e i n  a ny a rea , th i s  one i s  i t ,  and  t h e  O ' Connor campa i gn 
woul d be wel l -adv i sed to br i n g  th i s  i s s ue to t he voters i n  every way poss i bl e  a nd as  
often as po ss i bl e .  
QUE STION TH I RTEEN 
Woul d you say t hat  the way Governor  Ja n k l ow gets t h i ngs done bothers you a l ot ,  
or that  i t  doesn ' t  bother  you very muc h  i f  at  a l l ?  
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Bo t hers a 1 ot 
Al l res pondents  
26 . 8% 
Jank l ow l eaners a nd undec i deds 
2 1 . 6% 
Not very much 
Re fused 
Do n • t know 
65 . 7  
3 . 6  
3 . 9  
6 1 . 9  
4 . 1  
1 2 . 4  
The se fi gures i nd i cate t ha t  mos t  South  Da kotans wo ul d overwhe l mi ngl y a gree that 
Jan k l ow ' s  11 ends 11 j us t i fy h i s 1 1 means  . . . As w i t h  the 11 fi ght i ng  wi t h  o t her  s ta te s  .. 
i ss ue ( Quest i on 1 1 ) , th i s  a l so l oo ks l i ke an i s sue that wo n ' t  cut the  must a rd a s  
fa r a s  chan gi n g  votes i s  conce rned .  
Here a re a few notes regardi n g  t he demo gra ph i c characteri st i cs o f  t h e  Ja n k l ow l eaners 
and unde c i deds . 
Source  o f  mos t  S . D .  po l i t i ca l  i n fo rma t i o n  
Al l res pondents Jankl ow l eaners and unde c i deds 
Rad i o  20 . 0% 1 8 . 6% 
Tel ev i s i on 36 . 7  42 . 3  
Oa i 1 y news paper  37 . 2  30 . 9  
Weekl y news pa pe r  1 . 2  1 . 0  
Refusa  1 2 . 4  4 . 1  
Dont • know 2 . 4  3 . 1  
Te l ev i s i on and dai l y  news pa pers a re i n  a v i rtua l dead heat a s  t he  mos t  i mportant  so urce 
of po l i t i ca l  i n fo rmat i on for voters overa l l . However , tel evi s i on . proba b l y has an 
edge over news pape rs in  rea ch i ng  the Jank l ow l eaners and undec i deds . 
Res i dence 
Al l res pondents Jank l ow l eaners  and  undec i deds 
Fa rm or ranc h  25 . 8% 25 . 8% 
Less than 1 000 1 3 . 1  1 4 . 4  
1000 - 5 000  1 7 . 5  1 8 . 6  
5000 - 20000 1 6 . 5  2 1 . 6  
Over 20000 24 . 8  1 5 . 5  
Re fu s ed 1 . 7  3 . 1 
Don ' t  know . 5  1 . 0 
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The 3 l a rges t  c i t i es ( S i o u x  Fa l l s ,  Ra p i d C i ty and Abe rdeen ) a ppea r  to h a v e  a s l i gh t l y 
l ower con centra t i on o f  J a n k l ow l ea ne rs a n d  unde c i deds a nd the  sma l l er tow n s  a nd ·ru ra l 
a reas . 
1 8  - 2 9  
30 44 
45 - 6 4  
O v e r  6 5  
Re fused  
A l l res po nden t s  
1 7 . 3% 
2 4 . 3  
3 5 . 5  
2 0 . 7  
2 . 2  
Ja nk l ow l ea ne rs a nd undec i deds 
1 5 . 5% 
2 3 . 7  
3 0 . 9  
25 . 8  
4 . 1 
A s ubstan t i a l  n umber o f  s en i or c i t i zens  a re s t i l l  u ndec i ded . 
I ncome 
Al l res pondents  J a n k l ow l eaners a n d  undec i de ds 
Under  $5000  4 . 9% 5 . 2% 
$5000 - $ 1 5 000 2 9 . 2  4 1 . 2  
$ 1 5 000 - $25000  3 1 . 4  20 . 6  
Over $25000 2 1 . 4  1 3 . 4  
Re fu s ed 8 . 5  1 2 . 4  
Don ' t  know 4 . 6  7 . 2 
Fo r what  i t ' s wo rth , the  prepo n de rance of Ja n kl ow l ea ne rs a n d  undec i deds s eem to be 
concent ra ted i n  the $5000 - $ 1 5 000 i ncome catego ry . 
Pa rty Affi l i a t i on 
Al l res pondents  Jankl ow l eaners a n d  u n de c i deds 
Repub l i can  37 . 7% 2 7 . 8% 
Demo c ra t  38 . 0  4 3 . 3  
I n de pe n de n t 1 9 . 0  2 0 . 6  
Re fused  3 . 6  5 . 2 
Don ' t  know 1 . 9  3 . 1  
Fa r mo re Democ ra t s  t h a n  Repu bl i cans  a re Jan kl ow l ea ners and  undeci ded s , a ga i n  i nd i ­
ca t i n g  t h a t  a s pe c i al e ffo rt a i med  a t  target i n g  Demo c rats  wou l d  be wor t hwh i l e .  
Sex 
Ma l e  
Fema 1 e 
Not i nd i cated 
Al l res po n dents  
5 1 . 6% 
4 7 . 2  
1 . 2  
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Jan k l ow l eaners a n d  undeci deds 
4 1 . 3% 
5 3 . 6  
3 . 1  
S l i ght l y  mo re women than men a re i n  the  Jan kl ow l ea ne r/ u ndec i ded  ca tego ry . 
Geography 
S i oux  Fal l s  ADI 
Ra p i d C i ty ADI 
North Da kota ADI  
I owa ADI  
Al l res pondent s 
75 . 9% 
21 . 4  
1 . 0 
1 . 5  
Noth i n g o f  any s pec i a l  s i gn i fi cance he re . 
Jank l ow l eaners a nd undec i deds  
7 8 . 4% 
1 7 . 5  
2 . 1  
2 . 1  
S UMMARY 
The O ' Conno r campa i gn c l e a r l y has i t s wor k  c u t  o ut fo r i t .  I t  i s  s t a r t i n g  wi t h  l ow 
publ i c  s u pport a n d  c ha l l e n g i n g  a we l l - l i ked , we l l - k nown i n cumba nt . More i mporta n t l y ,  
mo s t  Demo c ra t s  a t  t h i s  t i me a re s i d i n g towa rds t he o ppos i t i on .  
But severa l o t h e r  p o i nts s ho u l d  a l so b e  kept i n  mi n d : 
1 )  Jan k l ow ' s  s u p po rt wi l l  i ne v i ta b l y deteri ora te ; I t ' s  on l y  a q ue s t i o n o f  how 
muc h how s o o n  
2) T h e  poo r  con di t i o n  o f  t h e  fa rm economy , wh i c h t h e  O ' Connor campa i gn i s  very 
e ffect i ve l y  a d d re s s i n g  thro u g h  t h e  gra i n  co n s o rt i um pro po s a l ,  i s  t he fo remo s t  
i s s ue o n  t he mi nds o f  So u t h  Da kota n s · to day . 
3 ) A ma j o r i ty o f  t h e  voters a re l ee ry a bo u t  Jan k l ow ' s  s e c ret dea l s .  
4 )  The fi rs t l ev e r  on t h e  vo t i n g  ma c h i n e  that mos t  S o u th Da k o t a n s  w i l l  pu l l  t h i s 
N ovember 2 wi l l  b e  t h e  o n e  w i th Tom Da s c h l e ' s  name i n  fro n t  of i t  on t h e  
Democ ra t i c  s i de o f  t h e  ba l l o t . Keep i n g voters i n  t h e  Demo c ra t i c co l umn i s  a 
much l es s  formi da b l e t a s k t h a n  t ry i n g  to ya n k  t hem over from t he R e p u b l i ca n  
s i de .  
5 )  O ' Co nno r s ho u l d  be a b l e to p i c k  u p  mo re t h a n  t h e  u s u a l  Demo c ra t i c s ha re o f  
votes i n  t h e  tra d i t i o n a l l y  Republ i can West R i ve r  a rea d u e  to Ja n k l ow ' s 
u n po pu l a r i ty i n  many R e p u b l i ca n  c i r c l es o u t  there . 
The b i gge s t  ta s k  fac i n g  t h e  c ampa i gn i s  to pe rs uade t h e  Democ ra t s  to ret u rn to t h e  
fo l d .  
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O ' Con n o r  i s  not we l l - known t hrougho u t  t h e  state yet , so a no t he r  t o p  p ri o r i ty s hou l d  be to ge1 
h i s  reco rd of a c co mp l i shmen ts befo re t h e  p u b l i c  a s  soon as pos s i bl e .  Th i s  way , t h e  
el ectorate ' s  fi rs t i mp res s i o n o f  h i m  w i l l  be fa vo ra b l e ,  ra ther t h a n  n e ga t i ve ,  wh i c h 
wi l l  b e  t he c a s e  i f  t h e  Re publ i ca n s  a re a l l owed to t a ke t h e  l ea d  i n  " i n tro d u c i n g "  
Mi ke O ' Co n n o r  t o  S o u t h  Da kota v o t e rs . 
W i t h  re ga rd to perso n a l i s s ues to b r i n g  up a ga i n s t  J a n k l ow ,  h i s  s ec re t i ve n e s s  i n  t h e  
E TS I dea l a n d  o t hers a ppears to be t h e  on l y  one that h a s  mos t  S o u t h  Da kota n s  u p s e t . 
Jan k l ow ' s  s ho ot i n g- from - t h e- h i p ,  feu d i n g  wi t h  ot her s t a te s , a n d  ends - j u s t i fy- t he-mean s  
s ty l e o f  o pe ra t i o n  bot h e r  few S o u t h  Da kota n s  a n d  a re endorsed by ma ny . 
O ' Conno r i s  we l l  on t h e  r i ght t ra c k  i n  hamme ri-n g away at t h e  farm economy i s s ue and 
gra i n  consort i um .  Howe ve r ,  s pec i a l  empha s i s needs to be p l a c ed on t he po i n t t h a t  t he 
s t a te governme n t  ca n a nd s ho u l d be d o i n g mo re to he l p  t h e  farmer , t h a t  t h e  fa rm 
pro bl em s ho u l d be dea l t w i t h  o n  t h e - s ta t e  l evel and t h a t  t h e  governo r  does h a ve a 
re s po n s i b i l i ty i n  t h i s a rea . 
Unempl oymen t ,  i e . i nd us t ri a l  deve l o pmen t ; water deve l o pmen t , a n d  taxe s / reve n ue a l s o 
need to be a dd res sed i n  a s i gn i fi c a n t  ma nner . The poo r  con d i t i on of t h e  s t a t e ' s  
h i g hways i s  a l so a good i s s ue for t h e  O ' Connor camp . 
W i th re ga rd to med i a ,  an e ffec t i v e a n g l e to take m i ght be somet h i n g  a l on g  t he l i n es o f  
" W h i l e  B i l l  Jan k l ow h a s been o ff w h ee l i n g a n d  dea l i n g a n d  taxpayers ' expen s e , S o u t h  
Da kota ' s  fa rm economy , h i g hways , a n d  t a x  s t ru c t u re h a ve ba d l y  dete r i o ra ted . Doe s n ' t  
S o u th Da ko t a  need a gove rno r  w ho ' s go i n g to be l oo k i n g a fter these t h i n gs c l o s e - t o ­
home a n d  no t a l ways fl y i n g  o ff t o  s ec ret meet i n gs w i t h  b i g execut i ve s ?  • . .  " 
As men t i o ned be fo re , t he O ' C o n n o r  campa i gn has a to u gh j o b  a head o f  i t .  B u t  i t  i s  by 
no mea n s  a n  i mpos s i b l e  j o b .  The s u rvey s hows t ha t  Jan k l ow i s  c l ea r l y  v u l nera b l e o n  
s everal  key po i. nts . S .i mi' l·y p u t , po u n d i n g  away a t  t he s e  po i n t s , w h i l e  s ho r i n g  u p  
some o f  t h e  O ' Connor campa i gn ' s  wea kn e s s es i s  ba s i ca l l y  wha t  needs t o  b e  done . 
146 
Se lected Bib l iography 
Books 
Agranoff ,  Robert . The Management of Election Campa igns . Boston :  
Ho lbrook Press ,  Inc . , 1 976 . 
----' ed . The � Style  in  El ection Campa igns . 2nd ed . Boston : 
Holbr ook Pres s ,  Inc . , 1 976 .  
At kins , Charles  G . , w ith Hock ,  Barry , and Martin , Bob . Getting 
Elected :  & Guide 1£ W inning Sta te and Loca l Off ic e .  Boston : 
Houghton Miffl in Company , 1 973 . 
Baus , Herbert M. , and Ross ,  Wi l l iam B .  P o l itics  Battle  P lan . New 
York:  The Macmi l l an  Company , 1 968 . 
Bla nkenship , A .  B .  Profess iona l Te lephone Surveys .  New York:  McGraw 
Hill  Book Company , 1 977 . 
Brown , James , and Se ib ,  Phil ip M. The Art of Pol itic s :  E l ectora l 
Strategies and Campa ign J'VBnagement-.-Port Wa shington , N .  Y . : 
A l fred Pub l ishing Company , Inc . ,  1 976 .  
Dil lman ,  Don A .  � 2 Telephone Surveys . New York : John W i l ey & 
Sons , 1 978 . 
Dreyer , Edward c . , and Rosenbaum, Wa lter A . ,  eds . 
2 Electora l Behavior: Es says � Stud ies . 
Wadsworth Publ ishing Company , Inc . ,  1 966 . 
Po l itica l Opinion 
Belmont , Ca l if . : 
Kingdon , John w. Candidates for Off ice : Be l iefs 2 Stra tegies . New 
York :  Random House ,  196·6:--
Lee , Richard w. , ed . Po l itic s and the Pres s .  Wa shington : Acropo l is 
Books , 1970 . 
Napol itan ,  Joseph .  � Election Game and How to W in It . Garden City , 
N .  Y . : Doubl eday & Company , Inc . ,l97� - -- --
Pa rkinson , Hank.  W inn ing � Campa ign . Engl ewood C l if fs , N .  J . : 
Prent ice-Ha ll , Inc . ,  1 970 . 
Parten , Mildred . Surveys , Pol l s ,  and Samples :  Practica l Procedures . 
New York :  Cooper Square Publ ishers ,  Inc . ,  1966 . 
Perry , James M.  The � Pol itic s .  New York:  Clarkson N .  Potter , Inc . , 
1 968 . 
Rol l ,  Cha rles W . , Jr . ,  and Cantril , A lbert H.  Po l l s :  The ir Us e and 
Misuse in Po l it ics . New York : Ba s ic Books , Inc . ,  1 972 .--- ---
147 
Rosenbloom, David Lee .  The Election �· New York:  Quadrangle  Books , 
1 973 . 
Sabato ,  Larry J.  The Ris e of Po l itica l Consultants : � Ways of  � 
ning Elections:- �York: Bas ic Books , Inc . ,  1 981 . 
Schwartzman ,  Edward . Campa ign Cra ftsmanship. New York : Un iverse 
Books , 1973 . 
Shadegg,  Stephen c .  The New How to W in an  Election . New York : 
Tapl inger Publ ishing-c0mpany-,-InG:,-r972. 
Van Riper , Paul  P .  Ha ndbook of Practica l Po l it ic s .  3rd e d .  New York : 
Harper & Row , 1 967 .  
Period ica ls 
Bryant , Barbara E.  " Respondent Se l ection in a T ime of  Cha ng ing House­
hold Compos ition . "  Journa l of Marketing Re search ,  X I I  ( JV\ay 1 975 ) ,  
129- 135 .  
Gla sser , Gera ld G . , and Metzger , Ga l e  D .  "Random Dig it D ia l ing a s  a 
Method of  Te lephone Sampl ing . "  Journa l of Market ing Re search , IX 
(February 1 972 ) ,  59-64 . 
Leuthold , David A . ,  and Schee l e ,  Raymond . " Patterns of  Bia s in Samples 
Ba sed on Te lephone Directories . "  Publ ic Opin ion Quarter ly, XXXV 
( Summer 1 97 1 ) ,  249-257 . 
Rogers , Theresa F .  " Interviews by Te lephone and in Person : Qua l ity of 
Res ponses a nd F ie ld Performance . "  Publ ic Opinion Quarter ly, XL 
( Spring 1 975 ) ,  51-65 .  
Roslow ,  Sydney , and Ros l ow ,  Lawrence .  " Unl isted Phone Subscribers are 
Different . "  Journa l of Adverti s ing Research ,  X II (August 1972 ) , 
35-38 .  
Seige l , Paul  Jay .  "An  Ana lys is of the Fa ctors that Det ermine the Suc­
c es s  of Congre ssiona l Campa igns . "  JV\asters  Abstra cts , XVI ( June 
1979 ) ,  1 1 4 .  
"Where the Pol l s  Went Wrong . "  �' 1 December 1980,  P •  22 . 
Newspaper s 
" It ' s off ic ia l :  E isnach  wins PUC post . "  S ioux Fa l l s  Argus Leader , -
1 7  November 1982 , p .  4B . 
148 
"Poll  shows Da schle l eading Roberts . "  Rapid City Journa l ,  2 0  October 
1982 , P •  8 .  
Letters 
Letter from Northwestern Be ll  Telephone Company, S ioux Fa l l s ,  South 
Dakota , 14 July 1 982 . 
Letter from John Y .  Devereaux , Off ice  of Rep .  Torn Da schl e ,  Wa shington , 
D .C . , 2 Decenilier 1982 . 
The sis 
Cra ft , John M. "A Miss iss ippi Opin ion Poll . "  M.A . thes is , Un ivers ity 
of Mis s iss ipp i ,  1 979 . 
Publ ic Document 
South Ia kota Publ ic Util ities Commiss ion . " State of S outh Dakota 
Numer ica l Order of  Pref ixes Serv ing Cit ies . "  P ierre , 1 979 . 
( Mimeogra phed . ) 
Interview 
Devereaux , John Y .  Office  of Rep .  Tom Da schle , Wa shington , D . C .  
Telephone interview ,  7 Decenilier 1982 . 
